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Abstract 
Despite the ubiquity of the languages of legality and legitimacy in international relations, seldom 
do we address the gaps that can emerge between them. Hard cases involving the legality of the 
use of force seem to fall through the gaps, perhaps demonstrated best by the vague label placed 
on the Kosovo intervention, ‘illegal but legitimate’. These cases are often treated as exceptions to 
the rule or anomalies which demonstrate at best the inadequacy of existing laws to deal with 
conflicts between legal regimes, or at worst the powerlessness of institutions in a system of 
powerful states. This dissertation examines the contestations between states over the use of force 
question in Rwanda, Kosovo, Libya and Iraq, noting that although states offered many of the same 
arguments to support their actions in each case, these claims received very different responses. 
Many point to these inconsistencies and argue the contestations and justifications offered to 
legitimise these actions and decisions are mere rhetoric. They equate this casuistry with sophistry 
and dismiss its value.  
However this dissertation disputes these assumptions, arguing the process of legitimation is more 
complex. It includes not only the role of central actors, but also audience members, some of 
whom attain higher positions of legitimacy as audience reframers. I argue that as central actors 
cast their contestations in terms which emphasise their own absolute legitimacy and legality, it is 
the frames of audience members and audience reframers in particular that blur the lines between 
legality and legitimacy and add this extra layer of complexity to the legitimation process. As these 
actors engage in the process of contestation they may themselves rhetorically entrap or 
rhetorically exclude other actors or their frames, or may be the entrapped or excluded 
themselves. This suggests not only that legality and legitimacy are not synonymous, but also that 
these two forms of language can be used as conjoined or oppositional concepts by states seeking 
to justify their actions to an international audience that exceeds what could be perceived as ‘mere 
rhetoric’. This process is itself a vital aspect of understanding institutional processes in 
international relations.  
The goal of this dissertation is therefore not to trace the emergence or acceptance of new 
normative principles or their interpretations, but rather to trace the nuances of this process of 
legitimation to prove not only its ubiquity in these cases, but also its influence. Realist approaches 
that deny the viability of law and argue that states apply logics of consequence in these 
contestations are capable of explaining an individual actor’s self-interested motivations in isolated 
instances. But understanding the legitimation process offers a more holistic understanding of the 
cases, the actors, their claims and the responses to these. This makes the legitimation process not 
only ubiquitous in these cases, but demonstrates the presence of normative expectations that are 
constitutive of and constituted by state beliefs and behaviour.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Hard Cases and International Law 
The adage “hard cases make for bad law”1 has been frequently invoked by scholars and 
practitioners in relation to international law.2 International law’s highly complex and poorly defined 
principles often conflict with each other, particularly in relation to human rights, the use of force 
and humanitarian law. Consequently, in times of crisis and conflict, some would argue that states 
ostensibly invoke whichever law suits their interests at that point in time. This cynical use of legal 
argument and justification contributes not only to perceptions of international law as inadequate and 
epiphenomenal, but also to the critique of casuistry as an acceptable form of argument.3 As an 
example, such conflicting arguments are often used in relation to the complex question of the use of 
force against a state for humanitarian purposes by ending widespread human rights abuses or 
preventing or ending a mass atrocity crime such as ethnic cleansing or genocide. The most pressing 
problem with understanding the use of force for humanitarian purposes in international relations is 
that when set in the context of traditional legal and international relations theories, these individual 
cases pose an impossible dilemma, whereby the question is not if international law will be breached, 
but which law will be broken.4  
The international community’s failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda in 1994 demonstrates this 
dilemma as the language used by key actors, especially Security Council members, reflected a 
                                                          
1 Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 152 ER 402 per Rolfe J at 408. 
2 Simon Chesterman. “The United Nations and the Law of War: Power and Sensibility in International Law.” Fordham 
International Law Journal 28 (2004): 531. 
3 Martti Koskenniemi, “Miserable Comforters: International Relations as New Natural Law,” European Journal of 
International Relations 15, no. 3 (2009): 399. 
4 Michael Byers and Simon Chesterman, “Changing the Rules about Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention and 
the Future of International Law,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. L. 
Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 177; Simon Chesterman, Just War 
or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 
2001), 1-3; Simon Chesterman, “Legality Versus Legitimacy: Humanitarian Intervention, the Security Council, and the 
Rule of Law,” Security Dialogue 33, no. 3 (2002): 293-4; Thomas M. Franck, “Lessons of Kosovo,” The American 
Journal of International Law 93, no. 4 (1999): 859-860; Bruno Simma, “NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal 
Aspects.” European Journal of International Law 10, no. 1 (1999): 6. 
2 Mind the Gap: Contestations of Legitimacy and Legality in International Politics  |     Vickie Frater 
 
deliberate attempt to avoid using the word genocide, as such a label carried with it legal obligations 
to prevent and punish.5 Although the international community did not have a legal responsibility to 
prevent a civil war, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide6 
does impose certain obligations in relation to genocide. Therefore, the Rwandan case would seem to 
demonstrate at best the inability of states to effectively apply and enforce international human rights 
and humanitarian law, or at worst a deliberate attempt to obfuscate existing law and avoid 
international responsibilities to assist civilians in conflict or crisis; the upshot is fodder for the 
critics of international law. 
Accordingly, such critics point to the contradictions, uncertainties, and unenforceability of 
international law demonstrated by the failure to respond to the Rwandan genocide and similar cases 
of widespread abuse and mass atrocity in Darfur, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Somalia or Syria to lend 
support to their claims that international law is too weak to be real law.7 They argue that 
international law is weak, unenforceable and epiphenomenal because states base those decisions 
solely on upholding their own interests, not the integrity of law itself.8 There appear to be so many 
contradictions among laws, areas of law and state behaviour, enabling states to use the law to make 
almost any argument and lending  credence to these more sceptical views of international law.  
Consequently, contestations over international legal disagreements are often surmised by the adage 
hard cases make for bad law or reversing it so that bad law makes for hard cases. The problem with 
viewing cases through either of these binaries is that they offer no understanding of the process 
behind these decisions. It follows that if legality and legitimacy are contestable concepts, then the 
contestation itself, rather than just the outcome, is a significant process.  
                                                          
5 Luke Glanville, “Is ‘Genocide’ Still a Powerful Word?” Journal of Genocide Research 11, no. 4 (2009): 467-469; 
Linda Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide (New York; London: Zed Books, 
2000), 177-181; Samantha Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” The Atlantic Monthly, September (2001): 84.  
6 United Nations General Assembly, Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 
December 1948, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 78, 277. Herein the Genocide Convention. 
7 Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, “Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational Choice 
Perspective,” The Journal of Legal Studies 31, no. S1 (2002): 119-121; Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The 
Limits of International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 3. 
8 Goldsmith and Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric, 119; Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 225; 
Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 25; Stephen D. 
Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001), 342; John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security 19, no. 3 
(1994): 49-50; Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Twilight of International Morality,” Ethics 58, no. 2 (1948): 98-99; Hans J. 
Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene,” Foreign Affairs 45, no. 3 (1967): 428-9. 
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For example, the labelling of the Kosovo intervention “illegal but legitimate”9 poses a challenge to 
the epistemological and ontological bases of positivist and natural international legal theories, 
which assume that legitimacy and legality follow on from each other, whereby that which is legal is 
legitimate. However the outcomes of the Kosovo intervention and other hard cases including 
Rwanda, Iraq and Libya have led to increased uncertainty regarding the application and 
interpretation of the laws governing the use of force and the legitimacy of human rights norms.  
Theoretical approaches to international relations and international law cannot satisfactorily explain 
this dilemma. They presume that the concepts of legitimacy and legality work in tandem so that 
which is legal is legitimate and vice versa. As such, the academic literature on the concept of 
legitimacy focuses on which laws, norms, rules or institutions are legitimate.10 The problem is that 
legitimacy does not attach itself just to a law, and disobedience does not delegitimise the entire 
legal system or even a single law or norm. Further, some cases may have one characteristic, but not 
the other, demonstrating that legality and legitimacy are not synonymous. Consequently, some 
cases fall into legitimacy gaps where a certain act or omission’s degree of legality is incongruous to 
its legitimacy making it illegal but legitimate or legal but illegitimate. This is particularly striking in 
the findings of the Kosovo Report, which has added to the confusion over the application of laws 
and norms and what constitutes legitimate state behaviour. After all, if we accept the Kosovo 
Report’s claim that NATO’s actions were illegal but legitimate, was the failure to protect 800,000 
Rwandans from genocide in 1994 a legal but illegitimate omission? 
Although even clear cases contain disagreement, Atria argues the disagreements underpinning hard 
cases may be distinguished from clear cases on three grounds.11 The first is a “semantic sense”, 
where “arguments are needed to specify the precise meaning of ambiguous terms in the canonical 
formation of the applicable rule”. Secondly, hard cases may be distinguished by conflicts regarding 
regulation, where “the law does not settle the issue” making argument necessary to fill the gap; and 
finally, in relation to evaluation where “the solution provided by the rule is clear, but what is 
unclear is whether or not the rule should be applied.”12 All three areas of disagreement emerge in 
these hard cases, making legality and legitimacy separate although interrelated parts of these 
contestations. Moreover, other hard cases, such as the role of unrecognised states or governments, 
                                                          
9 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, The Kosovo Report (Oxford: The Humanitarian Law Centre, 
2000), 85. Herein The Kosovo Report 
10 Thomas M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy among Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 3; Louis 
Henkin, How Nations Behave, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 47, 49-50; Robert O. Keohane, 
After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1984), 59, 138. This literature is explored in Chapter two. 
11 Fernando Atria, On Law and Legal Reasoning. (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2001), 75. 
12 Atria, On Law and Legal Reasoning, 75. (Emphasis in original) 
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torture, human rights and terrorism, pose a similar challenge not only to our conception of 
international law and its influence on state behaviour but also to what we consider legitimate orders 
and behaviour. International legal theories have struggled to connect the anarchical nature of the 
sovereign state system with overarching but ultimately unenforceable law. Hard cases have only 
strengthened criticism that international law is uncertain, indeterminate, and unenforceable—a tool 
of mere rhetoric used by states to mask the pursuit of their own interests. Consequently, this 
literature focuses on the issue of hard cases making bad law or bad law making hard cases and 
overlooks the process at play behind these contestations.  
This oversimplifies the complex role legitimacy plays in international law and international 
relations more generally. Legitimacy is a challenging concept to define, as it operates in many ways 
and on many levels. This dissertation begins by rejecting legal sceptics and arguing that hard cases 
are the reason behind having international law, rather than evidence of its failings. Hard cases need 
to be understood as examples of how the separate languages of legality and legitimacy meet, 
sometimes complementing each other or creating conflict and disagreement, or both. What has been 
lacking is an appropriate means to understanding the legitimation process through which the two 
meet. The problem is not international law as an institution or the individual international laws and 
norms at work, but how we approach law in international relations and how we understand not 
merely what is or is not legal or legitimate, but how it comes to be understood as such. 
This dissertation examines the puzzle created by these interactions between legitimacy and legality. 
This introductory chapter discusses the contradictions within and between these two areas of 
scholarship that have painted hard cases as irresolvable and forced research to focus on fixing the 
law. I demonstrate that what is needed is an understanding of how contestation over the, 
interpretation, implementation and application of rules, laws, norms and institutions is a process 
both constituted by and constitutive of international law. This leads to a call for an interdisciplinary 
approach that examines the role of legitimacy, particularly in the fields of humanitarian, human 
rights and use of force law, in order to understand how legitimation processes work within 
international institutions, as opposed to understanding legitimacy merely as a characteristic of valid 
or proper institutions, norms and actors.  
In chapter two, I develop a theoretical framework for understanding legitimacy as a broader concept 
that implies a deeper process of legitimation entrenched in discursive theories. It aims to develop a 
workable understanding of legitimacy not just as a characteristic, labelling something good or 
proper but as part of a deeper process through which claims to legitimacy are made and, in hard 
cases, contested to a determinative audience who decides which arguments to accept and to what 
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degree. Rather than focusing on the determination of legitimacy or illegitimacy, this framework 
focuses on understanding the processes of legitimation that lead to such determinations. This 
determinative audience is a fluid, ever-changing and disparate group, especially in international 
relations and may be domestic or international, comprising of individuals, states, groups or 
organisations. However, by targeting their claims of legitimacy at an audience rather than their 
opposition, states become engaged in a process of contestation rather than a mere power play or 
façade. These processes, in turn, prompt international responses, including decisions, actions and, at 
times, indecision and inaction.   
Understanding this process requires a different approach that situates international law in 
international politics. This dissertation aims to develop an understanding of international law as a 
real but fluid institution based on a discursive process of legal and political contestation.  I argue 
that this process of contesting and determining legitimacy is vital but has been largely 
misunderstood or ignored by traditional theories of international law and international relations, 
because the mere presence of disagreement and contradictory statements is viewed as an indication 
of uncertainty, inefficiency and unenforceability. Sceptics and proponents of international law 
would accept that states use common, even foundational legal principles to justify their positions; 
however, realist scepticism would suggest the apparent selectivity of these arguments and decisions 
points to a system based on interests and power, not normativity. This propagates the view that all 
casuistry is bad and can be equated with sophistry and dishonesty,13 or what some have called “the 
art of quibbling with God.”14 Casuistry is simply “the practical reasoning that considers whether a 
particular act fits within our ethical paradigm and allows each -act and paradigm- to modify the 
other.”15 Thus, I define casuistry simply as a method of analysis that applies “old illustrations to 
new problems.”16 It is a valid and frequently utilised method of reasoning in international relations 
that may be performed well or badly. The question is therefore not to dismiss such examples of 
casuistry outright, but to ascertain which approaches are good (legitimate) or bad (illegitimate).17  
                                                          
13 Conal Condren, Argument and Authority in Early Modern England: The Presupposition of Oaths and Offices (New 
York; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 184-185; Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin, The Abuse of 
Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 11; Wallace I. Matson, 
“Kant as Casuist,” The Journal of Philosophy 51, no. 25 (1954): 855; Richard B. Miller, Casuistry and Modern Ethics.  
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996): 3; .Richard B. Miller, “Humanitarian Intervention, Altruism, and the 
Limits of Casuistry,” Journal of Religious Ethics 28, no. 1 (2000): 3.  
14 Penny Cyclopedia in Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry, 12. 
15 Andrew H. Miller, “Reading Thoughts: Victorian Perfectionism and the Display of Thinking.” [In English]. Studies 
in the Literary Imagination 35, no. 2 (2002): 79-98, 79. 
16 Kirk in Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry, 46. 
17 Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry, 15. 
6 Mind the Gap: Contestations of Legitimacy and Legality in International Politics  |     Vickie Frater 
 
This dissertation therefore seeks to understand the workings of these contestations as part of a 
process of legitimation. Chapters three, four, five and six will identify a common process of 
contestation and legitimation in the contexts of the Rwandan, Kosovar, Iraqi and Libyan situation 
by applying the framework of legitimation developed in the second chapter.  Having established a 
shared process of legitimation in each case despite the variance in contexts and outcomes, it then 
seeks to establish which frames are widely accepted across the cases, and why some argumentative 
frames were accepted in some contexts, but not others. It therefore seeks to not only identify this 
process of legitimation, but to also understand how legitimation outcomes can vary from case to 
case.  
1.2 Legitimate Law 
Henkin rejects claims that international law is powerless, observing, “[i]t is probably the case that 
almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time.”18 Although realists would argue that such behaviour is the result 
of states calculating their interests and performing a rhetorical act of justification,19 this 
performance demonstrates states want to be seen to obey the law, even if only for rhetorical 
purpose.20 Why do states make these performances?21 Why do they use the languages of legitimacy 
and legality to justify their actions and decisions if they do not have to?  
Legal argument is a form of rhetoric based in casuistry. Many basic definitions use the term 
‘casuistry’ pejoratively, equating it with ‘sophistry’ so that the use of casuistic argument is assumed 
to be an illegitimate use of language and argument.22 However if we accept a non-pejorative 
definition of casuistry and understand it simply as a process of reasoning applied to hard cases that 
applies old principles to new situations in a manner that may shift our understanding of the situation 
or the principles applied, we change the way we look at legal argument. We stop asking what the 
‘right’ argument is and start looking for these shifts. 
 The contestations examined in these cases contain numerous versions of this act of reasoning, 
leading to contestation. Therefore in order to understand the role of these contestations, this analysis 
                                                          
18 Henkin, How Nations Behave, 47. Emphasis in original. 
19 Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 199. Frank Schimmelfennig, “The Community Trap: Liberal 
Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union,” International Organization 55, no. 01 
(2001): 48. 
20 Katharina Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement: The Politics of International Legitimacy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 23-24; Dino Kritsiotis, “When States Use Armed Force,” in The 
Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-Smit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 59. 
21 Koskenniemi, Miserable Comforters, 410. 
22 Condren, Argument and Authority, 184-185; Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry, 11. 
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will distinguish good or legitimate casuistic argument from “misuse, or abuse.”23 It will trace the 
claims of the central contesters, who contest their positions in terms of absolute legitimacy and 
legality while discrediting their opposition and the means by which these contestations may be 
accepted, rejected or reframed by an audience.  
Realist critics would argue that this widespread use of international law is not indicative of the 
acceptance of international norms and laws because law is used as a rhetorical tool or “cheap talk” 
to pursue their interests.24 They point to cases such as US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright’s 
advice to then British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook that his government “get new lawyers” when 
he informed her that the United Kingdom was reluctant to intervene with force in Kosovo without 
Security Council approval.25 Similar allegations have been made in relation to British lawyers’ 
advice on the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq, where legal advice provided by the attorney general 
was both late and seemingly made to fit the case the government wanted to justify the war.26  
However, as the discussion in the next chapter will show, these uses of casuistry and rhetoric are 
not linguistic masks used to hide true intentions or to manipulate other actors. A broader audience 
receives these claims and determines their validity, making it possible to distinguish between good, 
effective and legitimate uses of casuistry and bad, ineffective and illegitimate ones. Consequently, 
whilst the law may be used in a variety of ways to legitimise a state’s behaviour, this talk is not 
cheap. It cannot be assumed all casuistry is bad, as it is a necessary part of argument in general, and 
legal argument in particular. States can still be held accountable for this talk, and sometimes, as the 
cases will show, states make claims at a cost. Not all talk is cheap because these contestations lead 
to decisions that must themselves be legitimised. The problem is not removing casuistry from these 
contestations, but rather understanding the process of legitimation that underpins them. As a result, 
understanding the process behind these contestations for legitimacy is not merely an exercise in 
researching the laws, norms, rules and institutions, as it also needs to incorporate the actors, actions 
and ideas that support them. 
Therefore the fact that states may utilise bad casuistry to lie to or mislead other states while 
breaking international law does not imply that law does not exist or influence state behaviour. For 
                                                          
23 Jonsen and Toulmin, The Abuse of Casuistry, 15-16. (Emphasis in original) 
24 Jack L. Goldsmith, “Review: Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law,” Stanford Law 
Review 52, no. 4 (2000): 978; Goldsmith and Posner, “Moral and Legal Rhetoric,” S124. 
25 Charles Sampford, “Get New Lawyers,” Legal Ethics 6 (2003): 85. 
26 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Chilcott Inquiry: Lawyers expose pressure to give green light for way,” The Guardian, 
January 27, 2010, accessed October 14, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/jan/26/chilcot-inquiry-iraq-
invasion-lawyers. 
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example, Weber argues thieves behave surreptitiously because they fear punishment which points to 
the presence of a legal order.27 Although Weber specifically acknowledges that international law 
does not fit his definition of a legal system, this aspect of his argument can be applied 
internationally as states interact using legal and legitimacy language, reflecting not only a valid 
order, but also a desire to be a part of that order, even when breaching its rules. Extending this to 
the international level, if rule-breakers legitimise their behaviour by referring to principles of 
international law, they are not denying the validity of the system of laws, or the particular law they 
draw upon as they do not deny the legitimacy of an international legal order. States accused of 
breaching international law deny that their acts constitute a crime, claiming that they are fighting 
terrorists, secessionists, rebels or criminals but they do not deny the heinous and illegal nature of 
mass atrocity crimes or aggression.28  
For example, in the Rwandan case, the interim government framed the violence as “civil war” based 
in ethnic divisions, not genocide. In the cases of Kosovo and Libya, the regimes of Milošević and 
Qaddafi, respectively, justified their actions as fights against separatists and terrorists. Similarly, the 
US and its allies developed a legalistic justification for the 2003 invasion on Iraq, based on a 
combination of arguments, including human rights protection and the revival of past Security 
Council Resolutions. To add further complexity, states that opposed the use of force for 
humanitarian purposes in these cases have utilised these justifications for interference elsewhere- 
for example, Russia’s justifications for interventions in Ukraine and Georgia.29 In each case, all the 
actors framed their positions in the context of international law. However, although states seek to 
justify their actions or omissions in what are complex and ostensibly contradictory ways, they do 
not and cannot simply use any argument or dismiss any law. Rather, they consistently use the 
languages of legality and legitimacy to frame their claims. The goal of this dissertation is to 
understand why these language frames work in some cases, but not in others, resulting in the 
disparate outcomes across cases and the formation of legitimacy gaps.  
 
 
                                                          
27 Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology trans. Ephraim Fischoff, Hans Gerth, A. M 
Henderson, Ferdinand Kolegar, C Wright Mills, Talcott Parsons, Max Rheinstein, et al., ed. Guenther Roth and Claus 
Wittich (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), 31.  
28 Alex J. Bellamy, Massacres and Morality: Mass Atrocities in an Age of Civilian Immunity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 31-35. 
29 Roy Allison, “Russia Resurgent? Moscow’s Campaign to ‘Coerce Georgia to Peace’,” International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 84, no. 6 (2008): 1145-1146; Xymena Kurowska, “Multipolarity as Resistance 
to Liberal Norms: Russia’s Position on Responsibility to Protect,” Conflict, Security & Development 14, no. 4 (2014): 
489-490. 
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1.3 Legitimacy Gaps 
  
International law influences state behaviour and is reflected in the language and rhetoric used by 
states to justify their positions. However, when the law seems inadequate or conflicts emerge 
between principles of law, such as those in the cases examined in this dissertation, states turn to the 
language of legitimacy to justify their actions. This language is important, as it is verbalised to and 
then recognised by an international community of adjudicators and interpreters.30 However, 
understanding how and why some cases fall into legitimacy gaps requires more than legalistic 
analysis of the right norms or their correct interpretations.  
 
The dilemma of understanding legitimacy in set or static terms is perhaps best demonstrated by the 
ambiguities in the contestations over Kosovo. After the Kosovo intervention, the Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo released the Kosovo Report, concluding “that the NATO 
campaign was illegal, yet legitimate.”31 The Commission grounded this ambiguous conclusion in 
“the controversial idea that a ‘right’ of humanitarian intervention is not consistent with the UN 
Charter if conceived in a legal text, but that it may, depending on the context, nevertheless, reflect 
the spirit of the Charter as it relates to the overall protection of people against gross abuse.”32 
 
In making this judgment, the Kosovo Commission pointed to what it called a gap in international 
law. The Report argued that although this gap eroded the prohibition on the use of force, failing to 
act would have risked another Bosnia or Rwanda and “would have also weakened the United 
Nations, probably to a greater degree.”33 Consequently, in compensating for the shortcomings of 
law, the Kosovo Commission turned to the language of legitimacy. The problem is thus, if we 
accept Kosovo was illegal but legitimate, was the failure to act in Rwanda a legal but illegitimate 
omission? Furthermore, how do we deal with the legitimising language and legal rhetoric 
surrounding other dilemmas in international law, such as unrecognised entities, the use of torture, 
civilian protection, human rights and terrorism? Following the logic of the Kosovo Report, if we 
chart these issues by their perceived legality and legitimacy, the legitimacy gap can be plotted on a 
matrix.  
 
                                                          
30 Ian Johnstone, “The Power of Interpretive Communities,” in Power in Global Governance, ed. Michael Barnett and 
Raymond Duvall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 186-187. 
31 IICK, The Kosovo Report, 185. 
32 IICK, The Kosovo Report, 185. 
33 IICK, The Kosovo Report, 186. 
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Cases deemed illegal but legitimate (Kosovo) and legal but illegitimate (Rwanda) fall into 
legitimacy gaps. A legitimacy gap occurs when the legality and legitimacy of an action are 
incongruous, that is, the act is deemed illegal but legitimate or legal but illegitimate. These cases are 
also hard cases where the consequences of applying the existing legal principles, either way, seem 
unfair or unjust. As a result, the parties involved justified their respective positions and actions 
using a combination of legal and legitimacy languages. In the Kosovar and Rwandan cases, the 
governments responsible for violations of humanitarian and human rights norms attempted to frame 
their conflicts as secessionist terrorism and ethnically based civil war. Since the stakes in these hard 
cases were high, whereby they involved high principles and norms of international relations (chiefly 
human rights and sovereignty in the cases examined here), none of the parties involved in the actual 
violence or conflicts were willing to shift their position. Consequently, determining which claims 
were legitimate became a task for the audience, not the contending states.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The Legitimacy Matrix. 
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Legitimacy is a status attributed by an other or group of others constituting an audience that an act, 
actor or thing is good or proper.34 Their legality is determined through the application of legal 
criteria or standards. These criteria or standards may be based on valid, enacted law -positive law- 
or innate human understandings of what is moral and just- natural law. These approaches will be 
analysed in further detail in chapter two. States justify their behaviour by drawing on language from 
both law and legitimacy. When the legality of an act is difficult to determine, and involves 
contending claims where strict application of either approach seems unjust or unfair, such as in hard 
cases, states will make legal and legitimacy claims, often emphasising the latter. The audience then 
determines the validity of these claims, often in seemingly contradictory terms. The problem is that 
international legal theories ignore the political processes behind these contestations and 
determinations. Similarly, some political theorists deny that law influences state behaviour, at most, 
relegating that influence to the lowest level as a coincidence of state interests converging toward 
cooperation. Others see these contestations as developments of “new” laws and norms to fill gaps 
states perceive in the international legal system.35  
Although many actors may make claims to their legitimacy or the legitimacy of their acts and their 
interpretation and application of international law, it is a characteristic attributed to an actor or 
action deemed to be legitimate by another actor. It “involves being recognised as good, proper or 
commendable by a group of others.”36 Legitimation, on the other hand, is the process through which 
actors claim legitimacy for themselves and their actions to an audience.37 That audience then 
determines the validity of those claims, in part, in full or not at all. This framework will be further 
developed in chapter two.  
Legitimacy gaps occur when a hard case is legitimised in a way that is incongruent to its frame of 
legality. However although legitimacy gaps are puzzling, they are not the problem. The problem is 
that we do not have any way to properly understand how these gaps emerge. Conflicts between 
                                                          
34 Audiences in these cases are usually made up of other states. Claims are not always made in a formal setting although 
formal settings often keep the best records of these claims and determinations and, as such, United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) debates are one of the main sources for this research. Ian Johnstone, “The Power of Interpretive 
Communities,” 186-187. (The question of audience will be discussed in detail chapter two). 
35 Byers and Chesterman, “Changing the Rules About Rules?” 178-179; Robert O. Keohane, “Political Authority after 
Intervention: Gradations in Sovereignty,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. 
L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 276-277; Jane Stromseth, 
“Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, 
Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), 271-272. 
36 Coleman, International Organisations and Peace Enforcement, 22. 
37 Rodney Barker, Legitimating Identities: The Self-Preservations of Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 7. 
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legal principles, such as sovereignty and human rights, mean that different states emphasise 
different laws and many interpret them in their own ways, contributing to uncertainty and 
indeterminability. Despite these conflicts, it is apparent that there has been a saturation of legal 
instruments, particularly since the establishment of the United Nations, which has been 
accompanied by an increased use of legal language, or at least legal rhetoric in international 
relations. States constantly justify the legitimacy of their actions in legal language and, in doing so, 
create contestations over the legitimacy of opposing actors and actions. 
Existing legal and international relations theories contribute to confusion over legitimacy gaps, as 
most assume that legality and legitimacy apply in tandem, thereby offering no means of finding new 
understandings when hard cases cannot be shoehorned into existing assumptions. Consequently, 
these approaches do not have the capacity to properly understand these hard cases.  
International law attempts to unite “anarchical” sovereigns under a single “order” based on 
philosophical principles or social generalisation.38 However, international law often seems to be a 
fickle thing in which states can play any combination of roles such as law-breaker, enforcer, 
interpreter or law-maker. Consequently, international law is dismissed as irrelevant or 
unenforceable by realists.39 Consequently, realists view international law as an epiphenomenon that 
sometimes coincides with state interests but does not itself determine state behaviour. Neo-liberal 
theorists argue it is a means of cooperation amongst rational states.40 According to these rationalist 
approaches, international law is a tool of cooperation, reciprocated by states through institutions and 
regimes to ensure the stability of international order. For neo-liberals, international law is a tool to 
be used by states to pursue cooperative and shared interests, as opposed to realists, who focus on 
strategic interests and power.41 These are inadequate approaches as they focus on states’ impact on 
the law and provide no avenue for understanding how law shapes state behaviour. Both assume that 
law is obeyed, disobeyed or ignored in accordance with rationalised understandings of state 
interests. These rationalist claims are compounded by the nature of the international legal system. 
International law has no police force to enforce its principles and its courts are restricted to narrow 
                                                          
38 Martti Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 179-352; Martti Koskenniemi and P. Leino, “Fragmentation of International Law? 
Postmodern Anxieties,” Leiden Journal of International Law 15, no. 3 (2002), 556. 
39 Krasner, Organized Hypocrisy, 25; Krasner, Problematic Sovereignty, 342; Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of 
Institutions,” 49-50; Hans J. Morgenthau, “Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law,” The American Journal of 
International Law 34, no. 2 (1940): 260-261; Morgenthau, “The Twilight of International Morality,” 98-99. 
40 Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 6th ed. (New York: 
Pearson Longman, 2007), 4. 
41 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1984), 59, 138. 
13 Mind the Gap: Contestations of Legitimacy and Legality in International Politics  |     Vickie Frater 
 
roles, with restricted or even unclear rules of jurisdiction. The law itself is therefore manipulated by 
and often created in favour of the most powerful states. International law is powerless and 
unenforceable, and thus certainly not “real law.”42 These views on international law led to its 
polarisation from international relations and what Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood call “the l-word 
taboo.”43 This in turn led to the absence or avoidance of international law by international relations 
academics and decision-makers.  
However, there is considerable evidence of both the presence and success of international law. 
International legal instruments have gained in number and prominence in international relations, 
particularly since the establishment of the United Nations.44 Furthermore, states obey these laws far 
more frequently than they break them.45 Thus, while it may be the case that individual laws are 
created and manipulated by the most powerful states, perhaps even to maintain their positions of 
power, those states are still bound by their own creations.  
This has resulted in increased attempts at interdisciplinary studies that cross the chasm between 
international law and international relations in an attempt to explain the increased development of 
and reliance on what would seem to be unenforceable and powerless laws.46 These approaches have 
succeeded in developing new ways of making sense of the role of laws, rules and norms in 
international relations by explaining how rules emerge and develop in international relations. This is 
especially clear in relation to the use of force for humanitarian purposes, where constructivist 
analyses of how norms have developed and changed, have led to the acceptance of the international 
community’s role in what were previously viewed as internal matters.47 However, where other 
constructivist approaches trace the decision-making processes in these cases to identify patterns 
                                                          
42 Goldsmith and Posner, The Limits of International Law, 3. 
43 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stephan Wood, “International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,” The American Journal of International Law 92, no. 3 
(1998): 367. 
44 The United Nations Treaty Collection is a database containing the entirety of the United Nations Treaty Series 
(UNTS) (14 December 1946 - January 2005), League of Nations Treaty Series (LNTS) (5 July 1920 - 3 October 1944) 
and the status of multilateral treaties deposited with the Secretary General (MTDSG updated daily). The UNTS contains 
more than 158,000 treaties and actions presented in 2200 volumes. The LNTS contains 205 volumes (can you put a 
number of treaties here, to allow for that comparison?) of instruments created during its existence. The UNTS, while 
representing a larger timeframe, comprises of significantly greater number treaties, reflecting this explosion in treaty 
negotiations and ratification since the organisation’s establishment in 1945. The MTDSG contains a further 517 major 
international treaties currently at varied stages of negotiation, ratification and accession. United Nations Treaty 
Collection. The United Nations Treaty Collection, accessed March 16, 2010, 
http://untreaty.un.org/English/overview.asp. 
45 Henkin, How Nations Behave, 47. 
46 Michael Byers, ed., The Role of International Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and 
International Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 3-4; Slaughter, Tulumello and Wood, International Law 
and International Relations Theory, 367. 
47 Martha Finnemore, “Constructing Norms in Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms 
and Identity in World Politics. ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 153-185. 
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normative change or continuity, this analysis focuses more on the individual contestations within 
the context of each case in order to understand the process of legitimation, the forms contestations 
take and which of these forms, if any are successful. I develop a theoretical framework by focussing 
on the process of legitimation rather than the characteristic of legitimacy. This framework focus on 
how states contest the use of force using frames that draw on the languages of legitimacy and 
legality, leading to the creation of normative expectation that may exclude actors or frames that do 
not meet these expectations, or entrap actors who, having accepted certain frames and expectations 
must fulfil them.  
1.4 Legitimacy and Legitimation 
This dissertation will argue that, as legitimacy gaps do not occur because there are holes in the law, 
understanding the ramifications of hard cases requires an understanding of the process of 
legitimation, not simply the characteristic or designation of legitimacy. As international society has 
developed more rules, norms and laws on state behaviour, they have increasingly come into conflict 
with each other. This, however, does not mean that one law is less legitimate than another, but 
rather that states use a process to contest their positions. Legitimacy gaps are problematic not 
because we do not have the legal rules to address non-compliance in these cases, but because the 
theoretical approaches to international law and international relations do not provide us with 
adequate means of understanding legal contestation and the uses of legal and legitimacy language in 
international relations. The focus of this research will be on understanding how these claims were 
made and received in these cases, as opposed to what claims are made, in order to establish why 
some states make successful claims to legitimacy and legality, while others fail completely or in 
part. Critics of law point to the varying outcomes in such cases to argue international law is 
powerless and a mere tool of powerful states. In order to prove the influence of the international 
system, this research will seek new explanations for these variances by placing them within a 
process of contestation. .  
Chapter two lays out the legitimation framework. It adopts a combination of communicative 
approaches incorporating consensus-based communication48 as well as argument, rhetorical action 
and bargaining,49 to build an understanding of the uses of legitimacy and legal language in a 
                                                          
48 Thomas Risse, “Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics,” International Organization 54, no. 1 (2000): 
9. 
49 Jon Elster, “Arguing and Bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblee Constituante,” in Rationality and 
Institutions: Essays in Honour of Knut Midgaard on the Occasion of His 60th Birthday, ed. Raino Malnes and Arild 
Underdal (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992), 13-50; Ronald R. Krebs and Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, “Twisting Tongues 
and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric,” European Journal of International Relations 13, no. 1 (March 1, 
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legitimation process as opposed to the legitimation of institutions. Not only do states use these 
languages to dispute their opposing frames, they make these claims to an audience that may be 
receptive or determinative of these claims. In the case of the Security Council, members must not 
only receive and determine these frames, but also position their own claim in order to justify their 
own decisions as members of the United Nations’ primary security organ. That is, it is this 
international audience that designates legitimacy to a particular claim, not the states presenting 
them. This makes legitimising behaviour distinguishable from speech-acts such as promising or 
threatening. When a state proffers a promise to help another state, it both speaks of and performs 
the act of promising at the same time. Legitimation is not the same kind of act. A speaker does not 
complete the act of legitimising by claiming legitimacy, but rather performs an act of contestation, 
so that others may legitimise his/her position. Consequently, any inquiry into legitimacy needs to 
look not only at the justifications provided by contending states, but how they are received by this 
determinative audience. Therefore, as Walzer claims, we can expect both sides in such a 
contestation to make competing and adversarial claims although both sides cannot be just.50  
Hence, states make justificatory claims to a range of audiences, including their domestic audience, 
the international community of states and organisations, the opposition or even the domestic 
audience of the opposition. These claims may also change, depending on the audience. For 
example, the justifications the US government provided to the international community for the use 
of force in Kosovo differed from those offered to the domestic audience. When explaining the US’ 
involvement in Kosovo to the international community, the President emphasised an international 
obligation to respond to mass atrocities and ethnic cleansing, however, while addressing the 
domestic constituency, stressed US interests in maintaining regional stability in Europe, particularly 
the Balkans.51 The nature of the audience to which the claim is being made will affect not only the 
form of the claim but also how the audience determines its validity. This does not mean that all 
audience members would agree, but rather as adjudicators and purveyors of legitimacy, they would 
reframe and therefore recast the terms of the contestation in order to justify their own actions. 
Consequently, the arguments put forth by actors are not always successful. Thus, it would be a 
mistake to assume that a state’s claim to legitimacy constitutes legitimation. 
This framework will incorporate legitimacy and the process of legitimation that underlies it not by 
examining the truth of the actors’ justifications, or even their belief in their own claims, but by 
                                                          
2007): 39-41; Schimmelfennig, Frank. “Competition and Community: Constitutional Courts, Rhetorical Action, and the 
Institutionalization of Human Rights in the European Union.” Journal of European Public Policy 13, no. 8 (2006): 
1250-1251. 
50 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3rd ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000, 1977), 31. 
51 Miller, “Humanitarian Intervention,” 18-19. 
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exploring the way in which contestations for legitimacy work and how they were accepted, rejected 
or reframed by their respective audiences. It will incorporate theories of communication that include 
not just argumentation and legitimation, but also an understanding of casuistic approaches and 
rhetoric in order to understand whether or not legitimacy gaps are the result, as critics of 
international law claim, of powerful states trampling powerless laws, or whether a more complex 
process is at play. It claims that there is a more complex process of communication and language 
formation behind these often conflicting and contradictory justifications of prima facie (il)legal 
and/or (il)legitimate behaviour. However before developing this framework, I will first examine the 
gaps between legality and legitimacy themselves and how the inadequacies of international legal 
and international relations theories have failed to properly address each other, leading to a situation 
where neither international lawyers nor international relations scholars are able to fully account for 
both. 
The problem is that, whilst states usually obey the law and are using legal language more, this 
language does not clarify the law and it remains frequently ineffective, uncertain, conflictual and 
unenforceable. It is difficult to distinguish legal justifications from rhetoric.52 It can be argued that, 
instead of increasing the certainty of the law, the rising prevalence of legalistic language has made 
it more difficult to assess legitimacy contestations. Instead of becoming more certain and 
determinable, it appears to be becoming more fluid, pluralistic and flexible.53 However, states do 
make these judgments and, as such, this deeper process of contestation and perception needs to be 
understood. 
This dissertation examines the four cases from the legitimacy matrix, Rwanda 1994, Kosovo 1999, 
Iraq 2003 and Libya 2011, as each involved legal and legitimacy contestations over the use of force 
for humanitarian purposes. It examines the verbalised justifications of actors contesting the 
legitimacy and legality of their conflicting actions and ideas and issues of legitimation, legitimacy, 
argumentation, contestation, rhetoric, audience and reception or determination. It will also 
distinguish this research from the multitude of studies into the role of legitimacy in international 
relations by exploring the numerous approaches to understanding legitimacy in international politics 
and building a framework that understands legitimacy as a process of international relations and 
law, rather than as only a characteristic of legitimate norms, laws, actors or actions. The final 
sections of this chapter will lay out the method and structure of this research. 
                                                          
52 Kritsiotis, “When States Use Armed Force,” 78; Christian Reus-Smit, ed., The Politics of International Law 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 44. 
53 David Kennedy, “Theses about International Legal Discourse,” German Yearbook of International Law 23 (1980): 
355-356; David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 272-275. 
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1.5 Method  
 
This research is based on a framework of analysis consisting of claims of legitimacy and legality. 
Numerous legal and political issues fit within the matrix that emerges from the conflict between 
them, such as territorial and regime change conflicts, humanitarian crises, human rights violations, 
state recognition and government legitimacy. This creates a sample that could potentially involve 
countless cases across several areas of law. As such, this dissertation will focus on areas where 
contestations of legitimation are most prominent, namely cases involving human rights, 
humanitarianism and use of force law. I have selected four cases to form a fuzzy-set. Fuzzy-sets 
break away from crisp-set techniques for choosing cases. The cases in the set do not have the exact 
same membership scores. Rather, they reflect, to varying degrees, several crisply-defined property- 
space locations.54 In this case, those locations are the legal prisms of human rights, humanitarian 
and use of force law and each quadrant of the legitimacy matrix.55 They share several characteristics 
across these areas of law and have varying levels of legitimacy and legality; however, they are not 
equal in the presence of these characteristics.56 The four cases examined here represent a small 
selection of instances where the question of intervening force without the target state’s consent for 
purportedly humanitarian purposes has arisen. These four cases fill not only the four quadrants of 
the legitimacy matrix with their varying degrees of legitimacy and legality, but they also involve 
common actors and draw upon common norms and laws that have emerged over the last quarter of 
a century.   
 
These cases all involve Western states, in particular the US and the UK, as key actors. Interventions 
by Russia in Ukraine or Georgia would also be valid examples, however in order to maintain some 
connections between cases, I chose cases where western interveners played a significant if not 
central role in the situation. This maintains some degree of similarity in relation to the actors 
making these claims to legitimation so that variances in normative interpretation or application 
could be compared.  
 
Each case has also taken place in the last twenty-five years. This temporal element is important to 
case selection because the post-cold war period marked the increasing acceptance of using force for 
humanitarian purposes. Beginning with the widespread cry of “never again” following the Rwandan 
                                                          
54 Charles C. Ragin, Fuzzy-Set Social Science (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 188. 
55 Figure 1.1 page 10. 
56 Audie Klotz, “Case Selection,” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, ed. Audie Klotz 
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genocide, there is increasing acceptance of the principle that intervening force for humanitarian 
purposes may be used in certain contexts. The precise nature of that context remains, as these cases 
will demonstrate, contested, but each case takes place within a timeframe where the possibility of 
using humanitarian intervention was being normatively accepted. The temporal nature of these 
cases, however, is not intended to highlight the development of a clear norm of intervention over 
time. It is difficult to argue that a clear normative framework exists, even with the emergence of the 
RtoP, when variance continues across cases such as Libya and Syria. These frameworks are 
however the subject of contestation and as such, the individual cases will not establish the 
progressive acceptance of a norm of humanitarian intervention, but rather will demonstrate how 
certain contestations, when applied within a particular context may be accepted, but rejected when 
the contextual frame shifts in another case.  
   
The dissertation uses in-depth process-tracing in each of these four cases. According to Checkel, 
“process-tracing means to trace the operation of the causal mechanism(s) at work in a given 
situation. One carefully maps the process, exploring the extent to which it coincides with prior, 
theoretically derived expectations about the workings of the mechanism.”57 This dissertation maps 
the process adopted by claimants and decision-makers, by examining the justifications presented in 
public debates and how they were received by the international community. It draws upon primary 
sources, such as official government statements and media releases, debates and records of various 
law making and decision-making bodies including the United Nations and international 
organisations; confirming secondary resources such as newspaper articles and memoirs; and 
scholarly journal articles and books.  
 
It also specifically uses content analysis of United Nations Security Council debates.  Content 
analysis aims to “take a verbal, nonquantitative document and transform it into quantitative data.”58 
This involved searching 111 Security Council meeting records across all four cases for statements 
framing key arguments over the course of each crisis and coding them as claims of legitimacy, 
illegitimacy, legality and/or illegality. Although broader arguments outside the Council are also 
examined, the running record of verbatim meeting documents provides the opportunity to examine a 
large yet exhaustible body of documents for the identification of recurring or common 
contestations. In this way, individual claims can be coded in relation to both legality and legitimacy.  
 
                                                          
57 Jeffrey Checkel, “Process Tracing,” in Qualitative Methods in International Relations: A Pluralist Guide, ed. Audie 
Klotz and Deepa Prakash (Basingstoke: Palgrave and Macmillan, 2008), 114-27, 116. 
58 Kenneth D. Bailey, Methods of Social Research (New York: Free Press, 1994), 304. 
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Each case has also been divided into three timeframes: pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict. 
While the length of these time periods varies among cases, it is still possible to see how key 
arguments move through these crucial phases of conflict. By quantifying the contestations of key 
arguments over these time periods, it will be possible to see which contestations were widely 
accepted, reframed or rejected and how accepted frames influenced decisions in later phases.  
 
These arguments are divided in three clusters: actor, narrative and normative contestations. While 
some arguments do vary from case to case, these overarching themes remain constant across all 
cases and are therefore the main classifications for examining the contestations. The first 
contestation cluster identified pertains to the legitimacy of actors and contains two main levels of 
contestation. The first group of arguments surround the legitimacy of the central actors and are 
made by and with regard to those actors directly in involved in the conflict. This central actor 
legitimation contestation involves the legitimation or delegitimation of key actors, such as the 
states, their individual governments or leaders, non-state belligerents or an intervening state or 
organisation. The second element of this contestation pertains to the legitimacy of “key audience 
reframers”—members of the international community who have significant involvement in a 
situation, but are not directly involved in the conflict. They may be legitimised by international 
bodies such as the Security Council or they may have their own sources of legitimacy. These key 
audience reframers have the capacity to reframe the central contestation for the broader audience. 
Consequently, if legitimised as such a reframer, an actor may wield significant power by recasting 
aspects of the narrative and influencing the audiences’ decision. Examples may include individual 
actors, such as the Secretary General, UN Permanent Missions and their leaders, or institutions, 
such as regional organisations, or United Nations bodies or organs such as the Security Council. 
 
Arguments that might prove an actor’s legitimacy may be verbalised as praise for certain decisions 
or actions, such as participation in negotiation or diplomatic processes. Illegitimacy may, 
conversely, be demonstrated by condemnations for a failure to participate or act in good faith. A 
claim pertaining to an actor’s legitimacy might recognise its role as a good decision-maker, whereas 
a contestation over actor legality would be based on the legal standing of actors or states, such as 
the recognition of a government or leader as the legal and legitimate representative. The actor 
contestation provides a foundation for the following clusters of contestation, as those who are 
legitimised have increased power to frame the narrative and normative contestations.   
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Narrative contestations pertain to the nature of the situations within these states. As noted by Klotz, 
“Narratives highlight the agency of particular individuals or groups by telling a story with a plot and 
main characters.”59 They include contestations over the nature or prevalence of violence, conflict 
and human rights abuses, the framing of that violence as civil war, ethnic conflict, ethnic cleansing 
or genocide, as well as the actions and decisions of actors. Accepted narratives establish a context 
for establishing legal facts.  Such facts are important because “just as every other legal order, 
international law attaches to certain facts certain consequences.”60 When audiences accept a legal 
fact the situation is cast in terms which imply a legal effect. Examples include a narrative of 
widespread violence directed at civilians which may constitute a legally defined crime, such as 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, or mass killing. Therefore, the acceptance of certain narratives is vital to 
the finding of legal facts, such as that certain actions were in breach of humanitarian and human 
rights law, or that the situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security.  
 
Moreover narrative contestations are dependent upon and often overlap with actor contestations, as 
they inform each other. The actions and decisions of a particular actor may be framed in a particular 
way that further legitimises or delegitimises them. Actors who are viewed as legitimate may have 
the capacity to frame such narratives, where delegitimised actors will be marginalised and ignored.  
 
Finally, the third cluster reflects normative contestations. These include contestations regarding the 
legitimate and legal relevance, interpretation and application of international laws and norms. When 
applied to the context of a hard cases, they may involve sematic, regulative or evaluative 
contestations.61 Thus, these contestations tend to reflect broader claims, such as normative positions 
on the use of force in international relations for humanitarian purposes without the permission of 
the target state or, in some cases, the ability of the Security Council to address such issues. A key 
area of analysis for these contestations will be establishing if states dispute the existence of a norm, 
the interpretation of is meaning or the application of these to the facts. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
59 Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International Relations (Armonk: M.E. 
Sharpe, Inc., 2007), 45. 
60 Hans Kelsen, “Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations,” The American Journal of International 
Law. 35 (1941): 605-17, 606.  
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1.6 Cases and Chapter Outline 
 
The goal of this dissertation is to create a framework whereby legal language and legitimacy 
language can be understood in relation to each other. Chapter two lays the foundations for the 
communicative framework for the legitimation process, outlining a means of understanding these 
contestations and the role of rhetoric in the process using a combination of discursive and 
institutionalist theories. It rejects the view which assumes that the use of casuistic reasoning in 
contestations over the legality and legitimacy of actors, their narratives, their decisions or their 
actions in international politics can be equated with sophistry. Whilst certainly norms and 
established principles of law may be poorly applied or actors may deliberately intend to deceive or 
mislead, understanding the legitimation process requires an understanding of how international 
audiences sort through these claims during a legitimation process, which ultimately establishes 
understandings of legality and legitimacy which inform audience members’ positions and decisions. 
Rather than assuming that the application of casuistic reasoning processes to international legal 
problems is a misuse of language and reasoning, it assumes that such reasoning processes are to be 
expected in hard cases where the interpretation, application or implementation of a law or norm is 
unclear in relation to a new situation. Consequently, it agrees with Koskenniemi’s observation that 
“the turn away from general principles and formal rules into contextually determined equity may 
reflect a similar turn in the development of international legal thought and practice,” and his 
conclusion that “there is every reason to take this turn seriously.”62 Therefore it focuses on the 
process of legitimation in order to understand how contestation leads to the acceptance, rejection or 
reframing of individual claims across four use of force cases which, despite similarities in the issues 
addressed and arguments made, resulted in four different outcomes.  
 
Chapters three, four, five and six apply this framework to each individual case. Chapter two begins 
with the Rwandan case, which occupies the legal but illegitimate quadrant of the legitimacy matrix. 
The failures in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda in the early 1990s marked a shift in the international 
community’s approach to humanitarian intervention. Where even intervening states had avoided 
using humanitarian justifications for intervention in the past,63 the emergence of the catch-phrase 
“never again” indicated a shift where the international community needed not only to respond to 
such situations, but needed to intervene. This catch cry became a starting point for the development 
                                                          
62 Martti Koskenniemi, “The Politics of International Law.” European Journal of International Law, no. 1 (1990): 4-32, 
32. 
63 Finnemore, “Constructing Norms in Humanitarian Intervention,” 154-155. 
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of the responsibility to protect in 2001.64 However where many constructivists have traced the 
development, acceptance and rejection of rules governing the use of force for humanitarian 
principles before and since this case, chapter three will trace the legitimation process as it unfolded 
in 1994 in order to find which frames and arguments supported the Security Council’s initial 
decision to withdraw peacekeepers, and how the framing of the actors and situation shifted not only 
the Council members’ understanding of the events on the ground but international expectations of 
what it should do.  
 
Chapter four examines the Kosovo case and represents the illegal but legitimate quadrant of the 
matrix. Legalistic claims in this case were interpreted through a positivist lens. Although the 
interveners and some supporters adopted a natural law argument, the wider view maintained the 
positivist paradigm that, as NATO forces were not mandated by the Security Council, they had 
acted outside the scope of the UN Charter and therefore the law. Rather than attempting to prove or 
disprove the Kosovo Report’s finding that the intervention was “illegal but legitimate,” it aims to 
understand how the contestation and discourse at the time came to develop such an argument. This 
case will examine how contestations of legality and legitimacy are made and reinforce the argument 
made here. More specifically, it will demonstrate that many of the contradictions and problems 
encountered are a consequence of conflicts between the ontological underpinnings of understanding 
and interpreting the law, not the legal system itself. It argues that traditional approaches to both law 
and international relations do fail to provide an adequate avenue for understanding the role of 
legitimacy and legitimation.  
 
Chapter five will examine the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. This action represents the illegal and 
illegitimate quadrant of the legitimacy matrix. Like Kosovo, the invasion of Iraq was not mandated 
by the Security Council and therefore operated outside the scope of positive law on the use of force. 
Unlike Kosovo, opposition to the use of force in this case remains strong, with most audience 
members rejecting the justifications of the interveners, especially the US and UK.65 I call this case 
the ‘negative case’ as it provides ammunition for realism’s critics of international law to argue that 
major powers ignored powerless laws to ensure regional hegemony in the region. Both US and UK 
policy-makers attempted to justify their actions using numerous claims, ranging from the threat of 
terrorism in the post-9/11 security environment to the need to liberate the Iraqi people from the 
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oppressive regime of Saddam Hussein.66  This mixed-bag of justifications would seem to support 
sceptics who argue that such legalistic manoeuvring is about keeping up appearances, not normative 
power. It will examine the justifications for the allies’ intervention, in particular the legal 
justification entrenched in a specific understanding of the enforcement and retroactivity of Security 
Council resolutions. It will demonstrate that even in this case, where international law seems to 
have manifestly failed, this legitimation process not only took place, but influenced the outcome.  
 
Chapter six will examine the fourth and most recent case, Libya. Although events in Libya continue 
to unfold almost five years later, the adoption of Resolution 1441 (2011) by the Security Council, 
authorising the enforcement of a no-fly zone to protect civilians from Qaddafi’s forces falls into the 
legal and legitimate category of the legitimacy matrix. . It remains classified as a legitimate and 
legal operation because, at the time the Resolution was passed and the no-fly zone implemented, the 
decision to use force was widely viewed as legitimate. This case aims to explore the factors that led 
to the success of the justificatory claims in this instance, which informed the Council’s decision to 
authorise force. It examines the role of regional actors, the African Union (AU) and the League of 
Arab States (LAS), where the LAS gained a position as an audience reframer while the AU failed, 
resulting in its inability to gain further traction for its framing of events and actors in Libya. It also 
examines the role of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), although as the only RtoP case in this 
dissertation, it will not establish a ‘precedent’ for the emerging norm but will examine how the 
language of the RtoP framework informed the overall contestation and legitimation of the use of 
force for the protection of civilians in Libya.  
 
The final analysis in chapter seven draws these four cases together and explores how the 
legitimation process unfolded across these four contestations over the use of force. This is not an 
exhaustive exploration of all cases of humanitarian intervention and it does not establish a 
precedent, criteria or increasing acceptance of an interventionist norm. In this way it varies 
considerably from much of the constructivist literature on humanitarian intervention which traces 
the development and transformation of norms, ideas and values. This analysis does not trace or 
intend to trace a progression or regression of normative principles of intervention or RtoP. It does 
not aim to establish what norms or interpretations are right. It traces the nuances in the accepted 
frames and understandings of the actors, actions and norms used in these individual cases of 
contestation. This communicative process of legitimation is an inherent aspect of international law 
and its better understanding can open the door to research that breaks away from exploring what 
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law is, what it should be or what is legal, and allows a deeper exploration of the underlying 
processes at work in the international legal system. 
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Chapter 2  
The Legitimation Framework 
 
 
2.1 Understanding Legitimacy  
Legitimacy is used in many different contexts, making it a difficult concept to understand or 
define.1 Although the concept has been an integral part of political thought, its application in 
international relations is much newer.2 With its linguistic roots in the Latin word, lex, meaning 
law, legitimacy is often equated with legality. However, although the two are closely related 
and exist alongside each other, they are not synonymous.  Legitimacy can be attached to an 
actor, act, law, norm, rule, institution, or interpretation thereof that may be deemed legal or 
just good. Whilst it can be wielded as a tool by powerful states, it also constrains those states 
and has itself become an institution of international politics. Using this understanding of the 
interaction between legality and legitimacy, it is possible “to think of society beyond the state 
as more than the law of coexistence, as comprising social forces that are constitutive of that 
law” and break away from “the very reduction of international law to rules of coexistence, to 
see international law as a critical site for the negotiation of plural and purposive values.”3 In 
this chapter, I construct a comprehensive framework for tracing the process of legitimation, 
which I apply to the cases in the subsequent chapters. This framework draws on legal 
literature and the many definitions of legitimacy in theories of governance, politics, power, 
order, justice and communication.  
First, this chapter will examine the literature on legality and legitimacy with a view to 
understanding how these approaches have been inadequately equipped to deal with the 
interaction and contradictions between legality and legitimacy. The two main approaches to 
legal scholarship, positivism and natural law, juxtapose each other in relation to their 
                                                          
1 Ian Clark, International Legitimacy and World Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 15-19; Andrew 
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2 Shane P. Mulligan, “The Uses of Legitimacy in International Relations,” Millennium 34, no. 2 (2006): 349-350. 
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26 Mind the Gap: Contestations of Legitimacy and Legality in International Politics  |     Vickie Frater 
 
understanding of the sources of law and the making of valid law. Where one emphasises the 
letter and procedures of existing laws, the other focuses on naturally just outcomes. For 
positivists, illegal behaviour is illegitimate because it breaches valid laws made by valid 
processes. Valid laws should be followed to maintain consistency, certainty and order. For 
natural lawyers, rules that result in unfair outcomes are illegitimate and illegal, making 
breaching unjust rules to preserve justice and fairness legitimate and lawful. There are more 
nuanced approaches that blur the distinctions between these dichotomous understandings of 
legal theory.4 Positive lawyers have accepted that moral values play a key role in developing 
valid laws, but determining and applying legal principles, once validated, can be done through 
neutral and amoral legal reasoning only. Similarly more modern natural lawyers, especially in 
international law, accept that established principles of law may be unjust, but that moral 
reasoning ought to be applied where laws are unclear, especially in relation to using force for 
humanitarian purposes.5 However the common problem across these theoretical approaches to 
law is that although they may have different means of recognising valid laws, they both accept 
that once a law is validly created it is legitimate. Consequently, these approaches fail to 
account for legitimacy separately from legality, making it impossible to adequately deal with 
hard cases that fall into legitimacy gaps.  
The inadequacies of these theoretical approaches when applied to international law are 
especially clear, and led to the polarisation of scholarship on international law and 
international relations and what some have called the l-word taboo.6 Preferring not to deal 
with these problematic legalist approaches, international relations scholars avoided them and 
resorted to referring to norms, rules and institutions but not law.7 However, this polarisation 
                                                          
4 I accept that the examples provided in this analysis paint a very broad description of the two main theories of 
international legal argument that appears to overlook the numerous contributions from legal scholars that sit in between 
these two extremes of positivist and natural law approaches. Although they will be discussed as two distinct approaches, 
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Hans Kelsen, The General Theory of Law and State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), 368-370; Fernando 
R. Teson, “Ending Tyranny in Iraq,” Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005), 1; Fernando R. Tesón, “The 
Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. 
J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 128-129. 
. The distinction is being made in this case because the dichotomy between these theories demonstrates how the 
legitimacy gap emerges. It will be argued later in this section that even these more pragmatic approaches do not fill this 
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5  Tesón, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,”128-129 
6 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stephan Wood, “International Law and International Relations 
Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship,” The American Journal of International Law 92, no. 3 
(1998), 367. 
7  Slaughter, Tulumello, and Wood, “International Law and International Relations Theory,”393. 
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meant that, for much of international relations theory, law was deemed powerless due to its 
lack of enforcement, uncertainty and indeterminability. States make claims to legitimacy to 
justify their behaviour to mask their true intentions behind rhetorical façades. Such appeals are 
to “nothing real,” according to Morgenthau, because actors are trying to impose their own 
interpretation of morality upon everyone.8  
However, more recently, international relations approaches have broadened and legality and 
legitimacy have become central areas of study. Within this broad and diverse category of 
literature, I identify three approaches to legitimacy: the power of legitimacy, legitimacy as a 
tipping point or indicator and legitimacy as a process. The first group uses legitimacy to 
explain “why powerful states obey powerless international law.”9 It provides a valuable 
contribution to the legitimacy literature in that it offers a means of understanding how it is that 
even powerful states usually obey unenforceable law. However, it does not provide a means 
for understanding contestation and the process of legitimation in international law. The second 
approach views legitimacy as a tipping point or indicator of normative change in 
communities.10 The benefit of this approach is that it provides a means for understanding 
legitimacy that is separate from legality, however the issue of using force for humanitarian 
purposes brings together three existing regimes: human rights law, humanitarian law and the 
use of force laws. They do not sit easily alongside each other and the challenge posed by these 
hard cases is that accepting any of these legal justifications risks delegitimising another norm 
from a different regime. The following analysis will demonstrate that, although useful in some 
respects, this approach also fails to account for the process of contestation itself, focusing 
instead on its outcomes. Both of these categories of legitimacy as well as the legalist 
approaches will be explored in-depth in this chapter. Nonetheless, I will argue that neither of 
these areas of literature can provide an adequate understanding of legitimacy on its own.  
                                                          
8 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 
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the Future of International Law,” in Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. J. L. 
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893, 895; Jane Stromseth, “Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental Change,” in Humanitarian 
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This leads to the third approach, which understands legitimacy through a process of 
legitimation.11 The first two approaches to legitimacy help us to understand that an actor may 
engage in legitimation for either, all or a combination of these purposes. They may even be 
using the process to mask their true intentions behind a fascia of legitimacy, but even the most 
cynical or deceitful of claims is still subject to this process of legitimation as it is received, 
perceived and determined by an audience. This chapter builds a framework that views 
legitimacy as a process of contestation that incorporates elements of rhetoric, framing, 
arguing, bargaining and audience.  
 
2.2 Legitimacy and International Law 
Traditional theories of law, idealism or natural law, and positivism or formalism offer different means 
of determining valid laws and interpreting them.  Idealism, with its roots in the natural law 
approaches of Roman Stoics and Christendom, views moral laws as valid.12 Pufendorf moved natural 
law away from these canonical based interpretations, linking it instead to international law.13 Since 
then, idealists have argued that international law forms a common bond between all nations and 
humanity.14 Rawls’ The Law of Peoples encapsulates this approach, transcending legal scholarship by 
placing “a particular conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and norms of 
international law and practice” at the centre of his framework for a “realistic utopia” of liberal and 
non-liberal but “decent” peoples.15 As such, moralism is important to the legal idealist approach. 
There are varying approaches to the value of moralism within the idealist school. For example in 
some instances, moralism is an indication of what makes laws legitimate, whereas for others, 
moralism guide interpretation, especially where law is lacking or unclear.16 The difficulty for the 
                                                          
11 Rodney Barker, Legitimating Identities: The Self-Preservations of Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 11-27; Max Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology trans. Ephraim 
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12 Brian Davies, Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014), 216-218 
13 Craig L. Carr, ed., The Political Writings of Samuel Pufendorf (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 8 & 47. 
14 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1980); Hersch Lauterpracht, ed., 
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16  Tesón, “The Liberal Case for Humanitarian Intervention,” 128-129. 
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purposes of understanding and more importantly contesting claims of legitimacy is that it equates 
legitimacy with legality.  
The central assumption of legal positivism is that law is a process that ensures validity. In other 
words, if a law is made in accordance with the established processes, it is valid and therefore should 
be obeyed. There is no role for morality in assessing the validity of laws and therefore there is no 
room for legitimacy assessments.17 International law is the product of state consent, demonstrated by 
the formation of treaties, customary law and the adoption or ratification of these laws into the 
domestic system. A law “is valid if it can be traced to an authoritative source which is itself validated 
by the basic norm of the system; it is invalid if it is simply asserted without having an anchor in an 
authoritative source.”18  
Although there are numerous distinctions in the many uses or interpretations of positivism and natural 
law that sit between the two versions described here, the manner in which these theories may be 
utilised to understand casuistic reasoning19 of Belgrade and the US in relation to the use of force in 
Kosovo in 1999 demonstrates how these theories operate and oppose each other when applied to 
international legal dilemmas. Although this example does not provide a definitive natural or positivist 
approach, the contrast between the claims of NATO leaders and Belgrade demonstrate the disjoint in 
legal theory. During the Kosovo intervention, the US representative to the Security Council, Peter 
Burleigh, appealed broadly to human rights laws, humanitarian law and the overall purpose of the 
United Nations Charter. He claimed that the international community could not “turn a blind eye” as 
the Yugoslavian government and forces deliberately harmed and displaced thousands of innocent 
Kosovar civilians.20 This argument appealed to a higher sense of justice, claiming that NATO’s 
actions were morally and therefore legally legitimate. These claims reflect an idealist approach to 
international law, grounded in natural law.  
However, positivism holds that those acts that do not satisfy the letter of the law are unjustifiable. In 
relation to the use of force, positivists take a strict and literal reading of the prohibition against the use 
of force as embodied in article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. They view the use of force as 
permissible in only two circumstances: in self-defence or when the Security Council authorises the 
collective use of force under Chapter VII in response to a threat to international peace and security.21 
                                                          
17 H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 155-184. 
18 George P. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Legal Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 33. 
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20 United Nations Security Council, Security Council, 54th Year: 3989th Meeting Friday, 26 March 1999 S/Pv.3989. 
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International humanitarian and human rights laws, including the prohibition against genocide, are 
vital and valid laws. However, there is no norm, customary law or higher moral understanding that 
allows intervention, particularly unilateral intervention, for humanitarian purposes. Furthermore, 
Belgrade argued that the situation was an internal matter and ought not to be subject to international 
interference in any way. The representative of the FRY epitomised this claim when he pointed to 
NATO’s “unlawful aggression” and its “defiance of Security Council authority.” 
The problems inherent in these theoretical applications and their opposition to each other are twofold. 
First, both theories equate legitimacy with legality. For positivists, that which is legal and thereby 
legitimate is that which satisfies the letter of the proscribed law. For natural law scholars, on the other 
hand, that which is legal and thereby legitimate is that which satisfies common sense of fairness and 
justice. Whilst it may seem that naturalism provides an avenue for assessing legitimacy in its own 
right, it is not. Both natural law and positivist approaches treat legitimacy as a characteristic of valid 
law and legal behaviour. This leads to the second problem: not all positivists agree on what 
constitutes a valid law and norm, just as there can be disagreement between natural lawyers as to what 
is innately just. The analysis above reflects common arguments which emerge from the application of 
the basic premises of positivism and natural law approaches. However, some positivists may interpret 
the Kosovo intervention as legal and therefore legitimate by identifying a positive law permitting such 
intervention, while a natural lawyer could ground their argument in the natural injustice created when 
powerful states are permitted to intervene militarily in small states. Consequently, there is an ample 
body of literature through which scholars try to prove a positive rule of humanitarian intervention.22  
Irrespective of the legal approach used, failing to account for the role of legitimacy makes it 
impossible to understand the legitimation process. The presence of legitimacy language in both the 
predominantly positivist interpretation provided by Mr Jovanović and the predominantly naturalist 
justification provided by Mr Burleigh demonstrates that both approaches can be applied to any legal 
or political dispute to attain a different or even preferred outcome.  Figure 2.1 shows how these 
approaches apply to the legitimacy matrix in Figure 1.1,23 depicting these basic arguments of 
naturalism and positivism.  
Positivists deny the existence of separate legitimacy axis, shifting the cases vertically. Therefore, 
Kosovo and the 2003 invasion of Iraq are deemed illegal, while the Libyan intervention and the 
failure to act in Rwanda are legal by virtue of the simple fact that both cases observed the procedural 
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rules of sovereignty and non-interference. This is unjust and unresponsive to changing values 
amongst states. On the other hand, idealism denies the validity of unjust laws. The cases shift along 
the horizontal axis, making the use of force in Kosovo an acceptable application of a more just and 
humane approach and shifting the international community’s failure to respond to genocide in 
Rwanda to the unjust, inhumane and therefore illegitimate side. However, this means that idealists 
can be accused of incorporating so much into the morality of law that little is excluded. Such an 
approach is vulnerable to the interpretations of the most powerful states, rather than wider consensus. 
 
Figure 2.1: The Legitimacy Matrix Shifts. 
The problem is that assuming the legitimate is legal and vice versa, they ignore the differentiations 
that emerge from the legitimation process. Decision-makers must either follow the letter of the law, 
permitting injustices such as slaughter in Rwanda, or reinterpret the rules in favour of a more just 
approach, which risks fundamentally destabilising existing principles of law. Add to this the 
difficulties in relation to the interpretation and implementation of law, and hard cases become very 
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difficult to work into these traditional theoretical approaches.  These theories become entangled in 
this debate. Koskenniemi attempts to disentangle international law by moving beyond the “unified 
structure of all legal theories.”24 He examines these legal arguments by looking at the links and 
divisions between them, concluding that they result in oppositions that seem irresolvable. 
Acknowledging that some naturalists and positivists may reach different conclusions, depending on 
their interpretation of which laws are valid, he argues that having developed in ontological opposition 
to each other, and the two have created a co-dependency that negates the effectiveness of either 
theory alone. This is demonstrated in Figure 2.1.25 He argues that these dichotomies create a false 
dilemma in which “legal argument proceeds by establishing a system of conceptual differentiations 
using it in order to justify whatever doctrine, position, rule or argument one needs to justify.”26 
Through his deconstruction, he implies “that ultimately all discourse will disperse into an unending 
play of conceptual oppositions in which there is ultimately no basis to prefer conflicting ideas vis-à-
vis each other.”27  
International legal argumentation is therefore a part of the puzzle and cannot provide its own solution. 
Consequently, this dissertation begins with the constructivist view of mutual constitution whereby 
“critical constructivists understand the relationship between law and politics as mutually constitutive 
and mutually enmeshed.”28 However, this “mutual enmeshment of law and politics makes the 
delineation of any clear practical boundary almost impossible, despite the fact that boundaries are 
routinely invoked by political actors for justificatory or regulative purposes.”29 Therefore, “issues of 
contextual justice cannot be solved by the application of ready-made rules or principles. Their 
solution requires venturing into fields such as politics, social and economic casuistry which were 
formally delimited beyond the point at which legal argument was supposed to stop in order to remain 
‘legal’.”30 
2.3 Legitimacy, Legality and International Relations 
In the past, international relations theorists have tried to avoid the dichotomies of international legal 
argument leading to an l-word taboo in the discipline.31 Although scholarship has since expanded, the 
                                                          
24 Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 1989), xii. 
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legacy of this problem is the continued problematic conceptualisations of legitimacy and its role in 
international relations. Explanations of social action in international relations have been divided into 
logics of consequences and logics of appropriateness.32 Whilst the creators of this explanation of 
theories of international social action accept that the two are not mutually exclusive and do overlap, 
neither side of this division adequately understands the processes behind justifying and adjudicating 
these social actions.33   
Realist, neo-realist and neo-liberal institutionalist theorists apply logics of consequences by taking 
instrumentalist approaches to international law.34 They see the law as a tool that state decision-makers 
can use to pursue their own power-based, strategic or rational interests. Realists, such as Morgenthau, 
focus on power politics and interests and dismiss international law as irrelevant to the reality of state 
power and interests.35 However, realists fail to account for the increasing presence of law and legal 
instruments in international relations.  
 
Krasner,36 as well as Goldsmith and Posner,37 take instrumentalist approaches, accepting the 
increasing presence, use of and obedience to law, while rejecting its overarching ability to mitigate 
state behaviour.38  They acknowledge that, although states frequently use law, they consider it an 
epiphenomenon to rulers’ maximisation of their interests and power. Rulers make decisions that guide 
state behaviour by following a “logic of consequences,” thus behaving rationally, in accordance with 
self-interest, in order to optimise their power over any “logic of appropriateness.”39 Krasner, on the 
other hand, argues that constitutive norms do not prevent rulers from establishing the institutional 
forms that serve their interests. “Logics of consequence can override logics of appropriateness... In a 
contested environment in which actors, including the rulers of states, embrace different norms, clubs 
can always be trump.”40 Therefore, states will only obey law when doing so coincides with their 
interests. When an actor’s interests are better served outside its confines, the actor will break the law, 
with force if necessary. The casuistic justifications identified in the previous chapter are assumed to 
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be the result of linguistic games in which these rules are employed to build a front or façade to protect 
or advance this position of power.  
 
Similarly, the neo-liberal institutionalist approach views law as an instrument of rational states. Nye41 
and Keohane42 accept that states obey or break the law to pursue their interests. Unlike neo-realists, 
institutionalists argue that international law forms institutions that enhance cooperation, further 
promoting each state’s interests.43 They view politics as a strategic game, where egoistic states pursue 
their interests within environmental constraints.44 International law is a set of cooperative rules used 
to solve cooperation problems that arise from anarchy. As a result, states obey law because it is in 
their interests to do so and breaking international law is potentially harmful. Their actions are 
therefore also a result of a rationalised calculation, though based on a different logic of consequences.    
 
Although these approaches have developed in opposition to each other, they are based on similar 
assumptions about states and the international system and, as a result, are subject to the same 
critiques. Both theories assume that states are self-interested and exist in the wider context of 
international anarchy.45 Their main difference arises from their respective understandings of the 
rationalisation of those interests. Realists see that rationalisation as based on the pursuit of power and 
inhibiting the power-gains of others, whereas neo-liberals see the rationalisation of interests as lying 
in the mutual need for cooperation to curb the uncertainty of anarchy. Consequently, both treat 
international law as an instrument of rational states. Thus, the success of international law and norms 
becomes dependent on states’ perceptions of the laws’ usefulness for pursuing their interests. When 
law is no longer contributing to a state’s power gains or cooperative benefit, both approaches suggest 
that states will no longer act within its confines, as they must realign those respective interests. As 
such, critical approaches in this area refer to both paradigms as instrumentalist. 
 
Instrumentalist approaches explain how states use law in an anarchical system; however, they offer no 
explanation of why states use law, or more importantly, why they obey powerless rules. Henkin notes 
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that states usually fulfil their obligations under international law and argues the normative influences 
of the legal system shape state behaviour.46 In treating international law as a tool for pursuing state 
interests, these instrumentalist approaches fail to provide an avenue for studying how law shapes state 
behaviour. This dissertation has already argued that, even when states do break the law, they do so 
while making claims purporting legitimacy and even legality. They apply different interpretations or 
emphasise certain laws over others when they conflict, but they do not openly disregard the validity 
of international law. Therefore, states do not just create law to pursue power based or cooperative 
interests, but they legitimise their actions because they want to seem if not be legitimate. Yet, in 
assuming that the casuistic nature of legal argument is a mere front or façade, even disingenuous, they 
overlook the fact that a range of actors participate in these language games and make decisions based 
on them.  
 
2.4 Power, Order and Justice 
 
Instrumentalist approaches fail to acknowledge this process behind the legitimation process because 
of a limited perception of power, order and justice. Despite the central involvement of rules, 
structures and institutions that “guide, regulate, and control social life,” the fundamental features of 
power have been decentred in understanding global governance, having been claimed by the realist 
school.47 Realism defines power in terms of one state using “material resources to make another 
state do what it otherwise would not do.”48 Realists argue that international law is powerless with 
regard to controlling states in an anarchical system because it does not have an enforcing 
mechanism that can make an actor, especially powerful states, do what they would otherwise not 
do.49 Consequently, remedies in law exist only for those who have the power to take advantage of 
them. Whilst weak states may have certain rights and obligations due to them under the law, they do 
not have the power to enforce them, making law an ineffective determinant of state behaviour. 
However, the realist definition is limited because power is itself a contested concept.50 Burnett and 
Duvall identify four types of power: compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. According 
to this classification, compulsory power involves one actor’s direct control over another and most 
closely reflects the realist understanding of power. Institutional power involves an actor’s indirect 
control over others. Unlike compulsory power, actors using institutional power do not “possess” the 
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material resources or the institution constraining and restraining behaviour. Structural power, on the 
other hand, involves the co-constitutive internal relations of structural positions that determine the 
type of social being an actor will be. Unlike institutional power, which focuses on interest-seeking 
action, structural power is concerned with the development or establishment of social capacities and 
interests. Finally, “productive power is the socially diffuse production of subjectivity in systems of 
meaning and signification,”51 and overlaps with structural power in many respects.52 Where 
structural power involves the production and reproduction of actors’ internally related positions of 
subordination and domination, productive power involves the constitution of all social subjects with 
their unequal and varying social powers through systems of knowledge and discourse. Using these 
definitions of power, this dissertation will argue that the role of power is more diverse and dynamic 
than realists would suggest making it an important element the process of legitimation.  
Another problematic area that arises from the realist dismissal of international law and legitimacy is 
in conceptualising order and justice. Hurrell notes a tension in realist conceptualisations of order 
and justice, which view the goals of social order as survival and coexistence in a pluralist order to 
be achieved through a political framework using the balance of power, Great Powers, diplomacy 
and deterrence.53 These approaches fail, as they ultimately resort to emphasising the role of power 
in order, which inevitably skews any understanding of order and justice.54 Multilateralism and 
international law continue to provide important means for states to legitimise and delegitimise their 
actions and the actions of others. Even if institutions are used pragmatically for instrumentalist 
reasons, they “act as platforms for ongoing normative debate, for the mobilization of concern, and 
for debating and revising ideas about how international society should be organized.”55 Although 
they may be driven by instrumentalist purposes, they both shape and reflect communities of interest. 
These communities offer a framework for crystallising consensus, making it imperative that 
normative issues are a part of the picture and providing reason to believe institutions can be 
powerful agents for the diffusion and socialisation of international norms.  
 
More dense and more integrated, major international and social institutions constitute a “deformed 
political order” due to the extreme power disparities within international and world society and the 
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degree to which these disparities privilege and impose certain understandings of what comprises 
global justice.56 The combination of density and deformity leads to serious complications in the 
search for shared principles, grounding those principles and drawing order and justice together. As a 
result, this framework will be embedded in contemporary debates on institutionalism, particularly 
those related to institutional change. These are social processes and need to be understood as such. 
 
Mearsheimer, Morgenthau and Krasner would argue these instances of legitimation are better 
explained as states manipulating these international laws to mask their true intentions.57 While 
accepting that states legitimise their behaviour, they deny that this shows the existence or significant 
impact of a normative system regulating state behaviour.58 Rather, they would argue that, whilst states 
pursue power-based interests, they do not want to appear to be the bully. Consequently, states will use 
legal principles to justify their behaviour to each other and to their domestic constituencies.59 This is 
reflected by states switching from one legal justification to another, such as the numerous 
justifications provided by the US government and allies to legitimise their invasion of Iraq in 2003.60 
However realists overlook the role that other actors play in this process. Whilst central actors do 
invoke a range of justifications to support their claims to not only legitimise themselves, but 
delegitimise their opposition, others hear them and determine their acceptability. Consequently, even 
the biggest bullies cannot make any claims they wish in order to legitimise any behaviour because 
there is a deeper social process at play. 
 
Reus-Smit61 and Kratochwil62 develop this argument further. Reus-Smit argues that politics is a 
socially constitutive form of action and law is central to the normative structures that condition the 
politics of legitimate statehood and rightful action.63 Similarly, Kratochwil argues that law is not an 
enclosed system and contains contradictions between higher principles and rules.64 He emphasises 
                                                          
56 Hurrell, “Order and Justice in International Relations,” 36.  
57 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 27; Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” 40; 
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 289. 
58 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 3. 
59 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 283. 
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that, although legal doctrine has attempted to develop distinctions, absolutes and responsibilities, 
these concepts are contested and “are part of political struggles, not simply descriptions of them.”65 
The logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness approaches, even when combined, do not 
explain how these contestations themselves are a part of political struggle. There is social process 
based in discourse and communication underpinning the process through which these arguments are 
made.66 Actors communicate these contestations, agreeing or disagreeing, by justifying their own 
position.67 Kritsiotis emphasises “the value of international law as a communicative device, helping 
frame the various claims which states wish to make to other states and institutions in defence of their 
coercive actions under international law.”68  
This is demonstrated by the legitimacy matrix. States do not just debate the validity or enforceability 
of the law but justify their behaviour using legal and legitimacy language to an audience. Although it 
is difficult to establish truth in these claims, the audiences receiving these justifications do make these 
distinctions and accept some claims over others. As these claims to legitimacy are not always 
congruous to an act’s legality, this creates legitimacy gaps. Consequently, understanding these gaps 
requires knowledge of these contestations and the responses of those who receive them. Thus, the 
legitimacy of an act and an actor lies in the language of these contestations in public debate and how 
they are received by an adjudicating audience, making legitimacy something that needs to be 
understood as the product of a process of legitimation, rather than as a characteristic attached to an 
idea, actor or action. 
2.5 Language 
 
Language plays a key role in the process of contesting and adjudicating legitimacy. Rorty builds a 
framework for understanding the role of language, arguing that there is no single truth. 
Consequently, we cannot establish the true motives of actors.69 However, at the same time, even the 
most powerful actors cannot behave as they please and rely on their resources to trump weaker 
actors.70 They need to justify their actions using legitimising language, knowing that their claims 
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will be adjudicated by an audience.71 Rorty argues that the focus on finding a truth leads to the 
belief that “some non-linguistic state of the world is itself an example of truth…. But it is not so 
easy when we turn from individual sentences to vocabularies as wholes.”72 Furthermore, as 
language games move from “criterion-governed sentences within language games to language 
games as wholes, games which we do not choose between by references to criteria, the idea that the 
world decides which descriptions are true can no longer be given a clear sense.”73 However, can an 
audience decide which language games are legitimate in an accepted situation? 
Philosophical writing and debate usually centres on contesting an old, entrenched problematic 
vocabulary, and a new one that promises hope. Rorty identifies an increasing willingness to drop 
the idea of “intrinsic nature” and “a willingness to face up to the contingency of the language we 
use.”74 Understanding this contingency allows us to recognise “the contingency of conscience” 
which leads “to a picture of intellectual and moral progress as a history of increasingly useful 
metaphors rather than of increasing understanding of how things really are.”75 
 Kennedy identifies a new humanitarian vocabulary that responds to the need for military decision-
makers and humanitarians to balance the harms or costs of war.76 He argues that the “new 
vocabulary for evaluating force has drifted free of these strictly legal roots.”77 Thus, according to 
him, in the lead-up to the Iraq war, military, political, intelligence and humanitarian representatives 
shared this language, demonstrating “the common vocabulary has led to something of a merger of 
military and humanitarian roles.”78 The global legal and political environment has been increasingly 
understood as “An extremely broad and ongoing conversation among a wide range of players- 
national states, private actors, intergovernmental organisations, courts, legislatures, military figures” 
making international law “more conversation than trial. Made by the people who use it, 
international law catalogues the arguments people have used to assess the legitimacy of state 
behaviour.”79 
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This makes world opinion the court or “interpretive community” when a state’s behaviour breaches 
the limitation of that opinion.80 It is vital for states to defend these actions, backed by claims to 
authority and credibility. Therefore, the vocabulary used to make these assertions becomes 
important, “not because it represents an external limit, but precisely because it does not. It 
represents the judgments of others in the conversation- others whose views will affect the difficulty 
of the [sic] whatever one seeks to achieve.”81 
Hence, accepting that legitimacy gaps are created by contestation and the adjudications of 
those contestations, the issue becomes one based on language. Habermas’ communicative 
action theory82 can provide a useful “blueprint” for understanding agreement and 
disagreement in the justification process, however the legitimation process cannot rest solely 
on ideal speech requirements, the absence of forceful coercion, a joint search for 
understanding and the persuasive power of a stronger argument. Although critics of 
Habermasian communicative action argue that a “common lifeworld” is impossible in an 
anarchical international environment without a common history, culture or language, this is a 
misguided view, as there is more mutual recognition and equality among speakers than is 
commonly expected,83 in hard cases, such as those examined here. Those making justificatory 
claims to legitimise their behaviour are not trying to persuade each other with a better 
argument; they are trying to persuade an audience. The highly adversarial nature of central 
contesters indicate that individual central actors do not attempt or intend to persuade the 
opposition toward their position. The parties contest their respective claims to legitimise their 
behaviour not to each other, but to an audience of others. Here, “others” include not only the 
respective domestic constituencies of these states, but a broader audience that can receive and 
interpret these claims and designate legitimacy.    
Understanding law as a communicative device in this sense implies that we also have to be 
able to understand the nature of contestation. Argumentation is communication for the purpose 
of persuading an opponent to change their position.84 However, in these cases, whilst the 
parties are arguing over the appropriate principles of law and international relations at play, 
they are not trying to convince each other. As noted above, their arguments are targeted at an 
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audience.85 These actors justify their actions in a public setting and therefore must pose their 
arguments in the language of legitimacy. True motives, consequences and interests become 
irrelevant once the participants are engaged in a contestation of legal and legitimacy rhetoric 
capable of being recognised by the audience as “good, proper or commendable.”86 It is this 
process that needs to be understood in order to appreciate not only what is deemed legitimate, 
but also how it is legitimised. Consequently, this dissertation will develop a framework of 
legitimation applicable to world politics that incorporates the contestation of legal principles 
in legalistic and legitimacy languages and what often seems ubiquitous rhetoric or casuistry. It 
will build an element for audience reception or determination.  
2.6 Defining Legitimacy 
 
Understanding the role of international law in international relations requires an understanding of 
fundamental institutions and their role in this system. For the purpose of this dissertation, I use 
Keohane’s definition of institutions as “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and informal 
that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations.”87 Although often used 
interchangeably with “regime” in the literature on institutions and regime theory, I distinguish the 
two.88 In relation to the argument made here, “fundamental institutions are those elementary rules of 
practice that states formulate to solve the coordination and collaboration problems associated with 
coexistence under anarchy.”89 Regimes are “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and 
decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations.”90 International law is a fundamental institution based on the most 
elementary rules of international relations for state collaboration and coordination.91 However, as 
individual regimes develop more links among different areas of law, the capacity for conflict 
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between regimes increases considerably.92 Human rights and humanitarian regimes overlap on 
many issues, without much conflict. Yet, they may also conflict with norms of sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and use of force when we ask if we can intervene in a sovereign state in order to 
prevent or end gross human rights abuses or mass atrocities.      
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
This hierarchy of institutions becomes important in the legitimacy literature, as legitimacy is often 
used as a blanket term to refer to anything from the power of institutions and states, to the validity 
of a regime or individual rule, norm or law. Therefore, in this review, the pertinent literature is 
divided into three groups. The first group comprises sources whose authors value legitimacy as a 
characteristic that determines the power of an institution to ensure compliance or obedience. The 
second group of sources presents legitimacy as an indicator or a tipping point for normative change. 
According to this view, claims to legitimacy, once accepted, lead to institutional change and the 
adoption of new, more effective norms and rules. The third group consists of sources purporting 
that legitimacy is a characteristic established through a process of legitimation.  
 
Legitimacy and Power 
 
Legitimacy has been used in a range of contexts. It may refer to the legitimacy of international law 
itself or explain why states obey powerless rules.93 Franck and Hurd both view legitimacy as a 
normative force that compels powerful states to obey powerless laws.94 The first grouping of 
literature on legitimacy grew in response to this critique of the power of institutions on the basis 
that despite the power of states, international laws are obeyed and institutions have not only been 
formed, but have changed and developed. Consequently, institutions and the normative beliefs that 
underpin them are important and “matter because they shape the choices, behaviour and even the 
interests and identities of agents.”95 However, as not all institutionalists agree on the degree to 
which institutions shape agents’ interests, identities or behaviour, there is a lack of consensus 
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amongst theorists attempting to explain change.96 They also struggle to explain the role of 
legitimacy, conceptualising it as a characteristic that lends power through coercion, cooperation or 
normative validity to actors, institutions or ideas.  
According to Franck, states obey laws because “they perceive the rules and its institutional 
penumbra to have a high degree of legitimacy.”97 He defines legitimacy as “a property of a rule or 
rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull toward compliance on those addressed normatively 
because those addressed believe that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in 
accordance with generally accepted principles of right process.”98 Similarly, Hurd defines 
legitimacy as “the normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed”99 and 
concludes that “legitimacy matters to international institutions and to the nature of the international 
system as a whole.”100 These approaches treat legitimacy as a property of valid law. It therefore 
follows that, if a law is legitimate, acts are legitimate and illegitimacy is a reflection of 
indeterminable law. However, the cases examined here demonstrate that, when states contest the 
legitimacy of their actions, they initially appeal to a legalistic language that is quite determinable. In 
other words, the laws themselves are legitimate and the issue is whether or not the case in question 
fits the accepted interpretation of those rules. These approaches assist us in critiquing claims that 
international law is irrelevant and subject purely to the whims of powerful, self-interested states. 
Legitimacy can be seen as more than a rhetorical tool of powerful states. They also demonstrate the 
role of institutional power in conceptualising legitimacy separately from legality. However in 
focusing on what laws, norms and institutions are legitimate it overlooks the broader process 
whereby legitimacy is contested in relation to a range of elements and the process through which it 
is attributed or denied. In order to develop a framework of legitimacy that can be used in situations 
where legality and legitimacy are incongruous we need a different approach which may 
encapsulated not only what is legitimate, but how it is recognised.  
Legitimacy as an Indicator  
The existence of the legitimacy gaps outlined in the introduction demonstrates that law and 
legitimacy are not synonymous.101 States contest their claims of legitimation and they do so using 
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legal, rhetorical and moral languages. I also defined this application of legal and moral principles to 
hard cases as an example of casuistic reasoning, distinguishing this definition of casuistry from 
those that use it pejoratively.102 Understanding these gaps is not merely a question of identifying the 
reasons states obey or disobey the law, but rather establishing how they legitimise their actions 
using this framework. Finnemore accepts that legitimacy is not merely a matter of obeying or 
disobeying the law.103 She argues that actors question multilateral rules that fail to produce desired 
outcomes. In so doing, they increase pressure to craft new “good” rules, creating what she calls a 
“marketplace” of legitimacy where norm entrepreneurs contest and judge their preferred rules.104 
Hence, legitimacy indicates a tipping point where a rule or norm becomes accepted. She applies this 
framework to identify the development of normative change in international relations, arguing that 
“the pattern of intervention cannot be understood apart from the changing normative context in 
which it occurs.”105 This conceptualisation of legitimacy acknowledges the separation of legality 
and legitimacy and reinforces the potential power of the latter as a means of facilitating change in 
international institutions.   
However such approaches also fail to fully account for the process of legitimation, focusing on 
which norms are legitimate rather than how legitimacy is contested and then designated or denied. 
Bjola argues such approaches fail “to theoretically connect the social process by which actors’ 
commitment to legal and moral principles of legitimacy is shaped with the normative conditions 
that facilitate or constrain the definition, contestation, and adjudication of what counts as legitimacy 
in a particular political context.”106 In cases such as the four examined here, the problem is not the 
development of accepted norms, but their application to individual cases where complex regimes 
governing human rights, humanitarian law and the use of force interplay, overlap and sometimes 
conflict.  
 
Legitimacy as a Process 
Therefore a framework for understanding the legitimation process requires examining “the process 
by which actors’ commitment to social norms is determined as well as to the substance of the 
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conditions that facilitate or constrain the definition, contestation, and adjudication of what counts as 
legitimacy in a particular context.”107 It needs to be grounded in a moral foundation and the 
normative standards need to be attuned to the political environment of the decision. Whether a state 
is justifying the use of force against its own citizens, defending the integrity of its political 
sovereignty, denying a charge of human rights violations or protecting its own security, it will 
contest these actions by justifying them in law and the moral language of legitimacy. A legitimacy 
framework must therefore aim to understand the process, uses, contestations and perceptions of this 
language and not just the final product or determination of legitimacy or illegitimacy. 
Coleman offers a more detailed framework than those Bjola criticises. She defines legitimacy as a 
social and public status, attributed by an audience to be good or proper behaviour. As such, an actor 
or action does not need to be legal to be legitimate and vice versa. Instead, she dissects legitimacy 
with a view to understanding how these judgments of status are made using four guiding questions.  
 
First, who or what is the subject of legitimacy judgments? Second, who constitutes 
the relevant judging group or audience for claims of international legitimacy and 
illegitimacy? Third, what public rules serve as standards for international legitimacy 
judgment and how are they related to international law? And finally, why should 
states, the most powerful actors in the international system …care about 
international legitimacy?108  
 
In relation to the referent object, she argues that actions and actors need to be included.109 Second, 
she identifies four potential audiences: the domestic public opinion in the intervener’s state, the 
domestic public opinion in the target state, the neighbours of the target state and the international 
community. She notes that each of these is only a potential audience and each group’s opinions are 
not a requisite in every case. Nonetheless, states will ultimately seek legitimacy among peers, as 
this is the most likely source of social and political pressure regarding legitimacy.110 Third, she 
observes that, while rules are often broken, states justify their actions by making an important 
distinction between legality and legitimacy and the development of rules for judging or determining 
legitimacy. Finally, she argues that states seek the support of organisations to garner legitimacy.111 
Therefore, organisations can lend legitimacy to an actor or action. 
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Although Coleman’s approach is useful, some of its aspects are incomplete when attempting to 
understand legitimacy as part of a process. Her acknowledgment of a diverse range of actors and 
potential audience is very useful. Although these contestations are usually made between contesting 
states to other states, domestic audiences can have an important effect on the legitimacy of the 
state’s actions, particularly in democratic societies.112 Domestic audiences often have different 
expectations or concerns when their governments decide to use force. As a result, the domestic 
language may be very different from that used internationally. This contributes to an appearance of 
a convenient casuistry as governments and leaders seemingly change their justifications, depending 
on their targeted audience. As humanitarian intervention is an international response, most of the 
discourse examined here focuses on the international audience and international discourse. 
Domestic discourse will be examined where it became linked to the international argument.  
In order to understand how these contestations function, the first cluster of contestations examined 
in each case will be what I have termed the actor contestations. Actor contestations involve parties 
to a conflict contesting the legitimacy and legality of their roles as agents in a particular situation. 
Actors who obtain a degree of legitimacy have greater agency throughout the contestation and often 
win increased support for their frames, responses demands or recommendations. However, an actor 
who accepts or utilises a particular frame may also find themselves rhetorically entrapped, and 
therefore forced to accept or permit a particular decision or action because the frame creates an 
expectation. Alternatively, they may be rhetorically excluded, where the frames they present are not 
accepted, and the expectations they recommended are therefore out of step with the accepted 
understanding of the actors or situation. Actor contestations are foundational to this process and 
may influence all other areas of contestation that follow. There are two contestations within this 
broader category: the central actor contestation and the audience reframer contestation. 
Central actor contestations arise between those directly involved in a particular conflict as they 
legitimise their positions as proper actors and agents. Such contestations are adversarial in nature, as 
the actors compete for legitimacy, aiming to convince an audience of the correctness of their 
positions, while delegitimising the claims of the opposition. They are cast in terms of absolute 
legitimacy and legality, where each actor sees itself as the legitimate and legal actor, while the other 
is illegitimate and illegal. As such, central actors do not direct their claims toward the opposition, 
but rather to these domestic and international audiences. Consequently, actors do not attain 
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legitimacy by making these claims, but rather by contesting it to an audience who may accept, 
reject, or reframe and recast the contestation.  
This leads to the second actor contestation. The audience reframers’ contestation takes place when 
key actors, such as neighbouring states or institutions with an indirect role in the situation, establish 
their role in framing the situation and making decisions or taking action. These actors are important 
to understanding the legitimation process because central actors accept and reject elements of all 
central actors’ claims and recast the contestation in terms which cloud absolute understandings of 
legitimacy and legality.  It is not an adversarial contestation and some actors are legitimised by 
institutional power while others may have unique knowledge or proximity which makes their role 
pertinent to the situation. Audience reframers are often the first to cast contestations in terms which 
create legitimacy gaps.  
Furthermore, as legitimacy can be attached to an actor or a thing, it is also necessary to understand 
the legitimation of actions and decisions. I have called this aspect of the legitimation process the 
narrative contestation. Narrative contestations involve framing of the situation itself and tell the 
“story” or “plot” that explains the situation on the ground.113 These stories feed into a normative 
understanding of the situation itself and may result in a finding of fact, such as that certain events 
may be legitimately framed as human rights abuses, humanitarian crises, genocide or civil war. 
They may attribute responsibility for the situation, thus linking closely with actor contestation. Most 
significantly, narrative contestations establish legal facts. Legal facts have legal implications or 
“consequences” under international law and create an expectation about what action can and cannot 
follow.114  
Upon accepting a certain frame, the international community may decide to accept a legal fact that 
such events constitute “breaches” of key international legal instruments such as human rights and 
international humanitarian law or more specifically, ethnic cleansing, genocide or a mass atrocity. 
Labelling a case in these terms creates an expectation that compels certain responses.  Some have 
argued that this was why the international community was reluctant to use the word “genocide” to 
describe events in Rwanda, an argument that will be examined in chapter three.115 Contestations 
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over which facts to establish vary from one case to another, however, two narratives are common to 
all four of these use of force cases: whether or not the situation constitutes a “threat to international 
peace and security” and whether “non-forceful options have been exhausted.” These narrative 
contestations feed into the third Coleman’s question, “what public rules serve as standards for 
international legitimacy judgment?”116 These understandings of facts, such as widespread violence 
or killing, form the narrative informing findings of law, such as that these actions breach human 
rights or humanitarian law and constitute a threat to international peace and security. 
The fourth question and its findings are problematic, as Coleman falls into the analytical-normative 
divide Bjola identified, using legitimacy as a tipping point for the normative acceptance of 
international norms and organisations. Thus, while useful, in order to build a complete framework 
for understanding not just what is legitimate, but how actors, actions and ideas are legitimised, these 
questions need to be entrenched in a broader understanding of contestation.  
Legitimation 
The process which leads to the designation of legitimacy has been developed in more detail in 
political literature on the legitimacy of government. Habermas and Barker develop two 
approaches.117 The legitimation crisis and legitimation system Habermas develops offer an 
overarching understanding of legitimacy that goes beyond accepting or understanding what is or is 
not legitimate. This framework contributes to the study of the underlying process through which 
actors not just legitimise their actions and decisions, but also contest those claims. When Habermas 
speaks of a legitimation crisis, he is referring to four contradictions that emerge in advanced 
capitalist societies, which undermine their ability to maintain and reproduce themselves.118 
Habermas explains the emergence of the legitimation system through economic crisis. An increased 
need for legitimation emerges when the economic and political systems are “re-coupled.”119 
Following the appearance of functional weakness in the market system and dysfunctional offshoots 
in the steering mechanism, the concept of fair exchange ultimately collapses. The state machinery 
must actively engage in production, rather than securing the general order for production. It must 
also legitimate this role. Although Habermas is referring to contradictions within a specific society, 
his emphasis on the process of legitimation provides a useful distinction between legitimacy and 
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legitimation, whereby the former is a property or characteristic of a society, while the latter is the 
process through which this property is claimed. By recognising the process underpinning the 
conferral of legitimacy, it is possible to examine the contested arguments actors make when 
claiming legitimacy instead of focusing on what is or is not legitimate.  
Barker knits together these normative and empirical approaches to legitimacy and addresses the 
questions that arise when an otherwise abhorrent regime makes claims to legitimacy.120 He argues 
that “since the claim to legitimacy is one of the characteristics of government, to ask is the 
government legitimate can be tautologous. To ask in what way and with what success it claims 
legitimacy, is by contrast an appropriate question.”121 He distinguishes legitimation, defining it as 
“an observable human activity, whose study does not require any judgment about moral… truth.”122 
Hence, legitimation is a distinct concept and a theory of legitimation may solve problems that have 
troubled politics and government.123 As such, he emphasises that legitimacy, legitimation and 
legitimate are all terms that come together to construct a network of interlinked yet distinct 
descriptions of government and politics.124 As even the most abhorrent governments engage in a 
process of legitimation in one form or another “what characterises government… is not the 
possession of a quality defined as legitimacy, but the claiming, the activity of legitimation,”125 and 
is evident in the everyday language, etiquette and rituals of government.126 
These understandings of legitimation can be useful for establishing the same process between states. 
States seek legitimacy for themselves and, in these cases, for their actions. Still, simply asking 
whether these actions are legitimate ignores the process of legitimation states engage to claim this 
characteristic. The same can be said for laws; while states use legal language as well as legitimacy 
language to claim their actions’ legitimacy, this is not in itself an indication of legality. Rather, the 
observable element is not the property of legitimacy, but the process of legitimation.  
Therefore, the legitimacy framework adopted in this dissertation combines these elements. It is 
constituted of Coleman’s first three questions examining the actor and narrative contestations made 
in each situation. It also aims to identify a normative contestation in which states do not simply 
contest the existence of laws and norms, but their application or interpretation in a particular 
situation. It is within this contestation that we can expect states to contest the legitimacy of both the 
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threat and use of force as well as the implementation or methods employed by the actors in each 
case.    
2.7 Rhetoric, Argumentation and Contestation  
The final element of this theoretical framework is an understanding of the role of rhetoric in 
contestation. As evident in the cases for intervention, two or more potential norm-violators contest 
these situations. While they are not trying to persuade each other, they do contest the principles of 
law and legitimacy in an attempt to be recognised as legitimate by the adjudicating audience. For 
example, Alastair Johnston focuses on persuasion and social influence as two microprocesses of 
socialisation theory.127 Persuasion is a high intensity process of cognition, reflection and argument, 
where an actor may be persuaded by an influential relationship with an “in-group” or recognised 
source of legitimacy.128 Social influence is the “class of microprocesses that elicit pro-norm 
behaviour through the distribution of social rewards and punishments.”129 These microprocesses 
illustrate how social influence can encourage pro-norm behaviour by offering states the opportunity 
to obtain or improve their international status. However, in these cases, the parties are contesting the 
claim that they are norm-violators.130 The central contestation between those directly involved in a 
conflict or intervention is therefore not an effort at persuasion but rather contestation.  
Kennedy agrees that persuasion and legal validity are less relevant, noting that “we have left the 
world of legal validity behind, except as a claim made to an audience.”131 Persuasion has also been 
lost as audiences are not “inert judges” but participants who interpret these claims strategically. 
Therefore, persuasiveness and validity will not suffice. A more complex understanding of the 
interactions between these processes that accounts for the role of rhetoric and how it is perceived by 
the audience is thus required.  
Studies of rhetorical language incorporate this interaction. They are not concerned with whether or 
not an actor’s legitimising claim is true or persuasive. Schimmelfennig132 argues that rhetoric may 
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itself be usefully conceptualised. Krebs and Jackson go further, developing a theory of rhetorical 
coercion. In their view, “rhetorical coercion is a political strategy that seeks to twist arms by 
twisting tongues,”133 where an actor frames a policy and points to certain implications with a view 
to effecting change. Schimmelfennig offers a more general theory of rhetorical action, arguing that 
all polities have a standard of political legitimacy that determines who belongs and what is expected 
of members.134 However, weakly socialised actors do not assume a moral imperative from these 
standards and confront the standard “as an external institutional resource and constraint” that, in 
turn, influences interaction and power over outcomes.135 Hence, legitimacy allows for 
argumentation. Participants argue that their interests are in line with this standard, while 
delegitimising opposing views. If an actor can make the opposition shift its rhetorical stance, this 
will limit the options the latter has for justification. Rhetorical contestation is successful when the 
opposing actor can no longer maintain its opposition, or is “trapped” by the parameters of the 
contestation. 
The following analysis will identify and trace these microprocesses across these four cases in order 
to identify how claims to legitimacy are cast and received and how they impact this legitimation 
process. It will seek out cases of entrapment, or attempted entrapment and evaluate their 
effectiveness. It will identify the audience members’ role in this entrapment process establishing not 
only when key decision-makers are trapped by the accepted frame of a contestation, but where 
central contesters and audience reframers successfully trap others. It also identifies an alternative 
process where actors or frames become rhetorically excluded. Rhetorical exclusion occurs when an 
actor’s preferred frame differs from the accepted frames. Rhetorically excluded actors find their 
positions or responses are rendered incongruous to accepted frames of understanding a particular 
situation and they are consequently excluded. This dissertation will explore how these claims are 
cast and received, then accepted, reframed and recast through the legitimation process.  
Participants in legitimacy contestations attempt to define the parameters of the debate to legitimise 
their actions while delegitimising those of the other. They do not contest these positions to persuade 
each other, but develop their arguments for the adjudicating audience. As a part of a broader 
contestation of each situation, audience members usually accept or reject some aspects of the 
frames and recast them in order to develop an understanding of the actors or the situation upon 
which to base their decisions.  
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The subsequent four chapters apply this framework to four cases: Rwanda 1994, Kosovo 1999, Iraq 
2003 and Libya 2011. Although all four cases involved contestations over the use of force, the 
variation in outcomes across them creates a dilemma in which the interactions between legitimacy 
and legality are incongruous. Constructivist and English school scholars in particular have grappled 
with the dilemma of the legal and legitimate use of humanitarian intervention.136 However the 
following case analyses do not intend to trace an emerging or evolving norm of intervention or 
identify the rules and criteria which may permit it.  
This analysis takes a more holistic approach to understanding legitimacy first by accepting that 
legitimacy may be attributed to a range of elements or factors, including actors, decisions and 
actions as well as the relevance, interpretation and application of laws, rules, norms and institutions. 
It aims to establish how legitimation contestations unfurled across these cases, analysing discourse 
through the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict phases in order to establish which frames were 
accepted, rejected or reframed by central contesters, audience reframers and the international 
community, and traces contestations over the legitimacy of these questions by examining the actor, 
narrative and normative contestations within each case.  
By tracing this process across these three clusters of contestation and three phases of conflict, it can 
establish which frames impacted the decision-making process, which frames were rejected and 
which frames were recast. It will identify the presence of legal argument and assess the extent to 
which audience members accept the interpretation and application of normative frames. In 
identifying these accepted, rejected and recast frames it will be able to identify cases of rhetorical 
entrapment, where the acceptance of certain frames and facts created an expectation that the 
international community can or should respond in certain way, essentially forcing actors to accept a 
decision or outcome which is not in their favour. It also uncovers a new element within the 
legitimation process which I have called rhetorical exclusion. Rhetorical exclusion occurs when an 
actor’s frame is rejected or recast by the audience, leaving the actor in a position where they must 
adjust their position or be excluded from the contestation. In this way it will not only prove that the 
process of legitimation features strongly in all four cases, but that this process is capable of altering 
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state behaviour and forcing normatively informed decisions, even where the agreed or accepted 
option is not necessarily the preferred outcome of particular supportive actors.  
54 Mind the Gap: Contestations of Legitimacy and Legality in International Politics  |     Vickie Frater 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
RWANDA: Legal but Illegitimate 
 
3.1 A Legal but Illegitimate Omission? 
The failure to respond to violence in Rwanda in 1994 remains one of the most visible and 
catastrophic failures of the international order and international law. That this failure was q 
consequence of a lack political will is widely accepted, even amongst advocates of law. 1 Kofi 
Annan has attributed this failure to respond adequately to humanitarian crises to a “lack of 
political will, national interests narrowly defined, and simple indifference.”2  
However it is precisely this problem of political will that has informed the backlash against the 
international community’s response to Rwanda. The subsequent development of principles 
and rules to better inform such responses, most notably the emergence of the Responsibility to 
Protect (RtoP), emerged from dissatisfaction, summarised by Kofi Annan’s query: “if 
humanitarian intervention is indeed an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica –to gross and systematic violations of human rights that 
affect every precept of our common humanity.”3 
Although realism’s focus on individual state interests based on power maximisation provides a 
clear and simple explanation for why the international community failed to respond to 
violence in Rwanda, and has failed to address similar cases in Syria and Darfur, it does not 
explain how the international community’s response, while inadequate, slow and ineffective, 
changed over the course of the conflict itself. Therefore, while the international community 
broke no rules in its slow response to the Rwandan crisis, it has been widely acknowledged 
                                                          
1 Luke Glanville, “Norms, Interests and Humanitarian Intervention.” Global Change, Peace and Security 18, no. 3 
(2006), 158. 
2 Kofi Annan, “Secretary General Addresses International Peace Academy Seminar on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’.” 
United Nations Press Release, 15 February 2002, accessed 12th of December 2015 from http://www.un.org/press/ 
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3 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: 
IDRC, 2001), vii.  
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amongst scholars and even individual leaders involved that the international community failed 
to develop an effective, timely and appropriate response to the Rwandan genocide.4 
Consequently, it falls into the legal but illegitimate legitimacy gap created by the matrix in 
Figure 1.1. Utilising the framework just elucidated, the three clusters of contestations, actor, 
narrative and normative, will be examined next, in order to demonstrate the application of my 
approach to the Rwandan case. 
Tracing the process of legitimation in this case demonstrates how, despite the lack of political 
will which informed a weak, slow and inadequate response, the international community was 
forced to alter its position as it accepted alternative frames which shifted its understanding of 
the situation from civil war and ethnic violence, to genocide. This shift in the understanding of 
the narrative of the Rwandan situation created a normative expectation that the international 
community could not do nothing.  
The following analysis traces the process of legitimation in this case. It applies the framework 
of legitimation developed in chapter two, tracing the actor, narrative and normative 
contestations across the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict phases depicted in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
Figure 3.1: Rwanda Timeline 
  
For the purpose of this chapter, the pre-conflict phase begins with the signing of the Arusha 
Accords in August 1993, and ends with the death of President Habyarimana on the 6th of April 
1994.  The Arusha Accords established an uneasy peace between the Rwandan government 
and the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) forces, ending a three-year civil war. “The agreement 
                                                          
4 Kofi A. Annan and Nader Mousavizadeh, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 
73-79; Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 1-2; Roméo Dallaire and Brent Beardsley, Shake Hands with the Devil: The 
Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (London: Arrow Books, 2004), 6-7.  
Phase 1: Pre- Conflict
• 3 August 1993 (Signing 
of Arusha Accords)- 6 
April 1994 (President 
Habyariminana's plane 
shot down)
Phase 2: 
Conflict/Genocide
• 7 April 1994 (Genocide 
begins with deliberate 
campaign against 
moderate members of 
government)- 27th July 
1994 (RPF declares 
ceasefire)
Phase 3: Post 
Intervention/Conflict
• 27th July 1994- 31
•October 1994 (Full 
deployment of 
UNAMIR)
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was broadly favorable to the rebels,” awarding them 50% of the Officer Corps and 40% of 
regular personnel in the Rwandan army.5  It also established political conditions, including the 
formation of a broad-based transitional government and multi-party elections, and ceasefire 
conditions which included the establishment of a peacekeeping force in Rwanda (UNAMIR). 
UNAMIR was deployed in late 1993 under the command of General Romeo Dallaire.  
Both the Accords and the peacekeeping mission were racked with challenges from the outset. 
By April 1994, President Habyarimana’s government had not established a broad-based 
transitional government, nor made any plans for elections. Some have suggested he never 
intended to implement the Accords, having referred to them as “mere pieces of paper.”6 
Meanwhile, Hutu hardliners gained increasing influence in Kigali’s ruling elite. Although it is 
not clear that these groups were planning genocide, the presence of secret arms caches and 
1700 trained militia or “Interhamwe” in Kigali suggest that there were plans for mass and 
systematic violence.  
When Habyarimana’s plane was shot down over Kigali on the 6th of April 1994, it triggered a 
conflagration of violence which began with the elimination of moderate government members 
who supported the Accords and would blockade a genocide. Hutu elites formed an interim 
government, eliminating moderate Hutus who would stand in the way of their plans, including 
Prime Minister Uwilingiyimana and the Belgian peacekeepers guarding her, so that “by noon 
on April 7 the moderate political leadership of Rwanda was dead or in hiding, the potential for 
a future moderate government utterly lost.”7 Meanwhile, the Rwandan Army and interhamwe 
militia took to the streets to hunt down Tutsis in Kigali, aided by the anti-Tutsi, anti-UNAMIR 
propaganda of Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC).  
The United Nations Security Council met on the 7th of April, condemning the shooting down 
of the President’s plane and the violence that followed, including the deaths of the ten Belgian 
peacekeepers. Belgium withdrew from the force and two weeks into the genocide, the Council 
was forced to decide if it should entirely withdraw, partially reduce or significantly increase 
UNAMIR; it chose the second option, reducing UNAMIR’s troop size and limiting its 
                                                          
5 Scott Straus, The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda. (New York: Cornell University Press, 2008). 
24. The narrative contestation analysis will consider the legitimacy of the Accords. 
6 Joel Stettenheim, “The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda,” in Words over War: 
Mediation and Arbitration to Prevent Deadly Conflict, ed. Melanie C Greenberg, John H Barton and Margaret E 
McGuiness (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2002), 226. 
7 Dallaire, Shake Hands with the Devil, 232.  
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mandate to acting as an intermediary, assisting humanitarian relief operations, and monitoring 
and reporting developments.8 
Although the Council met again on the 30th of April, it was not until the 17th of May that it 
adopted Resolution 918 (1994), expanding UNAMIR’s troop deployment and mandate, and 
establishing UNAMIR II. However the mission struggled to secure enough resources, 
equipment and personnel to deploy to Rwanda. Although the Council extended the mandate 
again on the 8th of June, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali reported that it would be 
months before UNAMIR II would be deployed. Consequently, the Council shifted its response 
again, this time authorising a French-led operation under Chapter VII “aimed at contributing, 
in an impartial way, to the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees and civilians 
at risk in Rwanda.”9  
By this stage the narrative of the situation had shifted, with the international community 
increasingly using the term genocide to describe the violence. The evolution of this frame will 
be traced in the narrative contestation portion of this chapter demonstrating not only a shift in 
the discourse used by members of the Council, but also how these discursive shifts forced the 
Council members to adjust their responses. Realists would point to these shifts to argue they 
indicate there is ‘nothing real’ about the laws and rules invoked by these states.10 They would 
argue that despite the shifting positions of the Council, UNAMIR II struggled to secure the 
requisite resources to ensure its rapid and effective deployment because despite the 
Resolution, few states had any interest in contributing to a humanitarian mission in Rwanda. 
They would argue that the French-led Operation Turquoise was the result of French interests 
in supporting sections of the Hutu government retreating from the RPF advance, not the 
alleviation of genocide.  
Whilst the shifts in the Rwandan contestation and international responses certainly point to 
mistakes and the abuse of casuistry, assuming all discourse is the result of bad casuistic 
reasoning ignores the normative impact these shifts had on decision-makers, especially the 
non-permanent members of the Security Council. The following analysis will therefore trace 
this process of contestation through these periods, focusing on how this discourse developed 
across the three clusters of contestation: actor, narrative and normative. By tracing these 
                                                          
8  
9 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 929 (1994) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3392nd Meeting, on 
22nd June 1994 as S/Res/929, United Nations: New York 
10 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 
1985), 289. 
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processes it will identify examples of bad or abusive casuistic reasoning from those that were 
accepted or legitimised. In doing so it will demonstrate that although this case involved both 
mistakes and deceptions, the international community’s shift in response was ultimately 
motivated by normative expectations, not only interests in a mere façade of legitimacy.        
3.2 Actor Contestation 
The actor contestation is separated into central and audience reframer contestations. The 
central contestation takes place between those parties directly involved in the conflict. In this 
case those actors were the Rwandan government, first under President Habyarimana, then 
Théodore Sindikubwabo after the President’s death, and the leaders of the RPF. When 
successfully legitimised, central actors and audience reframers have increased influence over 
the narrative and normative contestations, making actor legitimation a key to accessing other 
areas of contestation. As central contesters justify their own behaviour, decisions and ideas, 
they are more likely to cast their claims in more certain terms where legality and legitimacy 
are congruent, such as in the legal languages of positivism or natural law. The audience 
reframer contestation identifies actors who are not directly involved in the conflict but have a 
significant degree of political, geographic or institutional proximity to the case, providing 
them the agency to reframe and recast the central contestations. I have suggested that it is in 
the language of these actors that contestations start blurring the lines of legitimacy and 
legality. 
 Central Actor Contestation 
The Rwandan central actor contestation was disparate and predominantly domestic. The 
international actor contestation was determined less by discursive contestation, and more by events, 
in particular the RPF’s defeat of the government. Consequently, the Rwandan representative to the 
United Nations during phases one and two was a spokesman for the Habyarimana and subsequent 
interim governments –the very government that would later be held responsible for the genocide. 
This changed when the RPF won the civil war, declaring a unilateral ceasefire and establishing a 
new government. Its representative’s credentials were accepted in August, during the third phase of 
the contestation.  As Rwanda also held a non-permanent seat on the Security Council, it also spoke 
and voted at all Security Council meetings during the crisis.11  
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Although there neither party was fully committed to implementing the Arusha Accords in full in the 
lead-up to the genocide, and even indications of plans for mass violence against civilians, the 
Rwandan government attributed the deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Rwanda as the 
consequence of the residual effects of the war and displacement, as well as drought.12 
Habyarimana’s plane was shot down the next day, instigating the onset of mass violence and 
genocide.   
The Rwandan government of course did not describe its own actions or the situation in Rwanda as 
genocide, speaking of general violence in a context civil war and violence. In the first weeks of the 
genocide the interim government attempted to legitimise its position while delegitimising the RPF 
when the foreign minister of the interim government, Jérôme Bicamumpaka—himself later charged, 
tried and acquitted before the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwandan (ICTR)—spoke at the 
Security Council on the 16th of May, 1994. He framed the situation as an ethnic conflict, derived 
“from the age-old history of the nation of Rwanda forged over four centuries of cruel and ruthless 
domination of the Hutu majority by the haughty and domineering Tutsi minority.”13 Labelling the 
RPF “invaders” and noting their self-appointed name, Inkotanyi, meant “implacable killers,” he 
accused them of wanting “power during the transitional period, and at any price.” He blamed the 
RPF for resuming hostilities by massacring Hutu civilians and argued the rebels’ actions had 
instigated a wave of ethnic violence “unleashing repressed hatreds and a festering desire for revenge 
and triggering an “apocalypse” upon their own people “in the form of an inter-ethnic war of 
unbelievable cruelty.”14  
Bicamumpaka’s statement was largely ignored by most Council members, with little 
condemnation.15 “Few, if any, governments were prepared to accuse the Rwandan regime”16 as 
doing so “would be breaking the rules of the club.”17 Only two speakers at the Security Council 
explicitly disputed the legitimacy of the Foreign minister’s frame. The representative for New 
Zealand, Mr. Colin Keating found the Foreign Minster’s presence and statement offensive and 
condemned him. Keating sought to delegitimise the interim government, stating that Mr. 
Bicamumpaka did “not represent a State” and had “no legitimacy,” as he was “merely the 
                                                          
12 United Nations Security Council. Security Council, 49th Year: 3358th Meeting, Tuesday, 5 April 1994 S/Pv.3358. 
United Nations: New York, Rwanda 2. 
13 United Nations Security Council. Security Council, 49th Year: 3377th Meeting, Monday, 16 May 1994 S/Pv.3377. 
United Nations: New York, 1994, Rwanda 3-4. 
14 United Nations Security Council. 16 May 1994 S/Pv.3377, Rwanda 3-4. 
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mouthpiece of a faction” and “should not have been seated in a privileged position at this table.”18 
With respect to Bicamumpaka’s framing of the situation in Rwanda, Keating dismissed his claims 
entirely as “a shameful distortion of the truth.”19 
however, it was the Czech representative who openly condemned the government for its role in the 
genocide, accusing “the Presidential Guard created by President Habyarimana... elements of the 
Rwandese Government Forces loyal to him… the militia, the Gendarmerie” of atrocities, claiming 
they had “been committed on orders of people close to President Habyarimana and at the instigation 
of the incendiary broadcasts of Radio Milles Collines.”20 Although the British representative 
expressed “regret” for Bicamumpaka’s statement,21 the positions of New Zealand and the Czech 
were not widely accepted amongst other audience members.  The other Council members did not 
engage this contestation and, as will be demonstrated shortly, although it accepted a frame that cast 
the Rwandan situation as civil war, rather than genocide, it simply did not attribute blame to either 
side, remaining impartial and calling on both sides to end violence and return the Arusha Accords. 
Doing so allowed the interim government to maintain its position as the recognised government of 
Rwanda and gave it the ability to continue to successfully influence the overall contestation, 
especially during phase one and the first weeks of phase two. 
The actor contestation changed following the RPF’s military victory over the interim government in 
July 1994 and the RPF’s establishment of a new transitional government with very little 
international contestation. The international community simply recognised the new government, as 
demonstrated by the acceptance of its representative’s credentials at the end of August 1994.22 The 
new Rwandan leaders also inherited the state’s non-permanent Security Council seat and, after 
suspending the rules to skip Rwanda’s scheduled Council presidency in August 1994, the Council 
members allowed the new government to hold the chair in December.23 That the Council did not 
believe the former interim government should hold the Presidency in August, but the new 
government was considered sufficiently legitimate to hold this post in December suggests the old 
regime was delegitimised in favour of the new. However as there is little public discourse on this 
matter, it is not clear if this decision was the result of the interim government’s association with 
genocide, or simply the fact that in August 1994, Rwanda was transitioning between governments.  
                                                          
18 United Nations Security Council, 16 May 1994 S/Pv.3377, New Zealand 11. 
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22 Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 147. 
23 Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 147. 
61 Mind the Gap: Contestations of Legitimacy and Legality in International Politics  |     Vickie Frater 
 
Once the new government was recognised it presented its own position in terms that absolutely 
legitimised the new government and RPF, while delegitimising the ousted leaders. Former RPF 
commander Paul Kagame addressed the Council as the new Vice-President and Minister of Defence 
to the transition government. Accepting Mr. Kagame as a representative of Rwanda not only 
indicated the international legitimation of the new government as the legally recognised authority of 
Rwanda, but also provided the new Vice President with the opportunity to recast the terms of the 
contestation according to the RPF’s position, even latently chastising the international community 
for its failure to assist. He described the genocide as “the tragedy that struck our country, the worst 
to befall the human race since the Holocaust.”24 Casting the RPF’s position, he claimed, “We took 
our courage in our hands and fought to stop the genocide. Our thanks go to the Rwandese people, 
who stood almost alone” and blamed “the defeated former Government forces” for destroying 
“everything in our country that they found in their path, killing and raping innocent civilians and 
looting whatever they could lift and carry off.”25  
Unlike other cases where the international community increasingly expressed views on the 
legitimacy and even legal standing of the central actors, often while government actors were still in 
power, the international community remained silent on the question of the legitimacy of either 
party. The comparison of this relative silence in contrast with the quite loud contestations in the 
other three cases will be explored in chapter seven. Although the central actor contestation differs 
considerably from those that follow, the effects of legitimation remain the same; legitimate actors 
have increased agency to shape the terms of the contestation by framing their own legitimacy as 
well as the narrative and normative contestations that follow. They cast these claims in absolute 
terms which depicted their own actors’ and actions as good, legitimate and legal and the opposition 
as bad, illegitimate and illegal. As neither central actor sought to convince the other of the 
supremacy of their arguments, but rather directed their claims at an audience of others, the 
reframers’ contestation is also vital.   
Key Audience Reframers 
Few states on the Security Council were willing to openly reject the interim government’s position, 
and as will be demonstrated in the next section, adopted the civil war narrative until the end of May 
when the Secretary General began using a genocide frame to describe events in Rwanda. In doing 
so the international community remained quite neutral on the issue of actor legitimacy, condemning 
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actors on all sides for the violence and calling all belligerents to return to the peace process. The 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) kept its position “strangely impartial,” and like the United 
Nations, “no group was condemned by name, implying that the two combatants were equally 
culpable. Both parties were urged to agree to a cease-fire and to return to the negotiating table.”26 It 
is therefore difficult to ascertain the audience reframers in this case as those who had the capacity to 
reframe the contestation, were slow to adopt the genocide frame.   
An actor becomes an audience reframer when they establish a position of increased agency in the 
contestation but do not have a direct role in the conflict or intervention. Their interests may be the 
result of an institutional role, geographical proximity or political interest. Although states such as 
the Czech Republic and New Zealand delegitimised the interim government and described the 
violence as genocidal before any other Council Members,27 their frames were not adopted by others 
so they were not audience reframers.  Alternatively, Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali did 
shift the narrative of the contestation when he utilised a genocide frame in May 1994. Although the 
Secretary General and his office would receive widespread criticism for their failure to report the 
nature of violence more clearly and quickly,28 the efforts of the office received widespread support 
from Council members at the time, suggesting that he was a key reframe for Security Council 
discourse.  
In a report by the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, dated the 31st of May, 1994, the 
Secretary General described events as genocide.29 This was followed by the unanimous adoption of 
Resolution 925 (1994), which also categorised events as genocide. Before this decision, only two 
states on the Council, New Zealand and the Czech Republic, had used the word genocide.30 
However, neither of these actors had sufficient institutional or normative pull or proximity to the 
situation to draw others to their frame. It was not until after the publication of the Secretary 
General’s Report in May that twenty-five more statements made during Council debates framed the 
situation as genocide. The evolution of this narrative will be examined in the narrative contestation 
but at this point it demonstrates the role audience reframers play, even where they are slow to frame 
a situation. Once made, the Secretary General’s frame of genocide could not be disputed by any 
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Council members and it created a normative expectation that the international community should 
respond.  
It also demonstrates that although an actor may frame a situation correctly, their frame will not be 
adopted unless they are able to persuade others to adopt their position. New Zealand and the Czech 
Republic were amongst the first states to use the term genocide in this case, yet they were not able 
to persuade others to adopt their frame. As a result, these states were forced to accept the position of 
the majority including the decision to significantly reduce UNAMIR’s troop strength and mandate. 
Although this would seem to support the realist understanding of power, especially when combined 
with criticisms that more powerful states such as the US, France and Belgium had a presence in 
Kigali but failed to use their proximity and knowledge to reframe the contestation. However the 
analysis across all four cases in chapter seven will demonstrate that the failure of some actors to 
convince others to accept their frames is set within an institutional understanding of power, not a 
traditional one.  
By traditional understandings of power, the Secretary General’s Office is a weak actor. Whilst it 
was certainly weak in this case, it was also able to draw on considerable institutional influence to 
shift the parameters of the contestation which in turn forced the Security Council to reverse its 
decision on Rwanda. Post-conflict examinations and academic literature also suggest that although 
these initial frames were based in misconceptions if not a deliberate effort to deceive the 
international community, it shows that bad frames cannot last, regardless of the power of the actors 
endorsing them. This suggests that while states may deceive or abuse the contestation process in 
hard cases, alternative frames may prevail even where it is endorsed by less powerful actors, or 
impinges on the interests of powerful ones. 
3.3 Narrative Contestation 
This leads to the second cluster of contestations in the legitimation process, the narrative 
contestation. Narrative contestations frame the situation, in particular actions and decisions. When 
narrative frames are accepted, they establish an understanding of the facts some of which may be 
considered legal. Legal facts imply an understanding that certain situations carry with them certain 
normative understandings or consequences. In the Rwandan case, this involved the evolution of the 
narrative frame from fragile ceasefire, to general violence and civil war, to the finding of a “threat 
to international peace and security” and finally, the designation of genocide. Each of these 
narratives affected a normative understanding of which laws to apply to the situation and how to 
respond. The casting of these narratives involved two broad contestations of legal fact—first, that 
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diplomatic or non-forceful options were exhausted, and second, the situation was a threat to 
international peace and security  
 Last Resort 
Initially, the Rwanda situation was cast as a fragile peace, held together by the piecemeal but 
internationally favoured peace deal, the Arusha Accords. The Arusha Accords were deemed viable 
and valid by the international community and therefore formed the basis of its initial non-
interventionist approach. Signed in 1993, the Accords ended a three-year civil war between 
government forces and the RPF. They provided a framework for the establishment of a Broad Based 
Transitional Government (BBTG), progression towards elections, the merging of the government 
and RPF forces, as well as a United Nations Peacekeeping force.31 However, the parties failed to 
reach many of the Accords’ milestones. Some argue that Hutu hardliners never intended to 
implement the Accords at all;32 President Habyarimana himself referred to them as “mere pieces of 
paper.”33 Furthermore, although the Council authorised a peacekeeping force in Rwanda 
(UNAMIR), the mandate it provided was less robust than that proposed by the Accords. The 
authorisation and deployment of a peacekeeping force was based on the parties’ consent and 
agreement to respect the ceasefire; therefore, the parties knew that if violence escalated, UNAMIR 
would be reduced or withdrawn. Yet, despite these shortcomings, the Accords and the ceasefire 
they established remained central to the international community’s understanding of the situation 
and strategy for peace in Rwanda. 
The New Zealand representative, Colin Keating has since been highly critical of the information 
provided to the Council, arguing that non-permanent members were ignorant to the complexities 
and dangers in Rwanda and were “won over” by the Accords.34 Consequently, during phase one, the 
Council accepted a frame that the Arusha Accords and ceasefire were valid, despite the failure to 
actually implement many of its key principles such as the establishment of a BBTG. This view 
continued into phase two, following the death of President Habyarimana, and was reflected by the 
Council’s decision to reduce UNAMIR’s presence on the 21st of April. The Council decided to 
reduce UNAMIR’s force and mandate in response to the collapse of the ceasefire, and the killing of 
ten Belgian peacekeepers. Resolution 912 (1994) recognised that the situation in Rwanda 
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constituted “large scale violence” against civilians and “fighting, looting, banditry and the 
breakdown of law and order.”35 Noting that Resolution 909 (1994), adopted on the 5th of April, one 
day before the assassination of Habyarimana, required “progress” in establishing the provisions of 
the Arusha Accord’s transition, Resolution 912 reduced UNAMIR to a force of 270 in accordance 
with the Secretary-General’s recommendation.36 Furthermore, it restricted its mandate to acting as 
an “intermediary” between the parties, assisting the resumption of humanitarian assistance and 
monitoring and reporting developments.37 Hence, in these initial weeks, UNAMIR’s presence and 
capacity was contingent on the re-establishment of a ceasefire and return to the framework of the 
Accords. This decision was based on a narrative of general violence and civil war causing the 
collapse of the ceasefire. Therefore despite numerous problems inherent in the Arusha Accords, the 
diplomatic process remained valid in the Rwandan narrative. 
 Threat to International Peace and Security.  
Therefore, the initial narrative frame of the situation in Rwanda told of widespread violence against 
civilians caused by a collapsed ceasefire, civil war and general violence, but did not identify any 
particular perpetrator or belligerent. However, as violence continued unabated and the scale of the 
humanitarian crisis grew, the international community adopted a second frame through Resolution 
918, which designated the situation a “threat to international peace and security.”38 With this frame, 
the Council accepted a more serious and urgent frame and the need to respond to the crisis in 
Rwanda. It reversed its previous decision, increasing UNAMIR’s mandate to a force of 5,500 and 
expanding the mandate to include the provision of security and protection to refugees and at risk 
civilians by establishing safe areas and assisting and protecting humanitarian assistance operations. 
Although the expanded UNAMIR mission would not be deployed for months, in making this 
decision the Council members maintained the frame of civil war and general violence, albeit 
worsening and affecting civilians and requiring an international response. For example, the Chinese 
Permanent Representation stated. “The situation in Rwanda has worsened quickly, with civil war 
engulfing the whole country…. Yet the international community has not forgotten Rwanda.”39 Most 
members accepted this frame of civil war and violence, albeit worse using words such as “human 
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tragedy,”40 “carnage”41 or a combination of “humanitarian” and “crisis,”42 “nightmare,”43 
“catastrophe,”44 “disaster,”45 or “tragedy.”46 The Council’s decision to expand UNAMIR thus 
reflected an evolution of this frame as a narrative of an increasingly violent and urgent humanitarian 
catastrophe that constituted a threat to international peace and security.  
Yet, the situation was still not widely recognised as genocide by the Council, at the United Nations 
more broadly or even in international media.47 As noted in the audience reframer contestation, the 
frame of genocide was not widely accepted until after the Secretary General utilised it in his report 
on the 31st of May. Before this date, Spain recalled Resolution 918’s caution that “the killing of 
members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying in whole or in part constituted a 
crime.” Yet, it did not use the word genocide.48 Only two states utilised explicit language labelling 
the situation a genocide at this time. New Zealand utilised a frame of genocide and called for 
Chapter VII intervention while the Czech Republic went one step further explicitly rejecting the 
“humanitarian crisis” frame as a distortion, “as though it were a famine or perhaps a natural 
disaster” and stressing “the proper description is genocide.”49 Hence, only two states explicitly used 
a genocide framework before the 31st of May and of these, only one explicitly rejected the 
“humanitarian crisis” frame.  
More broadly, the Council did not begin to accept a genocide frame until June 1994. The actor 
contestation showed that this frame was accepted after the publication of the Secretary General’s 
Report on the 31st of May, which concluded, “There can be little doubt that it constitutes 
genocide.”50 The Council used the word in a Resolution for the first time eight days week after the 
release of the Secretary General’s report when Resolution 925 (1994) noted reports that genocide 
had occurred.51 It required the Secretary-General to appoint a commission of experts to investigate 
violations of international humanitarian law and genocide in Rwanda in 1994. While only two 
states, New Zealand and the Czech Republic, used a genocide frame before the 31st of May, twenty-
five statements used it after that date. This points to a slow but identifiable evolution of the 
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narrative frame from civil war and general violence to a threat to international peace and security, 
and finally genocide.  
However the Security Council’s job was not done with the authorisation of a larger mission. 
Resolution 925 did not fulfil the expectations created by a genocide narrative because UNAMIR 
struggled to find the funding, personnel and equipment to deploy. Combined with the Secretary 
General’s revelation that UNAMIR would not be operational for three months,52 the Council 
members recognised a need to take further action to address the crisis. France proposed to lead, 
“Operation Turquoise,” a Chapter VII force with Security Council authorisation to establish and 
secure safe areas, secure and protect displaced persons and vulnerable civilians and assist 
humanitarian operations until UNAMIR could be deployed. The authorising mandate, contained in 
Resolution 929 (1994), passed with ten supporting votes and five abstentions. Although the 
Resolution did not use of the word genocide,53 this frame had already been accepted, as noted 
above. Having accepted the situation did constitute genocide but that UNAMIR was still months 
away from deployment, the French-led proposal offered the only means of ensuring an immediate 
response. Although five states abstained from authorising Operation Turquoise, these states 
accepted that a more forceful and immediate response was needed to address the genocide. Indeed, 
one of the abstaining states, New Zealand, had been one of the first to utilise a genocide framework 
and had called for intervention as early as April.54 The concerns expressed by these states were that 
Operation Turquoise’s more robust Chapter VII mandate would create a disjoint with the Chapter 
VI mandate governing UNAMIR.55 Hence, although slow to evolve, this analysis demonstrates that 
once the narrative frame of genocide was accepted, the Council members also accepted that more 
decisive action was needed to fulfil the expectation created by the finding of a legal fact of 
genocide. As a result, the states that had expressed a preference for a different mandate or structure 
to the French mission were trapped, unable to prevent or hinder the authorisation of Operation 
Turquoise because they had already accepted a genocide frame that compelled international 
immediate forceful action. As the only option to offer the reality of quick deployment, these states 
were forced to allow the authorisation of the mission.   
Consequently, the initial narrative frame cast the Rwandan situation was one of civil war and 
general violence. Combined with the Security Council members’ faith in the Arusha Accords, it was 
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left to the Rwandan government and RPF to abate the violence themselves and restore the peace 
process. It will be demonstrated in the next section that although the international community’s 
approach seems to be devoid of normative values, in accepting this frame based on the validity of 
the peace process and the responsibility of the actors to reinstate it, the Council utilised a narrative 
which created different normative expectations stemming from the rules and norms of 
peacekeeping, not genocide or mass atrocity prevention.  
Although realists would be correct in arguing the widespread reluctance to use a genocide narrative 
stemmed from a preference amongst powerful states to avoid creating an expectation that might 
lead to a risky mission to an area of little political or strategic interest, the evolution of this narrative 
and the reversal of the Security Council’s initial approach demonstrates that normative expectation 
influence state behaviour, even when their interests lie elsewhere. The evolution of this narrative 
from general violence, and civil war to threat to international peace and security and genocide 
marked a transition from understanding the situation as an internal matter, to a situation which 
could compel an international response. The acceptance that the violence in Rwanda constituted 
genocide reversed the decision to reduce UNAMIR, resulting in the authorisation of an expanded 
UNAMIR force and mandate. This marked a significant change in the approaches of states such as 
the US and France, who had employed frames of violence and civil war, arguably avoiding the 
invocation of the g-word and the implications of such a frame.56  When the Secretary General 
combined the genocide frame with a grim outlook on the deployment of the new UNAMIR force, 
the Council accepted it had a responsibility not just to authorise a token UN force, but to authorise 
the option which, despite misgivings, could be deployed quickly. Although Operation turquoise has 
been labelled “too little too late,”57 and was problematic in its own right, largely due to France’s 
links to the Hutu government some claim it was actually protecting, the evolution of this case and 
the development of a genocide frame demonstrates how narrative contestations establish not only 
the situational facts or story, but how these frames can impose legal facts that may trap states into 
adjusting their behaviour or responses.  
3.4 Normative Contestation 
This leads to the third and final cluster of contestations, the normative contestations. Normative 
contestations entail arguments over the legitimate interpretation and application of norms and laws 
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to a case and are based on the frames of the actor and narrative contestations. This type of 
contestation pertains to the principles and practice of using force, whereby states contest the 
legitimacy and legality of the use of force and its implementation. On this, Martha Finnemore 
argued that “no significant constituency was claiming that intervention in Rwanda for humanitarian 
purposes would have been illegitimate or an illegal breach of sovereignty” because “states 
understood very well that legally and ethically this case required intervention.”58 Several scholars 
agree that intervention in Rwanda in 1994 to stop or prevent genocide would have been legal,59 with 
some suggesting that even unilateral intervention would have been acceptable.60 Finnemore 
concludes by stating that the problem in authorising the use of force was not the acceptance that 
intervention was justified, but rather the Council’s lack of will to implement a larger, more robust, 
more costly and more risky intervention, particularly following the failures in Somalia. 
Consequently, states “had to work hard to suppress information and to avoid the word 
‘genocide.’”61 
However, this position overlooks the evolution of the narrative contestation, in particular the 
justifications the Council used in its initial decision to reduce UNAMIR in April 1994. Michael 
Barnett points to these many investigations, accounts and dissections of the Rwanda case and agrees 
that they lead to an “inescapable conclusion… that the UN responded to the genocide with wilful 
ignorance and indifference.”62 Still, although there was knowledge of genocide and crimes against 
humanity when the Council reduced UNAMIR’s force and mandate, “few believed that they were 
acting in a guileful, heartless or callous manner.”63 Guided by the normative principles of 
peacekeeping, they justified this decision by viewing the situation as a civil war and placing 
responsibility on the government forces and RPF to re-establish a ceasefire and return to the Arusha 
framework. Whilst they did not use the words “internal matter,” the Council did place the initial 
responsibility for action on the Rwandan parties, rather than the international community. 
On the 20th of April, the Secretary General’s office recommended three options to the Council. The 
first option involved a “massive reinforcement of UNAMIR” and increased its mandate, granting it 
enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to coerce the parties to accept 
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a ceasefire. It was predicated on the conclusion “that there is no realistic prospect of the two 
opposing forces agreeing to a cease-fire.”64 The second option, which was adopted by Resolution 
912, proposed the reduction of UNAMIR to approximately 270 troops, with a more restricted 
mandate to “act as an intermediary” and provide support for the resumption of humanitarian 
assistance operations.65 The third and final option was the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR, which 
was not favoured by the Secretary-General.66  
The Council adopted the second option unanimously, although some, including Nigeria, believed it 
to be the only acceptable option out of three poor choices.67 Only four states spoke at the meeting in 
which Resolution 912 was adopted. Their justifications for the decision were that the first option 
was not feasible and could not be deployed in time to be effective. Time would prove this 
evaluation correct as even UNAMIR II would struggle to find the resources for deployment despite 
authorisation and a genocide frame. Option three was simply unacceptable and “defeatist.” 
However, option two, whilst also not completely satisfactory either, was the only acceptable option 
in circumstances where the belligerents would not consent to a ceasefire or peacekeeping mission. 
Therefore, the justification for this decision was grounded in a normative understanding of the 
principles of peacekeeping, in particular the “holy trinity” of consent, impartiality and the minimal 
use of force.68 These three criteria of “traditional peacekeeping” were not intended to redevelop or 
rethink peacekeeping, but rather changed the emphasis of traditional peacekeeping to “adapt 
Westphalian tools to the new environment.”69 
Although no state argued that intervention would be illegal or illegitimate, particularly after the 
threat to international peace and security and genocide frames developed, the norms of sovereignty 
and non-interference as understood through the framework of peacekeeping formed the normative 
basis to justify the decision to reduce UNAMIR. The narrative frame that defined the situation as a 
collapsed peace process, general violence and civil war meant that the international community 
could apply these norms and justify their decision not to act without the consent of the belligerent 
parties. 
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3.5 The Rwandan Legitimation Process 
Therefore, following the acceptance of a more serious narrative that reframed the situation as a 
humanitarian crisis on a scale that constituted a threat to peace and security and then genocide, the 
Council did accept the need to take positive action. This resulted in the expansion of UNAMIR and 
subsequent authorisation of the French-led Operation Turquoise. All states recognised the 
exceptional and urgent nature of the Rwandan crisis and accepted the legitimacy of intervening in 
these circumstances. There were only five abstentions,70 of which four verbally justified their 
decisions on record. All four indicated that, while the need for intervention was recognised, keeping 
the French operation within the framework of UNAMIR was their preferred choice. Brazil 
cautioned against “invoking the extraordinary powers of Chapter VII,” noting that, in authorising 
such a mandate, the Council had created two separate but simultaneous missions, one peacekeeping, 
and the other peace enforcement.71 Hence, Brazil did not oppose the option of using force in 
Rwanda, but rather the creation of another mission, separate from UNAMIR with a broader 
mandate than the UN mission. Thus the contesters continued using casuistic reasoning, applying 
accepted principles associated with the use of force, humanitarian law and peacekeeping. The 
normative interpretation of these rules, however, was largely uncontested as the narratives the 
actors told shifted the very principles from which each actor began.  
Operation Turquoise has been the subject of criticism, many arguing France’s close relationship to 
the Hutu government meant the mission was guided by French geo-political interests, not 
humanitarianism.72 Furthermore, the in accepting the evolution of the narrative from violence to 
genocide, the international community and media had conflated the genocide and civil war as 
causes of the humanitarian crisis it addressed. Operation Turquoise therefore failed to recognise that 
the displaced population that fled to its safe area was not comprised of genocide victims, but rather 
civilians uprooted by fleeing government forces and militia. Hence, the displaced population also 
contained known génocidaires, which were then protected in the French safe area.73 However, 
despite these shortcomings and much reluctance amongst Council members, the international 
community accepted that being seen to be doing something, such as authorising the expansion of 
UNAMIR, would not suffice; it needed to authorise and ensure action. As the only state offering a 
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force ready for deployment, the approval of the French mission, like many other decisions in this 
case, seemed to be the best poor option.  
It is thus apparent that the normative aspects of this case were accepted in principle, as the 
contestation related to the framing of the narrative and the application of those norms to those 
frames. This case clearly points to the evolution of a narrative frame that, in turn, pushed the 
Council to accept the legitimacy and necessity of international force in Rwanda. The numerous 
apologies of key leaders, such as President Bill Clinton,74 demonstrate the widespread view that the 
international community failed in Rwanda.75 However, even if we agree with realists that this was a 
deliberate attempt at obfuscation to avoid committing to an intervention in a location of little geo-
strategic value, the evolution of this narrative, its impact on the Council’s decisions and the 
normative contestation demonstrate that accepted principles of international relations compel states 
to behave in certain ways despite the prevalence of such interests. Consequently, the international 
community recognised the legitimacy of intervening in the Rwandan case, albeit too late. The 
acceptance of this narrative led to the rhetorical entrapment of even the Council’s, most powerful 
members, leading to the reversal of the decision to reduce UNAMIR. Furthermore, the evolution of 
this narrative suggests that the legitimacy of forcefully intervening to prevent or avert a 
humanitarian crisis was not a new norm, but the application of an accepted norm to a new or 
changed narrative. I have defined casuistry as the application of accepted principles and values to 
the new situations, consequently, these contestations can be considered individual acts of casuistic 
reasoning. What the legitimation process highlights is that the international audience is capable of 
distinguishing good casuistry from bad, and applies accepted principles to the narratives it 
recognises. 
This suggests not only that normative expectations influence state behaviour, but that these 
decisions lie within a process of contestation, which is itself cast in and determined by the 
languages of legitimacy and legality. Not only did these contestations lead to the acceptance of 
certain actors and their agency, but they also established narratives that compelled a normatively 
driven interpretation of the situation and institutional decisions and actions. This example also 
demonstrates that, when states misuse or misapply these contestations, their actions may themselves 
be the subject of contestation. In other words, states cannot make any claim they please to justify 
their preferred response because there must be some degree of normative parity between the 
accepted frames of the actor, narrative and normative frames and the response of the international 
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community. Although the Rwandan case was an abysmal failure in civilian protection, the United 
Nations peacekeeping, Security Council enforcement and arguably, humanity, the shift in the 
international community’s contestations over and responses to the genocide demonstrate an attempt 
to find this parity and apply it to a hard case.   
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CHAPTER 4  
KOSOVO: Illegal but Legitimate 
 
 
4.1 Illegal but Legitimate? 
The legitimation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) intervention in the Serbian 
governed province of Kosovo-Metohija was and remains one of the most highly contested examples 
of the use of force for humanitarian purposes. Deemed illegal, because it lacked a Security Council 
mandate, but legitimate because the Security Council’s paralysis prevented a collective response,1 
this seemingly contradictory assessment further compounded failures in Somalia, Bosnia and 
Rwanda. It falls into a legitimacy gap, where its legitimacy and legality are incongruous and 
remains a contested highly case. Critics of international law would point to this widespread 
disagreement and as evidence of international law’s inability to impact powerful states when 
individual interests and political advantages are at stake. They argue the paralysis of the Security 
Council and NATO’s unilateral intervention were the consequence of competing great power 
interests colliding in the Eastern European theatre. However despite the uncertain nature of the 
outcome in this case which has left it amongst the most highly contested hard cases more fifteen 
years later, a legitimation process occurred in this case and tracing it highlights how the 
international community responded to the crisis despite the prevalence of selfish, bad and even 
deceitful casuistic arguments by powerful actors. 
The Kosovo conflict was entrenched in hundreds of years of nationalist history,2 but the 1999 crisis 
began with the escalation of violence and the threat of NATO intervention in 1998 following almost 
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a decade of failures to address the Kosovo question. Clashes between the Kosovar Liberation Army 
(KLA) and Serbian police forces had grown increasingly violent, causing the federal government to 
send Yugoslav military forces to the region. Kosovar Albanians, who constituted a minority in 
Serbia but a majority of the Kosovo province, had been demanding autonomy and independence 
from Serbia. Although they had demanded equal status as the other Yugoslav Republics until 1991, 
Albanian Kosovar leaders began demanding outright independence following upheaval amongst the 
Republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)3 in the early 1990s. However, 
the question of Kosovo’s status was not addressed by the 1995 Dayton Accords at the end of the 
Yugoslav Wars and it remained a part of the Serbian Republic of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). Frustrated by the failures of the passive civil disobedience approach endorsed 
by the President of Kosovo’s unrecognised government, Dr Ibrahim Rugova, hardliners formed The 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in 1996 and began attacking Serbian security posts. Due to its 
violent nature of these attacks, the United States placed the KLA on its Terrorist Organisations list 
where it would remain until 1998.4 Tensions continued to rise, peaking in 1998, when open violence 
between the KLA and Serbian police forces led to a military crackdown, internally displacing 
hundreds of thousands of Kosovars and causing thousands more to flee into neighbouring states, 
many of which remained in volatile post-conflict situations following the Yugoslav wars.  
Rugova appealed to world leaders, especially the US and European Union (EU), “to do whatever 
possible to save the people of Kosovo,” claiming that the attacks “were a part of a Serb programme 
for the ethnic cleansing of Kosovo.”5 President Clinton and United Nations Secretary General Kofi 
Annan, condemned the violence and called on the Serbian government to address the Kosovars’ 
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“legitimate concerns” in a joint statement.6 Clinton went further, foreshadowing the potential use of 
force by emphasising “that no option should be ruled in or out now.”7 However, Milošević refused 
to meet with international mediators, claiming that “Kosovo was a domestic Serbian matter.”8 The 
Security Council imposed an arms embargo on Serbia and Kosovo on the 31st of March 1998,9 but 
violence continued.  
The international community took an interest in this escalating violence, with Germany, Italy, Russia, 
the UK and the USA forming a Contact Group to monitor and respond to the crisis. It issued two statements -
-the London Agreement and the Bonn Agreement- in 1998, calling on the parties to put an end to the 
violence and seek a political solution or face international consequences, including sanctions. Attempts at 
dialogue between the parties failed to settle the matter and continued violence, reports of mass 
human rights abuses and displacement aimed at ethnically cleansing Kosovo of Albanians prompted 
Security Council Resolution 1199 (1998) in September, calling on all parties to end the violence 
and begin meaningful dialogue. It also stipulated that the FRY should withdraw its forces from 
Kosovo and permit an international monitoring group.10 At the same time, NATO delivered its first 
ultimatum or activated warning to Milošević, demanding he stop the violence and seek a political 
solution or face NATO force.11 Serbian authorities and the US envoy, Richard Holbrooke, reached 
an agreement in October 1998, obtaining a short reprieve and establishing an unsteady ceasefire 
over the winter. However, the killing of forty-five ethnic Albanians in the village of Račak in 
January 1999 caused international outcry. The OSCE’s Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) head 
placed the blame for what he viewed as a civilian massacre solely on Serbian police and the 
government and was subsequently expelled from Kosovo by Belgrade.12  
Following the Račak killings, the Contact Group called the parties to the negotiating table for peace 
talks at Rambouillet. These talks led to an autonomy agreement accepted by the Kosovo leaders, 
                                                          
6 Kofi Annan and William J. Clinton, “Remarks prior to discussions with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
and an exchange with reporters,” 11 March, 1998. The American Presidency Project, accessed September 18, 2011, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=55605&st=Kosovo&st1=. 
7 William J. Clinton, in Annan and Clinton, Remarks Prior to Discussions with United Nations Secretary-General Kofi 
Annan. 
8 BBC News. “US Rallies International Pressure on Yugoslavia over Kosovo.” BBC News, March 7 1998, accessed 
September 24, 2011, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/62998.stm. 
9 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1160 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3868th Meeting, on 
31 March 1998 S/Res/1160, United Nations: New York. 
10 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1199 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3930th Meeting, on 
23 September 1998 S/Res/1199, United Nations: New York. 
11 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Statement by the Secretary General following the ACTWARN decision.” NATO 
Press Statements, September 24, 1998, accessed September 25, 2011, http://www.NATO.int/docu/pr/1998/p980924e. 
htm. 
12 BBC News, “Walker: ‘No Doubt Over Račak’.” BBC News, January 31, 1999, accessed September 24, 2011, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/268788.stm. 
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despite falling short of independence, but rejected by Serbian authorities, who refused to permit a 
NATO-led international force. Attacks and skirmishes continued in Kosovo throughout this time 
and, when the Rambouillet talks broke down on the 18th of March 1999, Serbian forces intensified 
their crackdown on Kosovo. The KVM withdrew and NATO commenced airstrikes against Serbian 
targets on the 24th of March, intending to “destroy Milošević’s military machine.”13 
In the lead-up to the intervention and throughout the duration of the airstrike campaign, the central 
parties to the Kosovo contestation continued to legitimise their positions and behaviour using legal 
and legitimacy-based language. This chapter will examine the arguments presented by the actors 
contesting the legitimacy and legality of NATO’s decision to launch unilateral airstrikes against 
Serbian military targets to avert crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and gross human rights 
abuses against ethnic Albanians in the province of Kosovo. Applying the framework developed in 
chapter two, these key arguments have been broken down into three clusters and will focus on the 
legitimacy of the actors, the narratives they told and the norms they relied upon. The central actor 
contesters in this case consisted of: the government authorities, including both the FRY and Serbian 
leadership; the Kosovar opposition including the parallel government, the KLA, and Kosovar 
Albanian people generally; and finally, NATO, in particular the intervention’s lead states, the US 
and UK. The key audience reframers included the OSCE’s KVM, the Contact Group, Russia, and 
the Security Council.  
The second cluster of contestations is closely linked to these actor contestations and involves the 
narratives used by these actors to explain events on the ground and their responses to them. Parties 
that gained legitimacy as audience reframers in the actor contestation were able to accept, reject or 
reframe the narrative contestations itself. Audience reframers could thereby legitimise or 
delegitimise not only the central contesters and their actions or decisions, but also the responses of 
the international community. 
Narrative contestations can be divided into two related stories. The first focuses on how situational 
facts develop a plot that labels the situation a threat to international peace and security. This occurs 
when actors accept certain descriptions of the events, such as the disproportionate use of force and 
the targeting of civilians, and recast them as legal facts that recognise the action breaches 
international human rights and humanitarian law, or constitutes a crime such as genocide or ethnic 
cleansing. The second narrative focuses on diplomatic responses and processes, and establishes the 
                                                          
13 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Press Conference Given by the NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, and the 
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exhaustion of non-forceful options, making the use of force the last resort. In this case, this involved 
contestations over the central contesters’ levels of compliance with Security Council Resolutions 
and cooperation with international negotiation processes, such as the Rambouillet Accords. The 
establishment of legal facts creates an expectation that certain responses may or may not be open to 
the international community and lead into normative contestations where states use casuistic 
approaches to reasoning to determine which rules, norms and laws are relevant and to interpret and 
apply them to those facts 
The normative contestation therefore focused on the legitimacy and legality of the rules pertaining 
to human rights, humanitarianism, sovereignty, non-interference and the threat and use of force in 
international relations. Based on the findings of the narrative contestation, the overall question of 
the use of force in international relations and the necessity of Security Council authorisation is 
addressed. Finally, the implementation of the intervention and the impact NATO’s methods had on 
the framing of the overall situation and the use of force are also examined. 
Although these groups overlap and their arguments often flow into each other, isolating them allows 
for the delineation of a process of legitimation. Each cluster of contestations will be examined 
across three time periods (Figure 4.1). The first phase took place from early 1998 until the initiation 
of airstrikes on the 24th of March, 1999. The second phase coincided with the actual intervention, 
which lasted for approximately two and a half months, ending on the 10th of June, 1999. The third 
phase marked the post-conflict stage. By examining the contestations as available in media, United 
Nations documents, government reports and announcements and academic literature, this chapter 
will examine how these claims were made, perceived and reframed over the course of these three 
stages and trace this legitimation process in the confusion and contradictions of the Kosovo 
intervention.  
 
Figure 4.1: Kosovo Timeline. 
Phase 1: Pre-
intervention/Conflict
•9 March 1998 
(London 
Agreement)- 23rd 
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Intervention/Conflict
• 24th March 1999 
(NATO airstikes)-
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Final Agreement, 
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Resolution 1244 and 
NATO ends air 
campaign)
Phase 3: Post 
Intervention/Conflict
• 11th June 1999-
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(Milošević 
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4.2 Actor Contestations 
The central contestation involved three main groups of actors: the governments of the FRY and 
Serbia; the Kosovar Albanians made up of the political leadership, KLA and the Kosovar people 
generally; and NATO, particularly the US and UK. The secondary contestation of key audience 
reframers involved a range of actors, including the Contact Group, the OSCE’s KVM, the United 
Nations Security Council, and key Council members such as Russia. 
 Central Actor Contestation 
The central contestation between the conflicting parties over the status of Kosovo was longstanding, 
dating back hundreds of years. However, the crisis that peaked in 1999 with NATO’s intervention 
began in 1989, when Milošević removed Kosovo’s autonomy, which had been guaranteed by the 
1974 Constitution of the SFRY. As a result, Kosovo became a province of the Serbian Republic 
within the SFRY. Following the early stages of the disintegration of the SFRY in 1991, Kosovar 
Albanians held a “Secret Ballot.” They elected a parallel government, with Ibrahim Rugova as 
President and proclaimed the Republic of Kosovo in 1992. Rugova advocated a non-violent 
campaign of civil disobedience in which Kosovar Albanians established a parallel government, 
including independent health and education services. However, following the failure to address the 
Kosovo question at Dayton, Kosovar Albanians became frustrated by the failure of Rugova’s civil 
disobedience approach and the KLA emerged 1996 stating its goal was Kosovo’s secession from 
the FRY by force.14  
The Serbian-led government maintained its government’s legitimacy by arguing that it was the 
lawful authority of a pluralist state, which guaranteed the same rights to all minority groups across 
the FRY. The FRY’s special representative to Belgrade argued in a Security Council meeting in 
March 1998 that “the problems in Kosovo and Metohija are rooted in a separatism which, at this 
very moment, is publicly advocated by the representatives of some political parties of the Albanian 
national minority. This underpins terrorism.”15 Belgrade grounded this argument in the Federal 
Constitution, claiming that the FRY consisted of numerous minority groups, all protected by the 
Constitution that guaranteed the Albanian minority “the same rights that are granted to other 
citizens.” He distinguished the actions of only a small group of detractors from Kosovar Albanians 
more broadly, arguing that “the selective boycott of some, and the exercise of other rights is not the 
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result of the free will of the members of the Albanian national minority, most of whom are 
responsible, loyal and law-abiding citizens.”16  
Therefore, the FRY legitimised itself as a democratic federation made up of numerous minority 
groups, provided equal protection under the Federal Constitution. According to the Constitution, all 
minority groups could participate freely and equally in all levels of government. It also argued that 
this constitution satisfied the benchmarks set out by the OSCE and Council of Europe (COE) for the 
protection minority rights. It also claimed that the special autonomous rights removed from the 
province in 1989 had in fact breached the rights of other minority groups, giving the Kosovar 
Albanians an unfair privilege. Arguing that the problem lay with a minority of terrorists and 
secessionists within a minority ethnic group, it claimed to be the domestically legitimate authority 
of the entire Serbian Republic, including Kosovo. This framing argument would also be an 
important aspect of Belgrade’s legitimation of the situation as an internal matter. During the 
negotiations, it justified its continued refusal to agree to an autonomy arrangement based on the 
prescriptions of its federal constitution and the rights of all minority groups under FRY law. This 
claim aimed to not only legitimise the government’s decision to remove Kosovo’s autonomy status 
but also justified the initiation of police and military action to combat terrorist and secessionist 
threats.  
Kosovar Albanians rejected the frame that they were one of many minority groups in the FRY, 
protected by the wider institutions of the federation. Instead, they argued that the removal of 
Kosovo’s autonomous status led to widespread oppression of the Albanian population. Although 
they initially demanded equal status to the other Yugoslav Republics, the upheavals of 1991 and 
subsequent Yugoslav wars prompted the Kosovar leadership to call for independence from the 
federation. Continued frustration at Rugova’s passive gradualist approach following the failure to 
address the Kosovo issue at Dayton led to the formation of the KLA, which began attacking Serbian 
police and security posts in 1996.17 Although Rugova distanced himself from the KLA and all 
violent actors, he did not explicitly condemn them despite international calls for his leadership to do 
so. Consequently, there was a risk of Kosovar Albanian groups splintering over these pacifist-
moderate and hard-line divisions.  
The audience reframe contestation will demonstrate that neither the Kosovar nor the FRY 
approaches were widely accepted, however Slovenia did accept the Kosovar’s frame and cautioned 
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the international community not to abuse the term “terrorism”. As it was not a member of NATO in 
1999, this claim does not represent a NATO frame. The Slovenian representative stated there was 
“clear need to avoid the trap set by those who use the label of terrorism for reasons of political 
convenience and without proper factual foundation.” Accepting that “terrorism has to be 
condemned and combated,” the Slovenian representative also distinguished the Kosovar case 
arguing that “there are forms of struggle that, albeit undesirable, are not terrorism and ought not to 
be labelled as such.”18 This frame was not widely accepted, however, and the international 
community would ultimately recast the framing of this contestation in terms that accepted and 
rejected elements of both central contesters’ absolutist approaches.  
Nonetheless, the Kosovar opposition successfully formed a negotiating team for the Rambouillet 
Accords, which included three hard-line KLA supporters.19 The legitimacy of the negotiating 
process and the subsequent Rambouillet Accords will be examined as a part of the narrative of 
events. The Kosovo Albanian negotiating team was forced to compromise their independence 
demand, accepting an autonomy deal to appease international negotiators and secure a NATO-led 
monitoring force. In accepting this compromise, the Kosovar Albanian representatives, which 
included hard-line members of the KLA, legitimised their own position, forcing Belgrade to choose 
between rhetorical entrapment and rhetorical exclusion. Belgrade could either be rhetorically 
entrapped by accepting a compromise which would guarantee the territorial unity of the Serbian 
state or rhetorically exclude itself by rejecting the Accords entirely. Consequently, when the 
Kosovar leadership and the agreement gained widespread legitimation from the international 
community, 20  Belgrade was subsequently delegitimised, and its framing arguments were 
increasingly excluded from the accepted narrative and normative frame.  
As the third central contester in the actor contestation, NATO’s approach drew on elements of both 
the FRY and Kosovar Albanians and recast an actor frame of these two actors in terms that were 
more widely accepted by the international community. . First, all NATO members were quick to 
condemn any terrorist violence, stating unequivocally and frequently that terrorism, in whatever 
form, was completely unacceptable.21 For example, the Italian representative, speaking at the 
Security Council underlined that Resolution 1160 (1998) included the “firm condemnation not only 
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of all forms of violence, but also of terrorism,” while noting that “Dr. Rugova’s commitment to 
non-violence.”22 The KLA, however, since its formation in the early 1990s, had been recognised as 
a terror organisation in both the US and the UK.23 As violence escalated, it became apparent that, if 
NATO ever had to carry out its threats against Belgrade, it would need to change its approach to 
Kosovo without condoning a terrorist organisation. 
The US began this process by recognising the reality that any peace agreement would have to 
include the consent of the KLA. Speaking in mid-1998, State Department Spokesman, James P. 
Rubin, spoke to the problem of negotiating with a recognised terrorist group. While being careful 
not to refer to the group as a terrorist organisation, he stated that the increasing influence of the 
KLA in Kosovo meant contact would be made “soon,” most likely through Richard Holbrooke, 
adding that “President Milošević is just going to have to deal with that fact.”24 The Special Envoy 
for Kosovo, Robert S. Gelbard, had referred to the KLA as terrorists just months before meeting 
two KLA leaders with a view to encouraging them to support Dr Rugova’s more moderate plan for 
an autonomy arrangement.25 This marked a change in US policy on dealing with the Kosovo 
situation as an insurgency rather than a terrorist threat. Speaking of Ambassador Gelbard’s meeting 
with the KLA members, a senior US spokesman noted that dealing with the KLA was a simple 
reality of the situation:  
The United States regards Dr. Rugova as the leader of a very disparate group 
of Kosovar Albanian opinion, and his political party is the largest in Kosovo. 
But clearly the KLA has become a major force, and if we are going to be 
realistic, they need to be brought into the process.26 
Consequently, Western leaders accepted a legitimate role for the KLA as well as the Kosovar 
leadership. Although Rugova enjoyed significant domestic legitimacy, as the elected president of 
the parallel government and international legitimacy as a pacifist leader, the KLA gained increasing 
domestic legitimacy, as Kosovar Albanians grew weary of Rugova’s pacifist but seemingly 
ineffective approach. According to some estimates, its ranks swelled from just a few hundred armed 
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men in early 199827 to several thousand trained fighters by the end of that year.28 Combined with 
the continuation of violence and Belgrade’s unwillingness to withdraw its forces, NATO was forced 
to find a way to legitimise its dealings with the KLA. This called for a strategy in which the threat 
of force was “directed against Milošević… but contingent on cooperation by the Kosovar 
Albanians, including the KLA.”29  
Hence the international audience distinguished between the Kosovar Albanian leadership and 
terrorist activity in the early stages of the contestation, condemning the latter unconditionally. 
Resolution 1160 condemned “the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against civilians 
and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism by the Kosovo Liberation 
Army or any other group or individual” and called on “the Kosovar Albanian leadership to 
condemn all terrorist action,” emphasising “that all elements in the Kosovar Albanian community 
should pursue their goals by peaceful means only.”30 However it also distinguished the position of 
the pacifist parallel government, noting “the clear commitment of senior representatives of the 
Kosovar Albanian community to non-violence.”31Adopted one year before the initiation of 
airstrikes, Resolution 1160 demonstrated the audience’s early acceptance of the Kosovo Albanian 
people and non-violent leaders while condemning terrorism. This also represented a reframing of 
the central actor contestation between Belgrade and the Kosovars w, in which each expressed its 
own legitimacy in absolute terms, while completely delegitimising the other. The audience’s 
position, as demonstrated by Security Council resolutions and debates, points to a reframing of both 
central actors’ claims.   
However, agreeing to the Rambouillet Accords legitimised the entire Kosovar Albanian leadership 
and the international community stopped distinguishing the legitimate demands of the Kosovar 
people and Dr. Rugova from those of the KLA. For example, the Malaysian representative, Mr. 
Rastam “welcomed and supported the peace process initiated by the Contact Group, culminating in 
the Rambouillet accords,” noting that “the Kosovar Albanians signed on 18 March 1999.”32 He did 
not distinguish between the already legitimised moderate Kosovar Albanians and the KLA as they 
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had, as a group, accepted the compromise. Furthermore, he also delegitimised Belgrade’s refusal 
stating, “Unfortunately, the Yugoslav leadership… continues to reject the Rambouillet accords and 
rebuff all efforts at finding a political solution to the conflict.”33 Another audience member, 
Bahrain, took a similar position in which it accepted the legitimacy of the Kosovar Albanians, 
without distinction between the moderate leaders and the KLA, while delegitimising Belgrade for 
its refusal. The representative of Bahrain noted that “the party representing the Kosovar Albanians 
had agreed to a peaceful settlement at Rambouillet and had signed the agreement. The Serb side, 
however, refused to sign and has continued to use extreme force in the Kosovo region.”34  
Even states that were allies of the FRY and condemned the use of force against a sovereign state 
accepted some delegitimation of Belgrade. Russia, a longstanding supporter of Serbia, condemned 
“the excessive use of force by Serbian police,” but also unequivocally condemned acts of terrorism, 
stating, “Terrorism is categorically unacceptable in any form or manifestation.”35 Consequently, 
although a close ally of Belgrade Russia also took a position that was slightly nuanced from the 
FRY by accepting that the Serbia response was excessive, but also stressing the it categorical 
condemnation of Kosovar terrorist actions.  
Despite Russia’s nuanced position the audience widely accepted the some legitimation of the 
Kosovar Albanians and the widespread delegitimation of the Serbian government. Figures 4.2, 4.3 
and 4.4 demonstrate how this contestation unfolded on the Security Council and point to the clear 
delegitimation of the FRY and some legitimation of the Kosovar Albanian leadership. Although the 
Kosovar leadership did not receive legal recognition, it was widely recognised as the legitimate 
interlocutor for the Kosovar people, especially following its acceptance of the Rambouillet Accords. 
The near absence of delegitimation statements against the Kosovar Albanians in phase two is 
particularly relevant. This reflects the reduction in the distinction between the legitimate moderate 
leadership and the hard-line KLA terrorists following their acceptance of the Rambouillet Accords 
as a single negotiating group.   
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Figure 4.2: Kosovo Actor Legitimation Radar Phase 1: 9 March 1998- 23 March 1999 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Kosovo Actor Legitimation Radar Phase 2 24 March 1998- 10 June 1998 
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Figure 4.4: Kosovo Actor Legitimation Radar Phase 3 10 June 1998 -5 October 1998 
 
The radars also depict a peak in the delegitimation of Belgrade, as many audience members placed 
specific responsibility for the escalation of violence in early 1999 on Milošević’s failure to accept a 
political solution, as well as the methods of the Serbian and Yugoslav forces. Perritt argues that 
Milošević was directly responsible for his own delegitimation and the legitimation of the KLA. He 
suggests that, by expelling the Albanian populations, Milošević had done “more for the KLA than 
anyone else,” as he “ultimately drove not only a critical mass of the Albanian population but also 
the international community into the KLA’s arms.”36 The actor contestation radars therefore support 
the conclusion that the international audience conferred a small degree of legitimacy on the Kosovar 
Albanians while significantly delegitimising Milošević and Belgrade. 
Finally, the radars also point to another legitimation contestation over the role of NATO as a central 
actor. NATO received significant criticism for the use of force without Security Council 
authorisation.37 Some pointed out that NATO’s role as a collective security organisation meant that 
its actions overstepped the parameters of its Charter, as the alliance itself was not under attack.38 
However, NATO members maintained that, as a regional security organisation, it was concerning 
itself with a legitimate regional security threat. NATO was addressing a regional security issue, a 
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grave international human rights issue and an emerging humanitarian crisis. Pointing to the FRY’s 
barely stabilised neighbours and the Balkan’s recent history of ethnic cleaning and violence, NATO 
members argued that it was in regional and international interests to ensure the Balkan powder keg 
did not explode again.39 Many audience members accepted this reframe, although they did express 
concern at NATO’s lack of regard for the authority of the Security Council.40 As such, NATO did 
not achieve significant legal standing as an intervener. Its legitimacy as an intervener was much 
more widely contested, as demonstrated by broad sweeps into both legitimacy and illegitimacy. As 
such, NATO’s legitimacy as an intervener was more widely contested in terms of legitimacy than 
legality.  
The central actor contestation therefore demonstrates several key factors of the legitimation process, 
even before we embark on the analysis of the narrative and normative contestations. The first is that 
the central actors’ frames were all adjusted by actors outside the central contestation. This 
demonstrates that central actors do not aim to persuade each other, but rather direct their claims to 
an audience. Therefore, although the Kosovar Albanian representatives and Belgrade expressed 
their claims in absolute terms the completely legitimised their own roles, while completely 
delegitimising others, often utilising sloppy casuistry to force their case on the facts, the audience 
members recast this, attributing responsibility to both actors for violence, condemning Belgrade for 
excessive force and disproportionality and the Kosovar Albanians for condoning and using 
terrorism.  
However we also see the beginnings of rhetorical entrapment and rhetorical exclusion. By accepting 
the compromise offered at Rambouillet, the Kosovar negotiating team placed Belgrade in a position 
where it would be either trapped into accepting a negotiated settlement and political solution that 
did not suit its demands, or excluded from a contestation where its failure to cooperate with 
international processes was viewed in bad faith. These two features of the contestation will 
therefore be explored further in the narrative contestation.  
Key Audience Reframers 
This category of actors included a range of states and inter-governmental organisations that, 
although not directly involved in the conflict, established sufficient interest in, or proximity to the 
case to place themselves as key audience members. In this case, it included the OSCE and its 
verification mission (KVM), the G8 and the Contact Group, and Russia. Here, key audience 
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members played a crucial role, as following on from their legitimation as key actors, they in turn 
recast the terms of the contestation. 
The Contact Group’s legitimacy was contested as it was the first international group of states to take 
an active interest in the Kosovo situation. It issued the London Agreement in March 1998, 
condemning the violence and abuses in Kosovo, and calling on the FRY government to take 
responsibility for ending the violence, withdrawing troops and seeking a political solution or risk 
sanctions.41 Along with the G8, the Contact Group became integral in attempts to reach a peaceful 
solution to the situation, negotiating the October 1998 Belgrade agreement, the Rambouillet 
Accords and the Final Agreement. First, it issued the London Agreement, condemning violence on 
all sides and calling on all parties to end violence and seek a political solution. The Contact Group 
placed particular responsibility on government authorities, calling on them to withdraw forces, 
allow humanitarian and UNHCR access and ensure safe and voluntary returns.42 When the FRY 
failed to substantially address the concerns of the London Agreement, the Contact Group released a 
second statement, the Bonn Agreement, foreshadowing further measures. 43   
The FRY rejected the legitimacy of this international group’s interference in what it viewed to be its 
domestic affairs. It argued that “the positions taken by the Contact Group in London on 9 March 
1998 and in Bonn on 25 March 1998 are tantamount to the pursuit of a policy of force and so called 
gunboat diplomacy.” Noting that the Group was controlled by “Powers” that would “dictate 
solutions to internal questions and decide who can and who cannot defend himself against terrorism 
and separatism,”44 it rejected the legitimacy of the group entirely. 
 
The Contact Group’s decisions were widely supported, with numerous states and organisations 
speaking in favour of both the London and Bonn Agreements. Many speakers explicitly supported 
both statements during Council meetings. Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199 imposed 
sanctions on Serbia and Kosovo and the restated demands of the London and Bonn Agreements, 
making them the conditions for lifting the sanctions and effectively elevating their status through 
binding Council resolutions. Although Russia expressed concerns regarding the broader consensus 
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of the Group’s decisions, the audience of states widely accepted the legitimacy of the Contact 
Group,   accepting the Group’s framing of the situation and its recommendation to impose sanctions. 
However, Russia still had a significant influence on the formation of these actions, which resulted in 
the delegitimation and sanctioning of both parties in an effort to develop a more impartial frame. 
This clearly points to Russia’s role as a reframer whose position on the Contact Group resulted in 
significant adjustments to the international response.  
 
Russia did not support the broad array of economic and diplomatic sanctions imposed by the UK, 
US, Germany and France in the Contact Group’s statements. Still, it did support a Security Council 
arms embargo, as it targeted both sides of the conflict. Russia acknowledged that the situation was 
having a negative impact on the region, but maintained the only solution lay in dialogue between the 
government authorities and Kosovar Albanians. Russia felt the Contact Group’s sanctions plan was 
one-sided, targeting Belgrade more heavily than Kosovo. This issue was addressed by the Security 
Council when it imposed weapons sanctions against both Serbia and Kosovo and condemned all 
parties for violence and terrorism.45 Russia therefore successfully recast the contestation, trapping 
the Security Council into accepting a Resolution that condemned both actors for their poor 
behaviour and thus imposed sanctions on both belligerents. 
 
The OSCE’s verification mission (KVM) played an important role as an audience reframer, 
although perhaps the most significant event was not its framing of the events, but rather Belgrade’s 
decision to expel the mission’s head, William Walker, for framing killings in Račak as civilian 
killings. Belgrade expelled the verification mission and its head, claiming that Walker and the KVM 
had attempted to “deceive the world” as to the true nature of the situation in Kosovo “with a series 
of lies and fabrications… in an obvious attempt to divert the attention from terrorists, murderers and 
kidnappers and to once again protect them the way he has been protecting them all along.”46 
However, despite Belgrade’s condemnation of the mission, several Security Council Resolutions 
recognised the contribution of both the OSCE and the KVM.47 In a Presidential Statement released 
                                                          
45 James Hughes, “Russia and the Secession of Kosovo: Power, Norms and the Failure of Multilateralism,” Europe-Asia 
studies 65, no. 5 (2013): 992-1016, 1000. 
46 United Nations Security Council, Letter Dated 17 January 1999 from the Charge D’affaires A.I. Of the Permanent 
Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General S/1999/51, United Nations: New York, 
2.  
47 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1160 (1998) 31 March 1998 S/Res/1160; United Nations Security 
Council. Resolution 1203 (1998) Adopted by the Security Council at Its 3937th Meeting, on 24 th October 1998 
S/Res/1203, United Nations: New York; United Nations Security Council, Statement By The President Of The Security 
Council adopted by the Security Council at Its 3967th Meeting, on 19th January 1999 S/PRST/1999/2. United Nations: 
New York; United Nations Security Council, Statement By The President Of The Security Council adopted by the 
Security Council at Its 3974th Meeting, on 29th January 1999 S/PRST/1999/5, United Nations: New York. 
 
90 Mind the Gap: Contestations of Legitimacy and Legality in International Politics  |     Vickie Frater 
 
on the 19th of January 1999, the Security Council condemned the killings in Račak and noted the 
KVM had placed responsibility for the attacks on government forces. This demonstrates how a key 
actor’s reframe of the central contestation can place that actor in a significantly legitimised position.   
Therefore these actors thus played a crucial role as key audience members. Although not directly 
involved in the conflict, they established a proximal interest, whereby they could recast the terms of 
the contestation. This was especially problematic for the FRY. As Belgrade was increasingly 
delegitimised, its continued framing of the situation in absolute terms saw it reject the legitimacy of 
all of the Contact Group, OSCE and KVM. All three of these actors were, however, highly 
legitimised as audience reframers and were able to recast the parameters of the contestation. 
Consequently, Belgrade found itself not only delegitimised but rhetorically excluded as it rejected 
actors and frames that were accepted elsewhere. The legitimation of these central and secondary 
actors’ frames will be demonstrated further in the next section, where they use their status to frame 
the parameters of the narrative and normative contestations.  
4.3 Narrative Contestation  
The narrative contestation in the Kosovo case concerned the nature of events on the ground in 
Kosovo and the legitimacy and legality of central and key actors’ responses to these frames. These 
narrative contestations, along with the actor contestation, lay the groundwork for legitimising the 
use of force against Belgrade for humanitarian purposes. In particular, they provided a factual basis 
for designating the situation as a threat to international peace and security that had exhausted 
diplomatic options. Consequently, the first contestations in this cluster were over the nature and 
scale of violence, leading to claims of widespread violations of human rights and humanitarian law, 
including targeting civilians and ethnic cleansing. It was argued that this violence had created a 
humanitarian crisis through the displacement of civilians, which threatened the stability of the entire 
region emerging precariously from the Balkan wars of the early 1990s. Combined, the contestation 
of this narrative would lead to the designation of the situation as a threat to international peace and 
security. A further narrative contestation involved the legitimacy of diplomatic processes, 
particularly the Rambouillet negotiations and subsequent Accords. In contesting the factual nature 
of the diplomatic processes, the parties could contest the legal fact that diplomatic options had or 
had not been reasonably exhausted.  
Threat to International Peace and Security 
The first narrative contestation concerned the question of whether or not the situation constituted a 
threat to international peace and security. The basis of this contestation lay in alternative narratives 
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regarding the nature and scale of human rights abuses and the proportionality of the Serbian forces’ 
use of violence. The central contesters, particularly Belgrade and the Kosovar Albanian opposition, 
argued that the other was responsible for escalating the violence, while their own actions were 
perfectly legal and legitimate defensive responses. Consequently, Belgrade claimed that the 
situation was an internal matter of policing and counterterrorism, while the Kosovar Albanians 
argued that they were the victims of pervasive and gross human rights abuses and needed 
international assistance to resist an oppressive government. As with the actor contestation, these 
narratives were expressed in absolute terms where both actors legitimised their own version of 
events while delegitimising the other completely.  
The Kosovar Albanians argued their peaceful protests against Belgrade’s oppressive policies were 
met with disproportionate force that targeted civilians and constituted a policy of ethnic cleansing. 
Pointing first to the removal of Kosovo’s autonomous status and then to later failures, such as the 
failed Education Accords of 1996, Kosovar Albanians leaders claimed Kosovars suffered 
widespread human rights violations and a humanitarian crisis as a result of the government’s 
crackdown. Pleading on behalf of the Kosovars for the international community to assist, the 
Albanian government accused those in power in Belgrade of implementing a deliberate policy of 
ethnic cleansing to force ethnic Albanians from the province.48 The Kosovar “government in exile” 
also condemned Belgrade’s response as a “barbaric attack by the Serbian police, army, and 
paramilitary formations of [the Serbian paramilitary leader] Arkan against the defenceless Albanian 
population in Kosovo.”49  
Over time many Kosovar Albanians grew disillusioned with Rugova’s peaceful approach and 
turned to more forceful means, establishing the KLA in 1996. “The Kosovo Liberation Army… 
believed that full independence for Kosovo could only be achieved by force. This represented the 
other end of the spectrum to the policy of Ibrahim Rugova, which was one of passive resistance.”50 
However although designated a terrorist organisation, the KLA maintained it targeted military and 
security targets only, never civilians.51 This is a common argument amongst non-state military 
groups and the question of whether or not the military apparatus of the state can be legitimate 
targets remains a source of contestation dependent on the legitimation of the state itself.52 The KLA, 
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however, framed its actions in military terms, viewing itself as a legitimate fighting force, targeting 
legitimate military objectives under humanitarian law. 
Serbian and Federal authorities disputed this claim, labelling the KLA a terrorist organisation and 
the Kosovar Albanian leadership secessionists. It maintained the government’s response had been 
proportionate to the terrorist threat posed to the state. It accused the KLA of deliberately uprooting 
civilians in order to create a humanitarian crisis, prompting the government’s anti-terrorist response. 
Speaking to its domestic audience on the national news agency, Tanjug, leaders in Belgrade claimed 
that “the recent Serbian Interior Ministry actions in Kosovo-Metohija were carried out exclusively 
as a means of combating terrorism, which… were carried out by the book and with respect for the 
safety of other citizens and their property.”53 Using this same frame in an international forum, the 
representative for the FRY argued it was the sovereign right “of every State to defend itself from 
this evil [terrorism], to protect its territorial integrity, public peace and order and the safety of its 
citizens.”54  
The audience accepted certain elements of both central contesters’ narratives and recast a different 
frame. On the 9th of March, 1998, the Contact Group issued a statement condemning acts of 
violence by all sides. It condemned government forces, stressing this condemnation did not equate 
to supporting terrorists, as it also “wholly” condemned the terrorist actions of the Kosovo Liberation 
Army.55 The London Agreement also claimed that the Contact Group’s “commitment to human 
rights values means that we cannot ignore such disproportionate methods of control,” and 
emphasised the special responsibility of governments to protect all citizens’ human and civil 
rights.56 The Contact group met again on the 25th of March and issued the Bonn Agreement, noting 
“some movement in Belgrade’s position on dialogue on a range of issues, including the autonomy 
of Kosovo” since the London agreement. However, overall further progress was still needed, 
warranting the maintenance and implementation of the measures taken earlier in the month in 
London. It also emphasised that the authorities could not “justify their repression and violence in 
Kosovo in the name of antiterrorist activities... the way to combat terrorism is for Belgrade to offer 
the Kosovar Albanian community a genuine political process.”57 Therefore, the Contact Group 
accepted Belgrade’s frame that there was a terror threat, while rejecting its counter-actions to that 
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threat, indicating that repression and violence were not appropriate or proportionate responses to the 
actual threat. 
NATO leaders took a similar position, condemning violence on all sides, including terrorism, while 
placing greater responsibility on the government for its disproportionate response. At a joint press 
conference, US President Clinton and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the President condemned 
“in the strongest possible terms” the “excessive violence that has led to the death of innocent 
civilians there [in Kosovo]” and placed responsibility for the crisis on “the inadequate response by 
the Serbian Government to the legitimate concerns of the Albanian minority.”58 Similarly, the UK’s 
representative to the Security Council, Sir Jeremy Greenstock accepted “terrorism in whatever guise 
and for whatever end is unacceptable,” but also argued, citing the British Prime Minister, that 
“nothing can justify scorched earth tactics and forcible creation of hundreds of thousands of 
refugees.”59 
Therefore, NATO members did not contest that there had been terrorist activity, nor did they 
dispute the state’s right to oppose such a threat, thus accepting Belgrade’s frame to a degree. They 
did, however, argue that the scale of the government’s response was disproportionate to the threat 
posed by the Kosovar Albanians and the KLA, whose concerns they also framed as legitimate. Each 
of the Security Council Resolutions passed between 1998 and 1999 contained a blanket 
condemnation of terrorism. Almost every speaker in every debate on the Kosovo situation also 
made clear their state’s opposition to the use of terror tactics of any kind. Nonetheless, most also 
noted the government’s response was disproportionate. In recasting the terms of the narrative 
contestation, the audience members rejected the claims of absolute legitimacy made by the central 
actors, especially Belgrade and Kosovo.  
NATO members also cast a frame that told of the government’s disproportionate response, but took 
this narrative further, arguing the government had also implemented a policy of ethnic cleansing. 
The US endorsed the arms embargo imposed by Resolution 1160 on the grounds that the resolution 
made it clear that the international community would not “tolerate violence” and “ethnic cleansing 
in the region of the former Yugoslavia.”60 This frame was them accepted by some non-NATO 
states. Echoing this claim Bosnia Herzegovina also labelled the events on the ground “ethnic 
cleansing,” describing them as “intolerable” and calling on the international community to “add our 
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voices to the vigilant chorus of ‘Never Again’.”61 The Pakistani speaker went further, expressing 
deep concern that “Serbian forces have yet again resorted to ‘ethnic cleansing’” and strongly 
condemning “the genocide of the ethnic Albanians by the Serbian forces in Kosovo.”62 
By March 1999, most Security Council members recognised that the Serbian forces’ actions 
constituted human rights abuses and breaches of humanitarian law. Some applied the label “ethnic 
cleansing,” but Russia and China avoided using this frame.  Russia did acknowledge widespread 
human rights abuses, while also condemning terrorist actions by the KLA, but did not adopt a 
narrative of ethnic cleansing.63 Within Russia, The Moscow Times accepted that the situation risked 
a humanitarian catastrophe and that ethnic cleansing had been a part of the Serb authority’s policy, 
noting “No one criticizes NATO’s goals in trying to avoid a ‘humanitarian catastrophe’” and 
joining “the whole world… in condemning the ‘ethnic cleansing’ policies of the Serbs.”64 This 
frame accepted several key claims of the central narrative contestation, such as the presence of 
human rights abuses, a humanitarian catastrophe and ethnic cleansing, even suggesting that 
redressing these wrongs would be a “good intention.” On the other hand, Russia also maintained 
that redressing these wrongs by force, particularly airstrikes, would itself create abuses and prolong 
conflict, making the use of force, despite the accepted frame, illegitimate.   
A key moment, however was when reports of individual clashes and civilian killing emerged, along 
with an increase in civilian casualties and displacement. The killings at the village of Račak in 
January 1999 were a turning point in this narrative. Contestations over the precise nature of the 
killings unfolded as the Kosovar Albanians accepted the Rambouillet Accords and Belgrade 
rejected them. The Federal and Serbian governments claimed the forty-five Albanians killed in the 
village died during fighting, Kosovar Albanian groups claimed they were civilians massacred by 
Serbian security forces. Media and KVM head of operations, William Walker, viewed the case as a 
civilian killing and atrocity. Walker expressed “no doubt” that the evidence showed the victims at 
Račak “were all obviously not soldiers.”65 Belgrade, on the other hand, claimed that Walker was 
attempting to “deceive the world” and expelled the head of the mission.66 The Security Council 
condemned the Račak killings and Belgrade’s declaration of KVM Chief Chris Walker as persona 
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non grata by Presidential statement.67 Far from delegitimising the mission or its leaders, this action 
contributed to the delegitimation of the FRY and Serbian authorities and to a narrative of mass 
atrocity and civilian killing.  
Three forensic investigations into the killings produced contradictory reports. Serbian and 
Belarussian experts declared the event a legitimate military confrontation, stating that “not a single 
body bears any sign of execution…. The bodies were not massacred.”68 A Finnish investigation 
commissioned by the EU examined forty of the forty-five bodies and found that the victims were 
unarmed civilians, whose deaths constituted a “crime against humanity.”69 It also disputed the 
credibility of the Serbian experts’ findings, arguing that investigators had not been equipped to 
properly x-ray the bodies or conduct reliable tests for gunpowder residue. This contestation 
continued throughout Milošević’s trial before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 2002. But no final decision was made, as the defendant died before the trial 
concluded. At the time, however, in the lead up to the decision to intervene, the KVM head’s 
statement and Belgrade’s subsequent reaction legitimised the view that the Račak killings were a 
breach of international humanitarian law and Belgrade was further delegitimised, its narrative frame 
of legitimate defence of the state excluded by the widely accepted narrative of not just 
disproportionality, but mass atrocity. Burg suggests that this massacre indicated the point where 
“the Serbs… crossed that perceptual threshold, conjuring up images and memories of Bosnia and 
diverting attention away from the actions of the KLA.”70 Thus, despite recasting the actor and 
narrative frames in more nuanced terms, the Security Council placed greater responsibility for the 
escalation of violence on the Federal and Serbian governments.  
As the situation continued to deteriorate, UNICEF’s Director, Carol Bellamy, described it as a 
“humanitarian disaster” and argued “if concerted and effective international initiative is not taken 
soon, world leaders risk seeing the situation in Kosovo escalate to grotesque levels of violence and 
brutality.”71 Security Council Resolution 1199 condemned “the use of excessive force by Serbian 
police forces against civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as all acts of terrorism 
by the Kosovo Liberation Army or any other group or individual.”72 The debate surrounding this 
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meeting and resolution suggested that most states accepted violence had been perpetrated by both 
sides, including acts of terror by Kosovar militant groups. On the other hand, the broader audience 
found that the government’s response to that threat was disproportionate and repressive, 
legitimising the implementation of sanctions against the FRY and Kosovo. Outrage over individual 
atrocities, such as the Račak killings and claims of an unfolding humanitarian crisis, created an 
expectation that excluded the FRY’s position that the situation was an internal matter as the 
international community had a role to play. Findings that the violence in Kosovo breached 
international human rights and humanitarian laws created expectations that the international 
community should act. This narrative led to the designation of the situation as a threat to 
international peace and security at the Security Council.  
Belgrade, supported by a minority on the Council, argued that the situation was an internal matter 
that should be subject only to the sovereign authority of the Serbian Republic and the Federation. 
However, the Kosovar Albanian leadership argued that Belgrade’s disproportionate and excessive 
response meant that only the international community could help the people of Kosovo. The 
broader international community had already accepted that the frame violence in Kosovo was 
largely the result of disproportionate and excessive force by Yugoslav military and Serbian police 
within the context of the instability of the Balkan region. Hence, it viewed this as a threat to 
international peace and security. The situation was designated as such by Resolution 1203 (1998).73 
The Kosovar Albanian leadership called for international attention, with Rugova appealing 
principally to the US and Europe to help save the people of Kosovo.74 Furthermore, following the 
adoption of sanctions under Security Council Resolution 1160 in March 1998, a spokesman for 
Ibrahim Rugova welcomed the embargo, saying that it was confirmation that the crisis in Kosovo 
was an international, not a domestic, problem.75  
In contrast, the FRY claimed Kosovo was an internal matter, subject to the sovereign jurisdiction of 
the Federal and Serbian governments. Based on the frame that the problem in Kosovo was a 
terrorist-led secessionist movement endangering the FRY’s sovereign and territorial integrity, it 
claimed to be the sole legitimate actor capable of resolving the issue. Mr. Jovanović rejected the 
adoption of Resolution 1160, even though it also imposed sanctions on Kosovo, arguing that the 
“meeting of the Security Council and the adoption of a resolution are not acceptable to the 
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Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, since questions that represent an internal matter 
for Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are at stake.”76 He further claimed that all issues 
in Kosovo “should be resolved within Serbia through political means and on the basis of 
international standards for the protection of national minorities.”77 In a public statement to its 
domestic audience, the FRY’s Foreign Ministry denounced Security Resolution 1160 (1998), with 
Belgrade accusing the UN of meddling in the country’s affairs and openly siding with separatists 
and terrorists.78  
 
NATO members rejected this claim and pointed to the potential for “spill-over” of the humanitarian 
emergency into Serbia’s barely stabilised neighbours in Macedonia and Montenegro. Mistakes and 
slow reactions of the past, especially in relation to Bosnia, became a catch cry for avoiding the far 
worse scenario where the international community could once again find itself doing too little, too 
late. However, Jovanović disputed these claims stating that “there is not, nor has there been, any 
armed conflict in Kosovo and Metohija. Hence, there is no danger of a spillover, there is no threat 
to peace and security and there is no basis for invoking Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.”79 
 
Russia and China agreed with the FRY that the matter constituted an internal issue and was not a 
threat to international peace and security. Although Russia sat on the Contact Group and accepted 
that Belgrade’s response has been disproportionate, it maintained “from the very outset” that 
Moscow “viewed the recent events in Kosovo as the internal affair of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia,” concluding that “the situation in Kosovo, despite its complexity, does not constitute a 
threat to regional, much less international peace and security.”80  
Most members of the audience condemned terrorism and recognised the territorial integrity of the 
FRY, while accepting NATO’s frame of the scale of abuse and violence in the area. Combined with 
the fragility of the region and the potential for refugee flows to destabilise neighbouring countries, 
many accepted the situation did warrant legitimate international concern. The Japanese 
representative recognised that Kosovo posed “a threat to international peace and security in the 
region and that the further spread of violence there might lead to the destabilization of the entire 
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Balkans.”81 Recasting the central contesters’ narrative frames, many audience members accepted 
and emphasised the legitimacy of the FRY’s sovereign territorial integrity, but also acknowledged 
that the severity of the situation on the ground warranted international concern and decisive action. 
For example, Costa Rica’s representative attempted to balance the frame that “Serbian police forces 
have used excessive and unjustifiable force against peaceful demonstrators,” with “acts of violence 
and reprehensible terrorist attacks”, concluding that “in the context of the very sensitive political 
and security balance in the Balkans,” these facts “constitute a clear threat to international peace and 
security, which obligates the Council to take firm and decisive action.”82 The Kosovar situation was 
thus cast as a threat to international peace and security despite the presence of terrorism and secessionism, 
excluding Belgrade’s claim that the situation was an internal matter.  
The casting of the situation as a threat to international peace and security became essential when 
Russia, India and Belarus drafted a resolution condemning NATO’s unauthorised use of force. The 
draft was defeated by twelve votes, three of which were also vetoes. Of the twelve members who 
rejected the draft, seven were neither central contesters, nor NATO members.83 These members can 
be considered audience members. Council records and the members’ votes demonstrate the 
development of a normative expectation from the treat to international peace and security narrative.   
Slovenia and Malaysia made specific reference to the failure of the resolution to recognise previous 
Resolutions that had designated the situation a threat to peace and security.84 Argentina also 
recalled these Resolutions and the breaches of international law documented in them in justifying its 
vote against the draft and Bahrain voted against the Resolution because it would have encouraged 
Belgrade’s ethnic cleansing strategy.85  
These statements suggest that the narrative, including widespread abuses, breaches of humanitarian 
law and ethnic cleansing led to the designation of the situation as a threat to international peace and 
security and created an expectation. Whilst it is not clear what these states would have been willing 
to authorise, it is clear they were unable to support an action which detoured from the expectation 
created by the narrative they had already accepted. This reflects the rhetorical entrapment of the 
non-permanent members of the Security Council and the rhetorical exclusion of the Russian 
position.   
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Statements and actions by the non-permanent members who voted against the resolution reflect the 
entrapment of those actors. Having accepted a narrative which cast the situation in Kosovo as a 
humanitarian crisis constituting a threat to international peace and security, these actors developed 
an expectation that the international could and should respond more decisively to avert a crisis. As a 
result, these members were trapped into a positon of inaction, unable to officially condemn NATO’s 
unilateral actions because it had already accepted a narrative that created an expectation that the 
Council should have responded.   
Russia on the other hand was rhetorically excluded because its draft resolution failed to adapt to the 
narrative accepted by most Security Council members. Rhetorical exclusion occurs when the 
audience widely accepts a particular frame in a contestation excluding the conclusions of those 
utilising inconsistent frames. In maintaining a frame that cast the situation as an internal matter, 
Russia’s position was untenable because audience members had accepted that the situation 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. Consequently, when the draft Resolution it 
proposed with Belorussia and India was opposed by twelve Council members, consisting of six 
NATO states, and six non-NATO states it was rhetorically excluded, having developed a response 
that had no normative parity with the expectations created by the narrative frame. 
The contestations in this case pertaining to whether the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, not only found the situation in Kosovo constituted such a threat but 
that this frame was a vital aspect of determining an international response, demonstrated by the 
rejection of Russia’s draft resolution. Across all three phases of the conflict, thirty-nine statements 
on this issue framed the situation as a threat to international peace and security while fourteen did 
not. Furthermore, twenty-seven of these legitimising statements were made in the first phase, 
suggesting that this contestation was vital in framing the situation before the use of force. This first 
narrative frame was therefore quite widely accepted, trapping dissatisfied non-permanent members 
between Security Council paralysis and a draft resolution that did not address the expectation 
created by the narrative contestation they had accepted, and excluding Russia and Belgrade due to 
their refusal to adapt the narrative.  
Last Resort 
The second area of narrative contestation, the legitimacy of non-forceful attempts to resolve 
conflict, involved a narrative of the negotiation processes and the central actors’ participation in 
them. In particular, the Rambouillet negotiations in early 1999 were crucial to a narrative that 
delegitimised the FRY and, through it, Serbia. The acquiescence of the Kosovar Albanian leaders to 
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the Rambouillet Accords provided a massive boost to the international community’s perception of 
their legitimacy while the FRY’s rejection was grounds for many to further delegitimise Belgrade. 
Consequently, the legitimacy of the negotiation and diplomatic processes themselves was also a 
significant area of contestation. This contestation identified which actors had engaged diplomatic 
processes in good faith and if the processes had been exhausted, making force the last resort.  
In the early stages of phase one, Belgrade argued that it had satisfied the demands of the Security 
Council when the Serbian government opened negotiations with all minority groups in Serbia. The 
action was dependent on the FRY’s actor frame that the federal government had a legitimate and 
fair national approach to all minority groups, demonstrated by its willingness to open negotiations 
to all minority groups. The Kosovar Albanian leadership. An adviser to Dr. Rugova, Fehmi Agani 
stated, “The talks are impossible…. The invitation was addressed to the minorities and not to the 
Albanians. Moreover the dialogue is strictly conditional.”86 Kosovar Albanian groups felt slighted 
by Milošević’s invitation to “all minority groups” and argued the government’s invitations to 
negotiate were disingenuous and imposed conditions, such as an outright refusal to discuss the 
future status of Kosovo or to accept international mediation. However, the representative for 
Belgrade argued that the invitation was in keeping with the pluralist nature of Yugoslavia and 
demonstrated Serbia’s willingness to negotiate a political solution that could satisfy the needs of all 
the Republic’s minority groups. As the FRY considered the matter an internal one, which did not 
threaten international peace and security, it rejected all international attempts to negotiate an 
agreement between Serbia and Kosovo and rejected unequivocally all threats of force and 
conditions underpinning them. Belgrade thus equated initial diplomatic responses such as Security 
Council resolutions, negotiations and the London and Bonn Agreements as examples of “gunboat 
diplomacy.”87  
In this way, Belgrade rejected any international attempt to interfere in what it framed to be its 
internal matters. Pointing to the Rambouillet Accords, the Yugoslav representative argued the 
accords offered two unsatisfactory alternatives; “either voluntarily give up a part of its territory or 
to have it taken away by force.”88 Deriding the Rambouillet Accords and the negotiations leading 
up to it, he protested the legitimacy of the accords, claiming that these unsatisfactory options 
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formed “the essence of the ‘solution’ for Kosovo and Metohija that was offered by way of an 
ultimatum at the ‘negotiations’ in France.”89   
In an attempt to confer further institutional legitimacy on Belgrade’s rejection of the Accords, the 
FRY referred the agreement to the Serbian National Assembly. The Assembly rejected the 
agreement because it threatened its territorial integrity by allowing a foreign military presence in the 
form of a NATO-led force. Belgrade argued that, as the agreement was presented to the legitimate, 
governing body of the state, the rejection itself was also legitimate and legal. Praising the National 
Assembly’s rejection, Milošević noted the Assembly “made this decision unanimously” and argued 
it had “acted completely properly when it decided not to accept the presence of foreign troops on 
our territory.”90 Belgrade’s therefore rejected the Rambouillet Accords outright, attempting to 
bolster the rejection of the unfavourable terms by introducing democratic domestic decision-making 
institutions. 
The Contact Group, however, argued that the changes Belgrade proposed to the Accords concerned 
fundamental elements that “would jeopardize the key elements of the agreements of Rambouillet.”91 
The Permanent Representative to the United Nations for the US, Peter Burleigh, reiterated this 
approach in Council debates. He reasoned that the US and NATO would have preferred “to achieve 
our objectives in the Balkans through peaceful means.” He nonetheless argued that the Rambouillet 
Accords were “fair, just and balanced,” noting that “the Kosovar Albanians signed that agreement, 
but Belgrade rejected all efforts to achieve peaceful resolution.”92 Burleigh stressed that the US was 
“mindful that violations of the October ceasefire and provocations by the Kosovo Liberation Army 
have also contributed to this situation,”93 but placed ultimate responsibility on Belgrade for 
adopting a “systematic policy of undermining last October’s agreements and thwarting all 
diplomatic efforts to resolve the situation which have prevented a peaceful solution and have led us 
to today’s action.”94 Overall, NATO members therefore maintained that the talks were pursued in 
good faith but had been “stone-walled” by Belgrade’s refusal to accept an international protection 
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force and increased autonomy for Kosovo.95 NATO Secretary General, Javier Solana, announced 
the commencement of airstrikes noting the decision to use force came “after extensive 
consultations… and after it became clear that the final diplomatic efforts of Ambassador Holbrooke 
in Belgrade has [sic] not met with success.”96  
The broad consensus amongst the audience was that the Rambouillet Accords were a genuine 
opportunity for peace. The Kosovar Albanians’ acceptance of the deal was also well received, while 
Belgrade’s rejection delegitimised the FRY.  Bosnia and Herzegovina stressed, “The Contact Group 
made several fair and progressive proposals for peace,” but “Belgrade rejected the peace proposal 
and actually responded by intensifying its resort to military force.”97 The Malaysian representative, 
speaking also on behalf of the Non-aligned Movement, accepted this frame expressing “great 
disappointment that serious efforts at finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict in Kosovo have 
failed,” and placed full responsibility on Belgrade “since it continues to reject the Rambouillet 
Accords and chooses to carry out massive military offensives against the people of Kosovo, even at 
this very hour.”98 Overall, thirty-two statements supported the view that the Rambouillet Accords 
offered a legitimate political solution, while only four viewed it as illegitimate. 
Therefore, while accepting a narrative that violence and conflict had breached human rights and 
humanitarian law, amounting to ethnic cleansing and creating a humanitarian crisis that threatened 
international peace and security, the international community also deemed the negotiation process 
fair and exhaustive. Together, these frames satisfied two of the main criteria for just war: just cause 
and last resort. Responsibility for the failure of the Rambouillet negotiations was placed on 
Belgrade’s shoulders, despite the negotiators’ rejection of Belgrade’s proposed amendments to the 
agreement and the referral of the matter to the Serbian National Assembly. The fact the Kosovar 
leadership had acceded to a deal for autonomy rather than independence legitimised the agreement 
as a true compromise, where the Kosovars had abandoned their hard-line position for a peaceful 
alternative. This marks a significant shift in the Kosovar Albanians’ demands given the central actor 
contestation demonstrate that central actors do not often change their positions, focusing instead on 
persuading others to their cause.   
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Although some have suggested the Rambouillet Accords directly aimed to provide the appearance 
of last resort by offering Belgrade a peace agreement the drafters and Kosovar Albanians knew 
Serbia would reject,99 the process was still viewed as legitimate while Belgrade’s rejection was not. 
A major contributing factor to this frame that the process was legitimate was not just that the 
Kosovar Albanians acceded to it, but that it was framed as a compromise of their position. Belgrade 
was viewed as uncompromising, disingenuous and unwilling to engage political processes, while 
the Kosovar Albanians were willing to participate cooperate and moderate their views. Although the 
Kosovar Albanians may have recognised an opportunity to strike a political bargain in exchange for 
international support, acceding to an agreement they knew Belgrade would reject to garner 
international sympathy it still points to a process of legitimation.  
Although realists would argue that the Kosovar Albanian leadership accepted the compromise 
because it knew it would force Belgrade into a difficult position and gain international support for 
its own cause, it remains that they placed the contestation firmly within a process of legitimation 
that was not entirely in their control. Had Milošević acceded to the agreement, he would have 
“deprived the KLA of the moral high ground.”100 Consequently, while sceptics of international law 
are able to explain the Kosovar Albanian compromise as a deliberate strategy by one actor to gain 
increased international support for it position and force intervention on its behalf, such approaches 
do not explain how these leaders were in a position to make any strategic move at all. Extracting the 
legitimation process in this case demonstrates that the international community had accepted a 
range of actor and narrative frames which created an expectation about what the actors could and 
should do. Although the Rambouillet Accords were wielded as political and strategic tool by the 
Kosovar Albanian negotiators, Belgrade was already being rhetorically excluded by the accepted 
actor ad narrative frames. The situation was widely viewed as a threat to international peace and 
security an diplomatic processes such as the London and Bonn agreements, Security Council 
resolutions and the 1998 October Agreement pointed to an extensive diplomatic process, even 
before the Rambouillet round of negotiations. Combined, these frames created a normative 
expectation that the Security Council should have responded to the humanitarian crisis. Thus the 
strategically motivated compromise of the Kosovar Albanian leadership needs to be set within the 
broader context of the legitimation process which cannot be explained by solely logics of 
consequences. This leads to the final cluster of contestation.  
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4.4 Normative Contestation 
The final cluster of contestations pertain to the use or application of norms, rules, and laws. While 
these contestations also overlap with the other groups, they differ and can be set into this separate 
category because the contestations debate the legitimacy of the interpretation or implementation of 
norms, rather than facts. Amongst the central contesters, the parties cast frames reflecting positivist 
and naturalist understandings of legal argument. More specifically, the FRY adopted a positivist 
stance under the United Nations Charter, while NATO and its supporters mostly adopted a stance 
reflecting a natural interpretation of international law and humanitarian intervention. Although 
some interveners argued there was a positive rule which permitted the use of force to avert a 
humanitarian crisis, the language used at the Council by the US representatives in particular, were 
predominantly guided by moralism, not positive laws. Furthermore, even these positivist 
approaches that identify a principle of intervention must turn to moralism to circumvent the 
prohibitions against the use of force contained in the Charter. This process can be traced, revealing 
a normative contestation over the legitimacy and legality of the threat and use of force, along with a 
contestation in which the international community adopted its own frame of the situation to restore 
consensus and force a Security Council authorised international response through the use of a 
humanitarian reframe.    
Together, the narrative and actor contestations outlined above laid the groundwork for this 
contestation over the legitimacy and legality of the threat and use of force in Kosovo. In the first 
phase of the crisis, the central contesters as well as key audience members began laying the 
foundations for framing the normative debate regarding the threat of force. Although the US had 
threatened Belgrade with military force as early as 1992,101 the North Atlantic Council’s decision to 
issue an activation warning or ACTWARN in September 1998 was the most serious of these 
threats.102 Issuing this ACTWARN, the Council effectively coerced Belgrade to accede to the 
October 1998 agreement in order to avoid airstrikes. Although he accepted the agreement, 
Milošević called the threat “criminal act.”103 Belgrade also maintained NATO’s constant threat of 
force amounted to gun-boat diplomacy, aimed at interference in the internal affairs of the Serbian 
state and FRY more generally.     
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NATO acknowledged that the ACTWARN had forced Belgrade’s agreement but argued that the 
presence of a credible threat was vital to ensuring that a political agreement was made and kept. 
Welcoming the October Agreement, an official NATO statement attributed these results to 
“sustained pressure by the international community.” Stating this pressure “was, and still is, the 
threat of the use of NATO airpower,” the spokesman also declared NATO’s intention “to maintain 
this pressure.”104 Similarly, the US representative to the Security Council, Peter Burleigh, also 
maintained the threat of force was instrumental to the outcome: “we must acknowledge that a 
credible threat of force was key to achieving the OSCE and NATO agreements and remains key to 
ensuring their full implementation.”105 The NATO position therefore maintained that the credible 
threat of force was crucial to ensuring the development and implementation of a political solution.  
However, threatening force is not merely a tool of political rhetoric, as even the threat of force is 
prohibited under the United Nations Charter. Russia expressed concern over NATO’s threat, 
arguing that it risked worsening the crisis. Following the signing of the October Agreement, Russia 
called for “the immediate rescission of the NATO decision on the possible use of force, the so-
called activation order.”106 The Chinese also rejected the premise that either the threat or use of 
force were justified and amended Resolution 1203 to remove all elements authorising the threat or 
use of force. It abstained from the vote stressing “that the resolution just adopted does not entail any 
authorization to use force or to threaten to use force… nor should it in any way be interpreted as 
authorizing the use of force or threatening to use force.”107 
This contestation took on a stronger dynamic following the collapse of the Rambouillet negotiations 
and the initiation of Operation Allied Force. Explaining its decision to use force, the North Atlantic 
Council pointed to the humanitarian catastrophe and widespread abuses, arguing that “these 
extreme and criminally irresponsible policies, which cannot be defended on any grounds, have 
made necessary and justify the military actions by NATO.”108 Prime Minister Tony Blair used 
moral reasoning and natural law, claiming the intervention in Kosovo was “a battle for 
humanity.”109 NATO members held this position that their actions were legal and legitimate, 
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emphasising human rights laws and claiming that the prohibition against the use of force and 
principle of sovereignty had to give way to justice in the face of Security Council paralysis and an 
unfurling humanitarian and human rights catastrophe. Burleigh, as the representative for the United 
States of America, rejected the FRY speaker’s claims arguing, it turned “the truth on its head. The 
United Nations Charter does not sanction armed assaults upon ethnic groups, or imply that the 
international community should turn a blind eye to a growing humanitarian disaster.” 110 
The UK Secretary for Defence, George Robertson, presented a positivist interpretation for 
humanitarian intervention that rested “upon the accepted principle that force may be used in 
extreme circumstances to avert a humanitarian catastrophe.” Precluding the need for a Security 
Council mandate, he also argued that “an exceptional measure in support of purposes laid down by 
the Security Council” was justified “when that is the only means to avert an immediate and 
overwhelming humanitarian catastrophe.”111 Therefore, speaking to a domestic audience, the 
Secretary offered a positivist approach based on established principles. However these principles 
are not well established and when such arguments must refute the application of the United Nations 
Charters’ prohibitions against the use of force, they resort to moralistic reasoning. They may draw 
on other principles, such as human rights and sovereignty, but in order to prioritise these rules 
above the prohibition, this argument must resort to a natural law approach based in moralism.    
The principles of the Charter prohibiting the use of force are, however well-established, although 
their interpretation is often contested. The FRY relied on these rules to build its entirely positivist 
argument. The FRY claimed that NATO’s airstrikes violated Article 53(1) of the United Nations 
Charter, NATO’s own statute, the Paris Charter of the OSCE and the foundational principles of 
international relations- sovereignty and territorial integrity.112 It described NATO aggression as 
“unjust, illegal, indecent and unscrupulous.”113 Pointing to the damage caused by NATO’s bombs, 
the FRY’s representative, Jovanović argued that NATO was “perpetrating a deliberate and 
premeditated genocide in an attempt to intimidate the population”114 in violation of human rights 
covenants, humanitarian law and fundamental freedoms, especially the Geneva Conventions on the 
Protection of Civilians.115 This argument reflects a positivist understanding of the Charter, 
especially Articles 2(4) and 53(1). Although Belgium claimed that NATO’s actions constituted “an 
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armed humanitarian intervention, compatible with Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the Charter, which 
covers only intervention against the territorial integrity or political independence of a State,”116 
most audience supported the FRY’s interpretation of the law, accepting neither a natural law nor a 
positivist one authorised the use of force without the Council’s authority. 
Thus the positivist reading of the Charter’s prohibition against force was widely accepted amongst 
the key audience framers. Russia, India and Belarus co-sponsored a draft resolution that affirmed 
“that such unilateral use of force constitutes a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, in 
particular Articles 2(4), 24 and 53,” and constituted a threat to international peace and security. This 
draft was debated by the Security Council, leading to a formal contestation of the legality and 
legitimacy of NATO’s unilateral use of force.  
Where the central contesters argued that each of their respective positions was both legal and 
legitimate, the wider audience recast the normative debate in terms that created a legitimacy gap. 
This was perhaps best represented by the resounding defeat of the draft resolution condemning 
NATO’s actions. Only Russia, China and Namibia voted in favour of the draft while non-permanent 
members, Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, the Gambia, Malaysia and Slovenia voted alongside 
NATO members, Canada, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US to defeat it. This did not, 
however, mean that the audience supported NATO’s frame of the contestation. Malaysia “wished 
that the crisis in Kosovo could have been dealt with directly and in an effective manner by the 
Security Council” and expressed regret “that in the absence of Council action on the issue it has 
been necessary for measures to be taken outside of the Council.”117 Bahrain took a slightly nuanced 
view that did not recognise the legality of the intervention, but also refused to condemn NATO 
“because it would have encouraged the Belgrade authorities to continue with their current policy of 
‘ethnic cleansing’ and led to more massacres and displacements for the Kosovar Albanians.”118 
These non-permanent members were therefore trapped between a narrative that created an 
expectation of international action and a normative frame that required Security Council in a 
context of P5 paralysis.  
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Figure 4.5: Contestation Radar for the Use of Force in Kosovo 
Plotting this contestation on the legitimacy radar shown in Figure 4.5 demonstrates how this 
contestation developed over the three phases. NATO’s claim to a legal basis for the intervention 
was widely rejected- the radar only advances a very short distance along the legal axis. However, 
the contestation over legitimacy was far more diverse, with wide swings indicating numerous 
statements but little agreement. .However it is apparent that despite the Council’s rejection of the 
resolution condemning the use of force, the question of legitimacy was still highly contested. 
Eighteen statements recognised the legitimacy of the action, while twenty found it to be illegitimate.  
Making sense of these patterns requires situating this data within the context of the entire 
legitimation process. Sceptics would point to these findings and argue that the rules on the use of 
force are too highly contested and uncertain to be real laws. They would attribute the wide 
variations and disagreement between states to the preferences of individual state interests and the 
rhetorical application of rules to suit those positions. Individual elements of the contestation, such 
as the Kosovar Albanians’ strategic use of the Rambouillet Accords or even Madeleine Albright’s 
suggestion that the British government should “get new lawyers” when British Foreign Minister, 
Robyn Cook expressed his government’s concern at intervening without a Council mandate, do not 
accommodate the entire legitimation process at play here.  
The IICK’s finding that the intervention was “illegal but legitimate” adds to this confusion. 
This assessment was developed approximately a year after the intervention and offered a normative 
assessment of the disjoint between the principles of law at play and the outcomes in Kosovo. The 
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Commission argued that its conclusion was related to the controversial idea that a “right” of 
humanitarian intervention is not consistent with the UN Charter if conceived in a legal text. 
Nevertheless, it may, depending on the context, reflect the spirit of the Charter as it relates to the 
overall protection of people against gross abuse.119 The Commission’s normative assessment is not 
supported by the empirical findings of this data. The more widely held position was that although 
the audience substantially agreed NATO’s use of force was illegal, the question of legitimacy was 
not resolved and remains contested.  
Humanitarian Reframe 
The capacity of this process to force consensus is demonstrated by an analysis of the Council’s 
successful adoption of Resolution 1244 (1999) and the humanitarian reframe adopted to ensure its 
passage through the Council. NATO’s air campaign ended with Belgrade’s acceptance of the 
Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin Agreement on the 2nd of June 1999, supplemented by the Kosovo Military-
Technical Agreement on the 9th of June (together, the Kosovo Accords). The Kosovo Accords were 
accepted by the parties and embodied in Security Council Resolution 1244. Although considered by 
many to be Belgrade’s capitulation to the Rambouillet Accords it rejected in March 1999, there 
were numerous key differences between the Rambouillet and Kosovo Accords. Most significantly, 
where Rambouillet provided for a NATO-led security presence throughout the FRY, Resolution 
1244 established KFOR as an international security presence in Kosovo only. Where Rambouillet 
would have established a Kosovar-led interim authority, the Kosovo Accords and Resolution 1244 
established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK. In establishing 
KFOR and UNMIK, Security Council members had to implement the peace agreement without 
legitimising or delegitimising NATO’s actions. As mentioned in the previous section, content 
analysis demonstrated that this contestation was unresolved. Thus, in order to re-establish consensus 
and authority, the Council had to recast the situation and focus on the humanitarian crisis, agreed to 
by the vast majority of audience members and key reframers. I have termed such processes where 
Council members adopt a narrowly focused understanding of the situation that accepts the most 
basic and common humanitarian frame to achieve consensus a humanitarian reframe.  
This reframing process began with the adoption of Resolution 1239 (1999) on the 16th of May.120 
Resolution 1239 marked the first consensus vote on the Kosovo issue since Resolution 1203 was 
adopted in October 1998. Instead of focusing on the use of force, the resolution identified a 
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humanitarian crisis caused by the displacement of hundreds of thousands of refugees and internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), but it did not attribute responsibility to any party. Resolution 1239 
expressed “grave concern at the humanitarian catastrophe” and deep concern for “the enormous 
influx of Kosovo refugees… as well as increasing numbers of displaced persons.” It stressed “the 
importance of effective coordination on humanitarian relief activities” and called for humanitarian 
organisations and the UNHCR to extend assistance to IDPs in Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo, as 
well as demanded access for assistance providers.121 Drafted by Malaysia and Bahrain and 
sponsored by nineteen others,122 Resolution 1239 was carried with two abstentions, from Russia and 
China. While Russia and China accepted the need to address the humanitarian catastrophe, both 
abstained because the Resolution did not call for an end to military airstrikes, which they viewed as 
the cause of the crisis.123  
However, most audience members supported the Resolution’s focus on the humanitarian crisis 
faced by refugees and IDPs. As drafter and sponsor, Bahrain identified two goals for the resolution: 
first “to draw attention… to the humanitarian catastrophe” and secondly, “to make it possible for 
the Council to review the situation in Kosovo from the humanitarian concerns fundamental to the 
consideration of the military and political aspects of the situation when the Council is ready to do 
so.”124 Malaysia also drafted and sponsored the Resolution stating that the decision was a “concrete 
step in the effort to bring the Kosovo issue to the Council by the least contentious issues.”125 That 
is, the drafters specifically intended to reframe the contestation using the least contested frames in 
order to compel a political solution without determining the legitimacy or legality of the 
intervention itself.  
This decision was made necessary by the actions of Permanent Council members whose respective 
frames and interpretations of the situation made consensus impossible. However, this lack of 
consensus also entrapped the interpretive audience between the expectations that emerged from the 
accepted narrative of the situation, and the Security Council inability to satisfy them. However, the 
application of a humanitarian reframe gave these states the means to make a decision and take 
action within the parameters of both the legal constraints interference and the accepted frames of 
the actors and narrative.   
                                                          
121 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1239 (1999) 10 June 1999 S/Res/1239. 
122 The co-sponsors were Argentina, Bahrain, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Egypt, Gabon, Gambia, Islamic 
Republic of Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, Namibia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Slovenia, 
Turkey, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. 
123 United Nations Security Council, 10 June 1999, S/Pv.4011, Russia 7-8 and China 8-9. 
124 United Nations Security Council, 10 June 1999, S/Pv.4011, Bahrain 3. 
125 United Nations Security Council, 10 June 1999, S/Pv.4011, Malaysia 4. 
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Although it may be argued that these audience members had little choice, providing evidence of the 
weakness of international law, the presence of rule breaking and legitimation demonstrates that 
states are engaged in a process. Paralysed by the positions of the larger powers, these audience 
members recast the parameters of the contestation, narrowing its focus to the issues on which all 
agreed: that the situation in and around Kosovo had reached a crisis point and that a rapid and 
effective humanitarian response was needed immediately.  
By applying the legitimation framework to the Kosovo case, it becomes clearer that normative 
processes were at play, but the labelling of the intervention as illegal but legitimate becomes 
problematic. The IICK’s finding leaves space to suggest that unilateral intervention might be at 
least legitimised in the future. The analysis of the legitimation process offered here demonstrates 
that the illegitimacy attached to the paralysis of the Council and its inability to respond effectively 
to a recognised threat to international peace and security and humanitarian crisis. Thus, rather than 
pointing towards a normative acceptance of a legitimate intervention outside the law, it 
demonstrates that international audience members do have clear understandings of the laws are and 
expect states involved in these contestations to address the expectations created by accepted actor, 
narrative and normative frames. Suggesting the intervention was legal but legitimate leads to 
attempts to create a new principle for unilateral intervention. However the contestation here shows a 
more complex process at play that can only be fully understood when we stop making ambiguous 
normative assessments and examine the entire legitimation process. The international community 
was quite clear on what the accepted legal position was, but also clearly demonstrated it had 
developed an expectation that the Council should be able to respond to these crises. Therefore 
although the Kosovo intervention created divisive and inconclusive contestation over the legitimacy 
of NATO’s actions, this analysis places this contestation within the broader context of the 
legitimation process driven by normative expectations, not political or strategic interests. This was 
demonstrated when after rejected Russia’s outright condemnation of the intervention, the 
international community drew the situation back within the purview of international law and the 
Security Council with a humanitarian reframe. Such reframes reduce the impact of force rhetorical 
entrapment or exclusion, providing entrapped and excluded actors the opportunity to recast their 
positions within the new and broader parameters of the reframe. 
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4.5 The Kosovo Legitimation Process 
This examination of the legitimation process in Kosovo clearly points to several key findings of the 
nature and function of the legitimation process. First, the actor contestation highlighted the strong 
and clear delegitimation of the FRY and some degree of legitimation of the Kosovar Albanian 
leadership. The Kosovar Albanian leadership, although disjointed and politically divided, cast itself 
as the legitimate and genuine representatives for the Kosovar cause by demonstrating its willingness 
to compromise. Their accession to the Rambouillet Accords was viewed as both a legitimate and 
legitimising act, further enhancing their own agency while delegitimising the Serbian negotiators 
and leaders who rejected the agreement. The legitimation of the Kosovar Albanian leadership and 
delegitimation of Belgrade fed directly into the narrative framing of the situation. 
The Kosovo narrative was therefore largely framed by but also compounded the actor contestation, 
further delegitimising Belgrade and its actions. The international community accepted some aspects 
of both central parties’ contestations, demonstrating an acceptance of Belgrade’s frame by 
condemning terrorism and rejecting Kosovar leaders’ calls for independence and expressing a 
preference for an autonomy arrangement within Serbia. However, it also condemned Belgrade for 
what it perceived to be an excessive and disproportionate response to this threat, recasting 
Belgrade’s actions not as counter-terrorism, but as a systematic use of violence targeted at Kosovar 
Albanian civilians, leading to a humanitarian crisis that constituted a threat to international peace 
and security. With this narrative, it excluded the FRY’s claim that the situation was an internal 
matter. 
Some have pointed to this narrative and argued that the legitimation of the Kosovar Albanian actors 
and the designation of the situation as a humanitarian crisis risks establishing a moral hazard of 
intervention, which effectively encourages minority groups to provoke a violent response in order to 
attract international attention and intervention.126 Although realists can identify individual situations 
where actors apply principles of law to a casuistic reasoning process for selfish purposes, not all 
applications of casuistic reasoning are bad, selfish, deceptive or misleading. Audience members 
take these claims, and by accepting the elements of some frames and rejecting others, they recast 
the terms of the contestation. In doing so, they develop normative expectations for how the 
international community should or should not respond.  These audience members then develop 
more casuistic arguments, applying accepted principles to the accepted frames to achieve normative 
parity with these expectations rather than satisfying individual state’s self-interests. The 
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Studies Quarterly 52, no. 1 (2008), 50-51. 
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humanitarian reframe represents the establishment of this parity, albeit a slow response which 
followed an indeterminable contestation. The legitimation process breaks down these actor and 
narrative contestations and demonstrates how the international community came to situate the 
problem in terms of legality and legitimacy. The presence of a legitimation process demonstrates 
the existence of a fluid but determinative discursive process that, although imperfect, contested and 
uncertain, points to the presence of an accepted order in which the languages of legitimacy and 
legality can entrap actors into taking certain actions or exclude actions that do not fit accepted 
frames.   
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Chapter 5 
Iraq: Illegitimate and Illegal 
 
 
5.1 The Negative Case? 
In March 2003 the United States of America led the Coalition of the Willing made up of US, British, 
Polish and Australian forces into Iraq to verify its disarmament of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
(WMDs). The intervening states laid out a range of justifications for their actions, drawing on contested 
areas of law such as the use of pre-emptive force, the revivability of Security Council Resolutions, and the 
preservation of human rights and humanitarian norms.1  These claims however were not widely accepted 
and the case has continued to generate strong criticism. Even those considered traditional allies of the 
Coalition’s leaders such as Canada, Germany and France did not support the invasion, however, nor did 
they present a united alternative frame. While some detractors argued the use of force could only be 
legitimised and legalised by the passing of a second resolution, others argued a second resolution was not 
warranted as the process of disarmament could be verified by a more robust inspections regime. These 
debates suggest international law played a key role within the legitimation process. Although opponents 
of the war were powerless to prevent the invasion, the members of the Coalition of the Willing, in 
particular its lead states, the US and UK failed to buttress their claims with lasting effects for both, these 
states, and international law. Although a dictator was toppled by the invasion, the subsequent eight-year 
occupation was defined by sectarian violence and civil war. Not only were secret weapons never found, 
the intelligence upon which the invasion was based was proven false. These shortcomings compounded 
perceptions of the invasion’s illegality and illegitimacy, where the Security Council did not authorise the 
use of force and most members condemned the action. 
Consequently some view the invasion of Iraq as an indicator of the erosion or even “death” of 
international law.2 There is a widely held view that the leaders of the invasion, particularly the US and 
                                                          
1 John Yoo, “International Law and the War in Iraq.” The American Journal of International Law 97, no. 3 (2003): 563-
576. 
2 Michael J Glennon, “Why the Security Council Failed.” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 3 (2003): 22-24. 
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UK lied to legitimise a “war of choice.” 3 With criticism widespread amongst states and academic 
literature, this case falls within the illegal and illegitimate quadrant of the legitimacy matrix.4 It fails to 
satisfy the most widely accepted standards for the legal use of force, and as a “war of choice” has also 
been widely criticised as illegitimate. At first glance, this case appears to be a negative one for the 
dissertation, one in which the enforceability of international law is discredited. It is not. The frames used 
by all parties were steeped in the languages of legitimacy and legality and contested the actors’ roles and 
actions, the proper narrative of events and the application and interpretation of normative understandings 
to those frames. This chapter will trace this process, determining which contestations were accepted, 
rejected and reframed and how the acceptance of these frames shaped the outcome of the legitimation 
process. 
However, the Iraq case does differ from the other three cases as it has blurred the lines between 
humanitarian intervention and self-defence in two ways. First, allegations of a secret Iraqi WMD 
programme were central to the actor, narrative and normative clusters of contestation, making additional 
allegations of human rights abuses secondary frames. In previous cases the presence of widespread abuses 
and conflict formed the basis of the narrative contestation and were a major justification for the use of 
force itself. Contrastingly, in this case allegations of human rights abuses and breaches of humanitarian 
law were used to frame the actor contestation and delegitimise Hussein as a leader who should not possess 
WMDs because he had used them in the past. The second difference was over the normative 
underpinnings of the case. Both central actors entrenched their positions in divergent understandings of 
positive law. While one side argued existing resolutions established a legal basis for the use of force, the 
other side argued an additional mandating resolution was necessary under the rules of the UN Charter’s 
prohibition on the use of force. Consequently, the Iraqi case focuses on norms of self-defence and the 
legal authority for such actions.  
Therefore, although the following discussion will differ from other cases in content, it will demonstrate 
the presence of a common legitimation process through which actor, narrative and normative 
contestations can be identified. Further, prevailing across the Iraq case was a narrative which established 
an exceptional situation constituting a threat to international peace and security, and a normative 
contestation over the legitimate and legal authorisation, threat and use of force.  This points to both the 
pervasiveness of legal and legitimacy language in this case, as well as a common process of legitimation. 
                                                          
3 Richard Haass, War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars.  (New York: Simon and Schuster 
2009), 11. 
4 See Figure 1.1 page 10. 
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Case History and Timeline 
As with previous cases, this conflict has been divided into three phases, depicted by the timeline in Figure 
4.1.5 The first phase, or pre-intervention phase, preceded the use of force and began with the adoption of 
Resolution 1441 (2002) on the 8th of November.6 This also marked Iraq’s acceptance of the resumption 
of inspections. The intervention, phase two, began with the initiation of the invasion itself on the 19th of 
March 2003 and ended when US President George W. Bush announced the end of combat operations on 
the 1st of May, 2003.7  The third phase of contestation ended with the Security Council’s adoption of 
Resolution 1511 (2003) and the authorisation of a multi-national force to “take all necessary measures to 
contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq” on the 16th of October 2003.8 Although the 
international presence in Iraq would continue for eight years, this marked the end of the analysis for the 
purposes of this dissertation as the invasion and occupation turned towards rebuilding rather than 
intervention.  
 
 
Figure 5.1: Iraq Timeline 
The requirement for Iraq’s disarmament emerged from the conditions placed upon it by the ceasefire 
following its invasion of Kuwait. Iraq invaded Kuwait on the 2nd of August, 1990 following diplomatic 
and border disputes. The United Nations Security Council was quick to condemn the invasion and passed 
                                                          
5 For general history and background to the 2003 Iraq war, see Mohamed El-Shibiny, Iraq.  (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010); Rick Fawn, and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences. (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); Mahmoud Hmoud, “The Use of Force against Iraq: Occupation and Security Council 
Resolution 1483.” Cornell Int’l L.J. 36 (2003): 435-54; Bassam Romaya, The Iraq War.  (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan 2012); Phil Shiner, and Andrew Williams, The Iraq War and International Law.  (Oxford: Hart 2008); 
Ramesh Chandra Thakur and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structural, Institutional 
and Normative Challenges. (United Nations: New York University Press 2006). 
6 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441(2002) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4644th Meeting, on 8 
November 2001 S/Res/1441, United Nations: New York.  
7 BBC News, “Bush ‘Mission Accomplished’ Speech.” BBC News 1 May, 2003, accessed 6 July 2014, from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7377074.stm. 
8 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1511(2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4844th Meeting, on 16 
October 2003 S/Res/1511, United Nations: New York. 
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Resolution 660 (1990), calling upon Iraq to withdraw immediately.9 In November, it passed Resolution 
678 (1990), calling for Iraq’s complete withdrawal by the 15th of January 1991 and authorising Member 
States to “use all necessary means to uphold Resolution 660” if it failed to meet that deadline.10 President 
George H. W. Bush announced the initiation of allied airstrikes against Iraq on the 16th of January 1991.11 
Ground forces invaded Kuwait in February and Iraqi forces were quickly expelled. Within a month, Iraq 
accepted conditions for a ceasefire.12 Resolution 687 (1991) acknowledged Iraq’s acceptance of these 
terms and set out the conditions for the ceasefire.13 It imposed a range of conditions upon Iraq including a 
requirement to destroy and verify the destruction of all WMDs, including nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons as well as missiles with a range over 150 kilometres.  
However the situation between Iraq and Kuwait remained prominent on the Council’s agenda for the next 
twelve years with the adoption of almost seventy resolutions aimed at ensuring Iraq’s compliance with 
Resolution 687. International inspection teams from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and 
the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM)14 conducted inspections and monitored the 
dismantling of Iraq’s WMDs and development programmes until 1998, when Iraq alleged UNSCOM had 
been infiltrated by spies.15 Inspections were suspended when the US and UK initiated Operation Desert 
Fox, a four-day air campaign against Iraq which aimed “to attack Iraq’s nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors.”16 Inspections did not resume until 
November 2002, when Iraq agreed to a renewed inspections programme, maintaining its weapons 
programme had been entirely dismantled in 1991.17 Resolution 1441 provided a “final opportunity” for 
Iraq to comply with its obligations and cooperate with inspectors or face “grave consequences.”18 This 
                                                          
9 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 660 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2932nd Meeting, on 2 
August 1990. United Nations: New York. 
10 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 678 (1990) Adopted by the Security Council at its 2963rd Meeting, on 29 
November 1990 S/Res/678. United Nations: New York.  
11 George H. W. Bush, “Address to the Nation Announcing Allied Military Action in the Persian Gulf January 16, 
1991.” The American Presidency Project, accessed 1 July 2014 from http://www. presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=19222. 
12 United Nations Security Council, “Letter Dated 28th February 1991 from the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Iraq Addressed to the President of the Security Council” in Letter dated 28 February 1991 from the 
Permanent Representative of Iraq to the Secretary General S/22275*. United Nations: New York. 
13 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 687 (1991), Adopted by the Security Council at its 2981st Meeting, on 3 
April 1991. United Nations: New York.  
14 UNSCOM was replaced by the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) by 
Security Council Resolution 1284 on the 17th of December 1999. 
15 Amin Saikal, “Iraq, UNSCOM and the US: A UN Debacle?”. Australian Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 
(1999), 291. 
16 CNN News, “Transcript: President Clinton Explains Iraq strike.” CNN.com 16 December 1998, accessed 1 August 
2014 from http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1998/12/16/transcripts /clinton.html. 
17 United Nations Security Council, Security Council, 58th Year: 4714th Meeting 7 March 2003 S/Pv.4714. United 
Nations: New York, Iraq 35. 
18 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441(2002) S/Res/1441.  
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string of Resolutions would provide the legal basis for the interveners’ claim to the legality of the use of 
force in Iraq.19  
On the 5th of February 2003, Colin Powell brought the US’s intelligence evidence before the Council in 
an effort to encourage the international community to accept Iraq was in breach of the Council’s demands 
and authorise the use of force.  Although these justifications for the war would later be discredited,20 even 
by Colin Powell himself,21 the Council members did not authorise the use of force and most individual 
statements encouraged the US to hand its information to inspectors.  
Acting in accordance with these mandating resolutions, the IAEA and United Nations Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) continued inspections. Their reports on the 
disarmament process were ambiguous, finding Iraq’s compliance satisfactory in some areas, but not in 
others.22 This led to a narrative contestation over the substantiality of Iraq’s cooperation with inspectors in 
which central contesters on both sides pointed to the same report to argue the sufficiency and 
insufficiency of Iraq’s compliance with the Council’s demands. This question of cooperation will be dealt 
with in the narrative contestation section.  
President George W. Bush announced the invasion on the 17th of March, 2003 “to disarm Iraq, to free its 
people and to defend the world from grave danger.”23 The intervention phase continued until the President 
announced the end of combat operations on the 1st of May. This next stage would involve “bringing order 
to parts of that country that remain dangerous… pursuing and finding leaders of the old regime,” 
beginning “the search for hidden chemical and biological weapons” and “helping to rebuild Iraq.”24 
Consequently, the speech marked a transition from framing the situation as a war to framing it as an 
occupation. In turn, this transition paved the way to legalising the occupying power’s authority without 
legitimising the invasion itself with the adoption of Resolution 1511 (2003) on the 16th of October. 
Resolution 1511 authorised a multi-national force to “take all necessary measures to contribute to the 
maintenance of peace and security in Iraq.”25  The adoption of Resolution 1511 marked an endpoint 
where the contestation and reframing of the question of the use of force was recast in terms in a manner 
                                                          
19 Marc Weller, Iraq and the Use of Force in International Law. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 132-187; 
Yoo. International Law and the War in Iraq, 567-571. 
20 James P Pfiffner, “Did President Bush Mislead the Country in His Arguments for War with Iraq?”. Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2004), 43-45. 
21 Colin Powell and Tony Koltz, It Worked for Me: In Life and Leadership.  (New York: Harper Collins, 2012), 287-
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22 United Nations Security Council. Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council Resolution 
1284 (1999) S/2003/232. United Nations: New York. 
23 George W Bush, “Address to the Nation on Iraq March 17, 2003.”  The American Presidency Project, accessed 1 July 
2014 from http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=63713&st= &st1=. 
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25 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1551 (2003) 16th October 2003 S/Res/1551. 
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that deliberately brought the situation back within the purview of the United Nations and restored the 
credibility of the Security Council through the adoption of a humanitarian reframe. The normative 
contestation will therefore examine this reframe with a view to understanding the overall impact of the 
legitimation process on the Iraq invasion and vice versa.  
5.2 Actor Contestation 
The actor contestation involved a central contestation and an audience reframer contestation, both of 
which will be examined here. The central contestation took place between the actors directly involved in 
the use of force: the Iraqi government, headed by Saddam Hussein, and the interveners, in particular the 
leaders of the invasion, the US and the UK. There was no organised domestic opposition with 
international agency at the time, so there was no Iraqi opposition group involved in the central 
contestation. Of course, there was domestic opposition to the Ba’athist regime in Iraq, but this opposition 
did not take part in the international contestation during the three phases examined here.  
The audience reframer contestation brought about the legitimation of two main groups of actors, 
institutional actors, and states. Institutional actors are usually intergovernmental organisations whose role 
in a situation emerges from their connection to an organisation or institution such as the United Nations or 
regional organisation. Building these connections can even see non-governmental organisations given 
critical roles in contestations.  A key institutional actor was the United Nations Monitoring, Verification 
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) which had been granted a mandate to verify Iraq’s 
disarmament through the Security Council. Secondly, some individual states gained positions as audience 
reframers by opposing the invasion, although between them they offered two frames for justifying their 
positions. For example, where some states, such as Canada, opposed the use of force without a second 
mandate, but supported the drafting and adoption of a resolution, most other detractors argued a second 
resolution was a legal necessity, but that it ought not to be adopted at the time. This second approach was 
offered by France and Germany. France threatened to veto any Security Council resolution authorising 
force. Opposition from both France and Germany created division in NATO, leading to what some have 
called the US-European split.26 The fact that these states had been supportive of previous US and UK 
interventionist initiatives, such as the Kosovo intervention, led to a perception that their opposition in this 
case was particularly legitimate. This section will examine how these actors were legitimised and 
delegitimised, pointing to their further influence over the narrative and normative contestations in this 
case.  
                                                          
26 Hans Mouritzen, “Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory.” European 
Security 15, no. 2 (2006), 139-143. 
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 Central Actor Contestation 
As noted above, Iraq’s legitimacy as a member of the international community, good neighbour and good 
government had been contested due to a long history of conflict with its neighbours, especially Iran and 
Kuwait, and increasing antagonism with the west. However, for the purposes of this analysis, phase one of 
the contestation over the legitimacy of the 2003 Iraq War began in late November 2002 with the adoption 
of Resolution 1441. Adopted unanimously by the Council, it offered Iraq a “final opportunity” to comply 
with the demands of the Council particularly in relation to verifying disarmament.27 The interveners 
pointed to Iraq’s history of conflict with its neighbours, aggression toward the international community 
and human rights abuses within Iraq to support its argument that the possibility of Iraq retaining WMDs 
was especially dangerous as it was likely to use them. The Coalition therefore depicted Iraq’s illegitimacy 
in terms of its history of aggression, human rights abuses and disobedience. 
US Secretary of State, Colin Powell laid the foundations of this frame before the Council on the 5th of 
February, 2003. He argued Iraq’s poor record of conflict and abuse, including the use of WMDs in wars 
against Iran and its own citizens, pointed to a greater risk that Iraq would use such weapons again.  Powell 
delegitimised the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein in particular, arguing his regime’s behaviour demonstrated 
“contempt for the truth and, most damning of all, his utter contempt for human life.”28 He pointed to 
Iraq’s use of mustard and nerve gas in the 1980s during the Iran-Iraq wars as well as in a string of abuses 
against Iraqi citizens, and to its long history as a police state. He argued Iraq had direct connections to 
terror networks, including the Palestinian Liberation Front and a “potentially more sinister nexus” to Al-
Qaeda. In this way, Powell built the Coalition’s case by arguing that Iraq’s history of human rights abuses 
demonstrated, not only that Iraq possessed such weapons, but that it was willing to use them, possibly in a 
terrorist attack. Therefore, in the first phase of the conflict, intervening states utilised a human rights 
abuse framework not necessarily as a cause for the use of force, but rather as part of a broader frame to 
delegitimise the Iraqi government as a rogue state with a demonstrated a willingness to use WMDs 
against its own people and its neighbours. 
Iraq maintained it was not abusive; pointing the alleged use of chemical and biological weapons against 
Iraqi-Kurds in retaliation for assisting Iranian forces enter the Iraqi city of Halabja in 1987, the Iraqi 
representative, Mr Aldouri expressed “surprise,” dismissing the allegations “for one simple reason;” he 
claimed Iraq did “not have the chemical weapon that was used in the Halabja incident.”29 Although 
                                                          
27 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441 (2002) S/Res/1441, operative paragraph 2.  
28 United Nations Security Council, Security Council, 58th Year: 4701st Meeting 5 February 2003 S/Pv.4701, United 
Nations: New York, USA 17. 
29 United Nations Security Council, 5 February 2003 S/Pv.4701, Iraq 38. 
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numerous human rights organisations as well as a United Nations reports support the view that both the 
Iraqi and Iranian governments used chemical weapons against civilians in the 1980s during the Iraq-Iran 
war,30 Iraq built its case on the very uncertainties of its weapons capacity and development programmes 
that underpinned the contestation itself. Denying the allegations but unable to prove what it did not have, 
it challenged the international community to prove otherwise.  
Iraq continued to legitimise its position, emphasising its “commitment” in continuing its “proactive 
cooperation with the inspection teams…so as to verify that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction.”31 
Rejecting attempts to delegitimise it for expelling inspectors in 1999, it argued UNMOVIC withdrew 
because the US initiated airstrikes in December of that year.32 Furthermore, it attempted to delegitimise 
the interveners, arguing “the United States of America and Britain are continuing their feverish efforts to 
launch an aggressive war against my country…Their aim is to change the national Government of Iraq 
and to impose American hegemony over the region.”33 This pattern of making the US and UK the object 
of delegitimation was common in Iraqi statements. Speaking to the Security Council Mr Aldouri excused 
the “voice of those who are misled,” suggesting they were “intimidated” by a US “carrot-and-stick” 
policy.34 Iraq therefore maintained it had observed and was continuing to observe its international 
obligations, including cooperating with inspections to verify its disarmament while the invading states had 
launched a war of aggression in order to alter the internal make-up of the Iraqi state.   
The United States argued the Coalition of the Willing was legitimate by force of numbers. Comprised of 
forty-eight35  supportive states, the US argued before the Security Council that the Coalition’s actions 
were “not unilateral.”36 President Bush presented this argument to his own domestic audience, arguing 
“many nations, however, do have the resolve and fortitude to act against this threat to peace, and a broad 
coalition is now gathering to enforce the just demands of the world.”37 The interveners therefore took a 
                                                          
30 Joost R Hilterman, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja.  New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, 125-148. 
31 United Nations Security Council, 5 February 2003 S/Pv.4701, Iraq 38. 
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very literal approach to understanding the term “unilateral”, arguing the consensus of their number in the 
face of Security Council paralysis legitimised their actions.  
The Council took a more moderate view, adjusting both central contenders’ frames to recast the 
illegitimacy of both actors’ positions. Figures 5.2 and 5.3 demonstrate the flow of this process over the 
first two phases of the contestation. Although these broad sweeps on the legitimacy axis in phase one 
would suggest widespread disagreement, most audience members accepted elements of both arguments. 
The German representative stressed his government “did not hold any illusions on the inhumane and 
brutal nature of Saddam Hussain’s dictatorship,” but contrasted this with more recent developments which 
showed “cooperation has, nevertheless, notably improved” which it viewed as “a positive development.”38  
Consequently, phase one depicts the combination of the legitimation and delegitimation of the Iraqi 
regime as states attributed the state actor some legitimacy for improvements in its cooperation and 
compliance, but voiced concern for its past failures and continued shortcomings. Moreover, Resolution 
1441’s finding that Iraq was in material breach of its international obligations resulted in claims Iraq was 
acting illegally.  Phase two, however shows a marked rejection of legitimacy of both actors, following the 
commencement of the invasion. As many actors accepted Iraq was in breach of its obligations but the 
Coalition had acted outside the authority of the Council, there were few claims to the legitimacy of either 
actor, and no claims to legality outside the central contesters themselves. 
 
Figure 5.2: Iraq Actor Legitimation Radar Phase 1: 8th November 2002-17th March 2003 
                                                          
38 United Nations Security Council, 7 March 2003 S/Pv.4714, Germany 9. 
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Figure 5.3: Iraq Actor Legitimation Radar Phase 2: 18th March 2003- 1st May 2003 
 
Beginning with the announcement of the end of military operations on the 31st of May, Phase three, saw 
very little contestation over the legitimacy of the central actors. Baghdad and the Ba’athist regime fell in 
April 2003 and Saddam Hussein went into hiding, removing the Iraqi leadership from the central 
contestation and ending the actor contestation. These contestations would re-emerge following Hussein’s 
capture in late 2003 and subsequent trial, conviction and execution by the Iraqi Special Tribunal for 
Crimes Against Humanity in 2006. As such, the regime offered little to the contestation during this phase, 
making it impossible to plot this period of the contestation on a legitimation radar.  
Meanwhile intervening forces entered the occupation phase of the mission. This phase posed a challenge 
to the credibility of the Security Council. Although many decision-making states viewed the use of force 
as illegal and illegitimate, the Coalition was the de facto authority in Iraq. The international community 
needed to legitimise the decisions and actions of this transition without legitimising the invasion itself. 
Consequently, it legalised the Coalition as the occupying power, making it responsible under international 
humanitarian law for the maintenance of security and implementation of the transition. This led to a 
humanitarian reframe, which will be examined in the normative contestations section. The significance 
for the actor contestation is that although it recognised the reality of the interveners’ legal authority, it did 
not recognise the legitimacy or legality of the intervention itself.   
This central actor contestation therefore reflects the common patterns of the legitimation process. First, 
the central contesters did not aim to convince each other of their legitimacy, but rather directed these 
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claims to a broader audience. Furthermore, this audience recast these frames in a manner which accepted 
elements of both central contester’s frames, delegitimising both central actors. Consequently, the 
international community framed an ambiguous position on Iraq’s legitimacy, accepting improvements in 
cooperation as indicators of a change in Iraq’s behaviour while simultaneously delegitimising it for past 
failures and continuing shortfalls in cooperation. However, it also delegitimised the Coalition, especially 
immediately following the initiation of the invasion.  
 Audience Reframers 
The second element of the actor contestation, the audience reframer contestation, brought about the 
legitimation of several key actors which can be divided into two broad groups. The first group consists of 
institutional actors, in particular the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams authorised by the Security 
Council to inspect, report on and verify Iraq’s disarmament. The second group is made up of state actors, 
France, Germany and Canada who gained prominence as traditional allies of the US and UK that opposed 
the invasion. Although these states were united in their opposition to their traditional allies, they 
represented two approaches to justifying their critiques, which will be examined in the normative section 
of this contestation. In relation to the audience reframer contestation, the close proximity of these actors to 
the central actors, without being direct participants in the conflict provided them with agency to frame 
significant aspects of the contestation. However as will be demonstrated some actors gained more 
influence than others.   
The inspectors and their reported findings were widely legitimised. Between the recommencement of 
inspections in November 2002 and the submission of UNMOVIC Executive Chairman, Hans Blix’s 
Twelfth Report on the 27th of February 2003, inspectors conducted 550 inspections across approximately 
350 sites.39 Almost 150 legitimation claims and thirty-five legal claims across nine Council meetings 
recognised the legitimacy and legality of the inspectors’ role; none claimed it illegal or illegitimate. Even 
the central contesters accepted the legitimacy of the inspection teams, and drew on Blix’s report to frame 
their contestations. The Twelfth Report assessed Iraq’s compliance, contributing significantly to all three 
areas of contestation. The role of these reports in influencing the contestation process will be examined in 
more detail below in the narrative and normative contestations, however the wide acceptance of these 
reports points to the clear legitimation of UNMOVIC and the IAEA.  
The second group of actors involved NATO members –France, Germany and Canada- who, although 
usually viewed as allies of the US, and UK did not support the use of force. They used two divergent 
approaches to interpret the normative frame of the situation which will be examined later in this chapter. 
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All three argued a second resolution was a legal necessity but disagreed over the necessity of the use of 
force to verify disarmament. Canada contributed to the drafting of a resolution which moved towards 
authorising force but distanced itself from the unmandated invasion.40 France and Germany agreed a 
second resolution was a legal necessity, but unlike Canada, did not support the drafting of a mandating 
resolution because force was not warranted at that time.41 Consequently, France threatened to veto any 
attempt to bring a mandating resolution before the Council and both France and Germany blocked NATO 
action.42 This division caused a US-European split and divided NATO.43 The content of these 
contestations will be examined in the narrative and normative sections of this chapter, where opposition 
from these traditional sources of support moulded key contestations. As reframing actors, this agency 
granted to these states was especially influential as their role in supporting US and UK led interventionist 
actions in the past, such as in Kosovo, made France and Germany particularly legitimate sources of 
dissent. The following sections will examine how these actors shaped and framed the narrative and 
normative contestations in a context where the central contesters were widely delegitimised.  
5.3 Narrative Contestation 
Narrative contestations tell the story or plot of the situation and aim to establish facts which frame the 
justification of the actors’ decisions and actions. The focus on the question of WMDs distinguishes this 
case from the others which contested situations of human rights abuses, breaches of humanitarian law and 
questions of humanitarian crisis or catastrophe. As in previous cases, the plot accepted in this case framed 
legal facts, leading to contestations over whether or not the situation constituted a threat to international 
peace and security and had exhausted non-forceful options. It will be demonstrated that although the 
accepted frame of fact established the first of these narratives, it did not establish the second.  
 Threat to International Peace and Security 
The international community recognised the situation in Iraq as a threat to international peace and security 
in November 2002 through the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441. Resolution 1441 recognised “the 
                                                          
40 Rick Fawn, “Canada: Outside the Anglo-American Fold.” Chap. 9 In The Iraq War: Causes and Consequences, 
edited by Rick Fawn and Raymond A. Hinnebusch, 115-28. (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006,),116-
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126 | P a g e  
 
threat Iraq’s non-compliance with Council resolutions and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and long-range missiles poses to international peace and security.”44 This threat was entrenched in Iraq’s 
non-compliance with requirements for its disarmament and was therefore based on contestations over 
allegations of illicit weapons possession and non-compliance with Security Council Resolutions.   
The international community also widely accepted the frame that Resolution 687 required the verified 
disarmament of Iraq and this was a legitimate concern of the international community generally, and the 
Security Council in particular. Described as “the mother of all resolutions” for its intrusiveness and 
scope,45 Resolution 687 was adopted by twelve votes.46 It enshrined the terms of the ceasefire and marked 
the end of the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Despite the exceptional nature of this Resolution, it was widely 
accepted that verifying the disarmament of Iraq was a legitimate matter for the Security Council.47 In the 
lead up to the invasion, Russia stated “we all agree that we must achieve the full and effective 
disarmament of Iraq, in conformity with Security Council resolution 1441 (2002).”48 Therefore, the first 
claim, taking root before the first phase and remaining throughout the entire contestation was whether or 
not Iraq in fact had prohibited weapons or weapons development programmes.  
As leaders of the coalition, the US and UK alleged Hussein had continued Iraq’s WMD programmes 
retaining prohibited weapons and the capacity to produce them throughout the 1990s. In the aftermath of 
the conflict, the contestation over this issue would no longer involve the “truth” of Iraq’s secret weapons 
programmes, but rather whether or not the coalition leadership, in particular the White House, knew of the 
falsehood before the conflict.49 In the lead-up to the invasion, however, only the central contesters 
disputed the legitimacy of the allegations against Iraq. The benchmark for these allegations was set on the 
5th of February, 2003 when Colin Powell presented the US’s intelligence to the Security Council. Powell 
spent approximately an hour and a half laying out US intelligence agencies’ evidence against Iraq. The 
Secretary of State revealed documents, intercepted radio recordings and satellite images of alleged 
development, production and storage sites, including what he claimed were mobile laboratories on 
                                                          
44 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1441(2002) S/Res/1441.  
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trucks.50 He claimed the evidence pointed “to an active and systematic effort on the part of the Iraqi 
regime to keep key materials and people from the inspectors, in direct violation of resolution 1441 
(2002).”51 The briefing also alleged “the potentially much more sinister nexus between Iraq and the Al-
Qaeda terrorist network, a nexus that combines classic terrorist organizations and modern methods of 
murder.”52 Summarising the conclusion of his US counterpart, British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw 
argued “there was only one possible conclusion” from the evidence; “that Iraq is in further material 
breach” of Resolution 1441.53  
Iraq disputed the Secretary of States’ evidence claiming his statement was “utterly unrelated to the truth 
and the reality on the ground.”54 At the Council, the Iraqi representative, Mr Aldouri, pointed to previous 
allegations made by the US and UK in 2002 which “were at the top of the list of sites inspected by 
inspection teams” who “discovered that none of the allegations… were true.”55 Iraq also rejected claims to 
terror network linkages, citing President Hussein’s claim that “if we had a relationship with Al-Qaeda and 
we believed in that relationship, we would not be ashamed to admit it. We have no relationship with Al-
Qaeda.”56 Iraq therefore rejected the entirety of Powell’s statement and argued inspections had not found 
any evidence of prohibited weapons programmes because the prohibited materials were already 
destroyed.  
Although Powell’s evidence was later proved false57 most Security Council members accepted the 
Secretary of State’s presentation as a legitimate frame of the allegations against Iraq, but they did not 
accept the allegations established Iraq’s material breach or the need to use force. The more prominent 
view was that these serious allegations ought to be investigated by UNMOVIC and IAEA inspectors. The 
Chinese representative welcomed the US Secretary of State’s presentation, which it believed was 
“consistent with the spirit of resolution 1441 (2002) and could help increase transparency,” but called on 
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the US to handover its information to the inspection teams.58 This statement reflected those made by 
many Council members such as Pakistan and Russia, who did not question the legitimacy of Powell’s 
presentation as evidence of serious allegations, but called on the US and its allies to hand this information 
over to inspection teams for further investigation.59  
Powell recalls in his memoir that by late January, the President “did not think war could be avoided” and 
told the Secretary “it was now time to present our [the US] case against Iraq to the United Nations.”60 The 
presentation aimed to convince the international community that Saddam Hussein had an illicit 
programme, rhetorically entrapping the Security Council into accepting a narrative that Iraq was material 
breach of Resolution 1441. The US had already stated that it did not believe a second resolution 
authorising force was necessary -a normative claim examined in the next section- but establishing a 
narrative that “today…Iraq still remains in material breach” would demonstrate “its failure to seize its one 
last opportunity to come clean and disarm” and bring Iraq “closer to the day when it will face serious 
consequences.”61 Consequently, although the US would argue it did not need a second resolution, the case 
he delivered to the Security Council on the 5th of February would establish the legal fact that created a 
normative expectation that Iraq should face “consequences” for its failures. 
However the audience did not accept this frame completely. Although it accepted the authenticity of the 
US intelligence brief and the narrative that Iraq posed a threat, only Bulgaria and the UK repeated the 
claim that Iraq remained in “material breach”.62 The other audience members called on the US to turn its 
evidence over to the inspectors for investigation. This reframed the positions of both central actors and 
denied the establishment of a legal fact of ‘material breach’ that would create an expectation for further 
consequences. Thus the Secretary of State’s attempt to rhetorically entrap the international community 
into accepting a material breach narrative was reframed, excluding the expectation of forceful 
consequences. This is an example of rhetorical exclusion. Therefore although Resolution 1441 
acknowledged the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, it was not widely held 
that this narrative compelled a forceful response.     
This leads to the second frame, also entrenched in Resolution 1441. The second element to establishing a 
narrative for force was based in the question of compliance, or more specifically, whether Iraq was 
cooperating sufficiently with inspectors. On the 28th of February the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, 
Hans Blix submitted the Twelfth Report. The report supported both central contesters’ claims, 
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acknowledging improvements in Iraq’s cooperation and compliance, while also stating it was lacking in 
other areas. Presenting the Twelfth Report to the Council on the 7th of March, 2003, Hans Blix framed the 
key question of the debate: “the question is now asked whether Iraq has cooperated ‘immediately, 
unconditionally and actively’ with UNMOVIC.”63 This became the benchmark for establishing Iraqi 
compliance and in doing so redirected the terms of the contestation toward establishing cooperation rather 
than possession.  
However the report remained vague on this question and as such, was utilised by all actors, including the 
central actors, to cast their opposing claims. The report distinguished between “cooperation on ‘process’ 
and cooperation on ‘substance’” finding the Iraqi government had cooperated actively with regard to 
process but less so in relation to substance. 64 Pointing to an appropriate degree of cooperation with 
processes, the report found “Iraq has from the outset satisfied the demand for prompt access to any site, 
whether or not it had been previously declared or inspected.”65 The report also noted that despite some 
resistance, Iraq had also finally agreed to provide flight access to surveillance sites and escorts, 
established an Iraqi commission to trace proscribed weapons and produced lists of personnel involved in 
weapon development or destruction programmes for interview. However it also noted Iraq’s 12 000 page 
declaration, submitted in accordance with Resolution 1441 in December 2002 “despite its large volume” 
had not provided “new evidence or data that may resolve outstanding disarmament issues.”66 Pointing to 
the inadequacies of the declaration and other barriers, the Twelfth Report found “Iraq could have made 
greater efforts …Iraq could have made full use of the declaration, which was submitted on 7 December” 
and suggested it was “hard to understand why a number of the measures, which are now being taken, 
could not have been initiated earlier.”67 This ambiguous assessment of Iraq’s cooperation led to further 
contestation, as every Council member addressed the sufficiency of Iraqi cooperation on record at the 
4714th meeting on the 7th of March. 
Iraq argued it had cooperated fully with the inspection regime. It had provided the documentation 
demanded by Resolution 1441, containing an “accurate, full, and complete declaration of all aspects of its 
programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.”68 Mr Aldouri argued Iraq was not 
only cooperating, but had done so “on a deep sense of responsibility and on a clear vision of the nature of 
the very difficult international situation.”69 He also referenced a press statement by Hans Blix “that Iraq is 
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cooperating proactively” concluding that “efforts being undertaken by Iraq and the inspectors represent 
steps towards the actual verification of Iraq’s unilateral destruction of its previous proscribed 
programmes.”70 Finally, the Iraq representative placed the onus on the inspectors, arguing “all weapons 
that have been proscribed… have been either declared or unilaterally destroyed by Iraq… It is for the 
accusers to prove otherwise, if they possess any evidence.”71 Iraq therefore argued its cooperation was 
proactive as it could not provide further evidence of what it did not have. It challenged dissenters, placing 
the onus on the inspectors to prove the weapons did exist.    
Pointing to the elements of the report which criticised Iraq’s level of cooperation, Coalition leaders, the 
US and UK, argued Iraq had failed to cooperate “immediately, unconditionally and actively,” as required 
by Resolution 1441 and therefore remained in breach. Speaking again on behalf of the US, Colin Powell 
reiterated Blix’s question, stating “the answer depends entirely on whether Iraq has made the choice to 
actively cooperate in every possible way, in every possible manner”72 and was echoed by UK Foreign 
Secretary; “has Iraq taken this final opportunity to disarm?.”73 In this way, the central contesters not only 
disputed if Iraq was cooperating, but also what constituted sufficient cooperation.  
Once again, audience members recast the frames of both contesters. Most accepted the framing of the 
inspectors’ findings, recognising the legitimacy of Iraq’s improved cooperation, while calling for 
increased compliance in the identified problem areas. This ambiguous assessment resulted in the broad 
legitimation and delegitimation of Iraq in phase one, as many speakers would both, legitimise Iraq for its 
improvement, but delegitimise it for it past failures and continued shortcomings. Speaking for Germany, 
Mr Fischer argued the UNMOVIC reports “made clear once more that Iraq’s cooperation…does not yet 
fully meet United Nations demands.”74 He also pointed to instances of cooperation, in particular the 
destruction of Al Samoud missiles to argue “it shows that peaceful disarmament is possible and that there 
is a real alternative to war.”75 Therefore, audience members accepted that although Iraq had not complied 
with Resolution 1441 completely, improvements in compliance indicated a valid political process which 
did not warrant force. The validity of this process will be examined below where the legitimacy of non-
forceful responses is assessed.  
Audience members widely agreed with this position and found Iraq’s cooperation improving but mostly 
insufficient. In phase one of the contestation, thirty-seven statements viewed Iraq’s cooperation as 
illegitimate while eighteen recognised it as legitimate. Fifty-three statements supported the claim Iraq was 
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in breach of Security Council resolutions while thirteen maintained it was not. Therefore there was 
significant support for the Coalition leaders’ frame that Iraq had failed to fully cooperate with the 
inspections and in failing to comply with the demands of Resolution 1441 to cooperate “immediately, 
unconditional and actively,” was in breach of its obligations. Unlike previous cases, the recognition of a 
threat to international peace and security did not create an expectation that force was warranted. Although 
the US attempted to rhetorically entrap the international community into accepting a frame that Iraq 
remained in material breach, thereby creating an expectation that the consequences foreshadowed by 
Resolution 1441 ought to be implemented, the audience recast this position. Without questioning the 
authenticity of the evidence presented, most called for the allegations to be investigated by UNMOVIC 
and the IAEA. Thus, although a threat to international peace and security was established, the narrative 
failed to develop an expectation amongst audience members that force was the only remaining option. 
Last Resort  
The second narrative contestation was over the legitimacy of the inspections regime as a non-forceful 
means of verifying Iraq’s disarmament and the exhaustion of such processes. Pointing to twelve years of 
sanctions and Security Council Resolutions, the US argued Iraq’s repeated refusal “to respond to 
diplomatic overtures, economic sanctions and other peaceful means designed to bring about Iraqi 
compliance with its obligations to disarm”76 demonstrated the failure of the inspections regime and non-
forceful responses. Similarly the UK argued “that Iraq was repeatedly defying the United Nations in 
refusing complete disarmament.”77 Justifying his position to a domestic audience less than a week before 
the invasion commenced, Australian Prime Minister, John Howard argued “for 12 years the community of 
nations has tried to cajole and encourage Iraq to honour its UN disarmament obligations, and it’s failed.”78 
In relation to allowing more time and inspections he argued “it’s not a question of time or inspectors but 
it’s a question of attitude.”79 Statements by non-permanent Council members and Coalition supporters, 
Spain and Bulgaria as well as twelve other Coalition supporters, took similar views, arguing that 
diplomatic processes had been exhausted, and that the only way to ensure Iraq’s disarmament was by 
force.80  
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While Coalition supporters viewed Resolution 1441 as a last opportunity for Iraq, most Security Council 
members saw it as affirmation of the Council’s commitment to achieving the peaceful disarmament of 
Iraq. Several Council members, including permanent members, China, France and Russia argued 
disarmament could and should have been achieved peacefully, within the framework of the United 
Nations and Resolution 1441.81 Speaking immediately after the initiation of force, the German speaker 
stated his country did “not believe that there is no alternative to military force as a last resort. To the 
contrary, we feel that Iraq can be disarmed using peaceful means.”82 Similarly, the French representative 
argued “the disarmament of Iraq could be achieved through the peaceful means of inspections.”83 
Therefore this question of last resort would prove to be the most influential frame in the rejection of the 
use of force.  
This question was widely disputed over the course of two days when more than seventy speakers 
delivered statements on the situation in Iraq approximately one week into the invasion. Overall, twenty-
five statements made across both sessions of the 4726th meeting of the Council supported the view that 
Iraq had failed to comply with the Resolutions and was responsible for the resort to force while thirty-two 
expressed support for continuing the inspection process.84 The German representative, as well as others 
who opposed the use of force, such as Russia, China and France, maintained that although it was 
necessary for Iraq to comply, the inspection process was working and remained a legitimate alternative to 
force.85 However the UK, US, Spain and Bulgaria argued diplomatic processes, including inspections, had 
been exhausted by Iraq’s non-compliance.86 The Council was therefore divided on this question, however 
the more widely held view, especially amongst decision making Council members, was that inspections 
and political processes were working but needed time. 
Combining this with the human rights, WMD and cooperation narrative frames, it is clear that 
although the Security Council members accepted many of the factual bases provided by the 
intervening states, most developed expectations that fell short of justifying force. Consequently, 
Council members accepted Powell’s statement on the 5th of February 2003 as legitimate evidence of 
allegations of illicit WMD and development programmes in Iraq, but called for the information to 
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be handed over to the inspection agencies for investigation. Similarly, although it was widely 
accepted Iraq’s cooperation did not satisfy the demands of Resolution 1441, most also accepted 
improvements in Iraq’s behaviour indicated the inspection process was working. Finally, although 
the international community also widely accepted the Ba’athist regime was oppressive, dictatorial 
and abusive, and stood accused of numerous serious atrocities against its neighbours and citizens, it 
also accepted Iraq should and could be disarmed peacefully. Consequently, the audience frames 
developed an expectation that excluded the use of force. Although the US attempted to trap the 
Council into a frame that would create an expectation of force, the audience recast this frame. As 
such, although they did not widely dispute the validity or authenticity of the evidence presented on 
the 5th of February, the audience still widely rejected the view that Iraq remained in material breach 
and should incur more serious consequences. Therefore, the audience members recast the narrative 
frame in terms that reset normative expectations of the responses available to the Council, 
excluding the option of force because viable diplomatic approaches remained. 
5.4 Normative Contestation  
Despite the exclusion of the use of force as an option by the narrative frame, the Coalition launched 
military operations against Iraq. This action led to a normative contestation over the legitimate and legal 
use of force. The coalition members argued Iraq’s non-compliance reactivated the initial authorisation to 
use force against Iraq in 1990 and is called the “reactivation” or “revivalist” approach. Dissenters rejected 
the revivalist argument and argued a second resolution was necessary to authorise force to confirm 
disarmament. However, opposition to the use of force was not united and there were two frames within 
this approach. One, offered by the Canadians argued a second resolution was legally required and 
necessary while the other, espoused by France and Germany in particular, argued that although a second 
resolution was legally required, the use of force was not a legitimate response. This conclusion was reliant 
on the narrative frame that the inspections regime remained a viable alternative to the use of force.  
This section will examine the above normative contestations as well as an added position advanced almost 
exclusively by the US which reformulated the customary norm of pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence 
to a nuclear threat. Finally, it will also examine the eventual consensus achieved in this case, which like 
Kosovo and Rwanda, utilised a humanitarian reframe. This humanitarian reframe provided the Council 
with the means to reassert its authority over the case to address the reality of the invasion and occupation, 
while avoiding legitimation or legalisation of the invasion itself.  
Iraq adopted the same argument Belgrade used to argue against the use of force in Kosovo. It argued that 
articles 2(4) and 51 of the United Nations Charter prohibited the use of force except in cases of self-
defence or where the Security Council mandates its use to address a threat to international peace and 
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security. An Iraqi representative labelled the invasion “full-scale military aggression” and “a blatant 
violation of international law and of the United Nations Charter” which defied “the international 
community and deviates from international legality.”87  
 
In contrast, the Coalition members presented their own legal justification for the invasion, also based in a 
positivist application of existing Security Council resolutions. This can be contrasted with the Kosovar 
case, where many intervening members appealed to a natural law permitting intervention. They argued the 
use of force was legally mandated by the revival of Resolutions 678 (1990) and 687 (1991). The first of 
these mandated the use of force against Iraq to repel its invasion of Kuwait in 1990 while the latter 
established the ceasefire in 1991 which ended the conflict and imposed conditions on Iraq, including 
disarmament. As Resolution 687 only suspended the authority to use force, Coalition members such as 
Australia argued “existing Security Council resolutions - including Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441- 
provide authority for the use of force to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and to restore 
international peace and security to the region” concluding that “participation in the coalition is in 
complete accordance with international law.”88  
Resolution 1441 found Iraq in material breach of Resolution 687 and gave Iraq “a final opportunity to 
comply with its disarmament obligations,” warning of “serious consequences” if it failed.89 Viewing 
Resolution 1441 as a final warning and legitimate threat, the coalition members argued Iraq’s “repeated 
non-compliance over the past 12 years” meant it was in breach of its obligation under these Resolutions. 
Furthermore, as Resolution 1441 “gave Iraq one last chance to disarm” this continued non-compliance 
“compelled an international coalition… to take enforcement actions.”90 Therefore, this normative frame 
claimed “Resolution 1441 and its reference to others adopted by this Council supported the legality of the 
action undertaken by the coalition.”91  
However when Resolution 1441 was adopted in November 2002, Council members were quick to 
emphasise it did not constitute or reactivate a use of force mandate.92 France, Russia and China issued a 
statement recognising that “Resolution 1441 … excludes any automaticity in the use of force” and noted 
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statements of the US and UK that accepted this view.93 For example, the US representative stated “this 
resolution contains no ‘hidden triggers’ and no ‘automaticity’ with respect to the use of force.”94 But the 
US speaker also foreshadowed an alternative approach arguing that “if the Security Council fails to act 
decisively…this resolution does not constrain any Member State from acting to defend itself …or to 
enforce relevant United Nations resolutions and protect world peace and security.”95These competing 
interpretations of the impact of Resolution 1441 demonstrate attempts by both the interveners and 
audience reframers to rhetorically entrap the contestation. The audience states, France, Russia and China 
attempted to force the Coalition states to accept an interpretation of Resolution 1441 which compelled a 
second resolution, however the interveners foreshadowed an alternative approach which did not require 
any implied authorisation from resolution 1441 or elsewhere because the authorisation, they argued, was 
already contained in Resolution 678.    
Most audience members rejected the revivalist approach, arguing instead that a second resolution was 
needed to specifically mandate the use of force in 2003. Two approaches can be identified within this 
group of detractors. The first, best demonstrated by the Canadian position, was that a second, separate 
resolution would have legalised and legitimised the use of force. This approach accepted that Iraq was in 
breach and the use of force was warranted, but that the Security Council needed to make this 
determination by adopting a second resolution with a specific authorisation of force. Canada supported 
the drafting of a second resolution and had assisted the US in the negotiation of such a draft. But when it 
became apparent the draft would fail, the Coalition argued all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and 
action was needed   Prime Minister Chrétien distanced himself from its neighbour stating “if military 
action proceeds without a new resolution of the Security Council, Canada will not participate.”96 
Therefore, although this position accepted most of the Coalition’s narrative and actor frames, it viewed a 
second resolution as a legal necessity in this case. The fact that it was not forthcoming therefore made the 
prospect of using force illegal and illegitimate according to this frame. 
France and Germany also rejected the revivalist approach and argued a second resolution was legally 
necessary to authorise any use of force, but argued the use of force was not justifiable on any grounds in 
2003. France and Germany had blocked the US’s attempts to obtain NATO’s support for invasion and 
France threatened to veto a draft resolution authorising force, demonstrating not only opposition to what 
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they termed unilateral force, but to the use of any type of military force against Iraq.97 Consequently, 
although they accepted Council authorisation was necessary to legalise force, they remained opposed to 
authorising the use of force. France argued “the military agenda must not dictate the calendar of 
inspections” and suggested “accelerated timetables” for inspections but stressed it would not “allow a 
resolution to be adopted that authorizes the automatic use of force.”98 Therefore, unlike the Canadian 
position, this approach rejected the Coalition’s frame that Council mandated force would be legitimate 
based on a narrative frame that diplomatic options for the investigation of Iraq’s disarmament remained 
viable.  
The Coalition troop contributing states, the US, UK and Australia, rejected the view that a second 
resolution was necessary, although they conceded it would contribute to the invasion’s legitimacy. The 
British Foreign Secretary argued his government had a “preference…that there should be a second 
Security Council resolution authorising military action.”99 However he also accepted that “the faith now 
being placed in the Security Council… requires the Council to show a corresponding level of 
responsibility… but we must reserve our position in the event that it does not.”100 This grounded a 
position that although the UK would prefer a second resolution, it was not a legal necessity.101  
President Bush has maintained in the aftermath that a second resolution was neither likely nor legally 
necessary but would have only enhanced the political legitimacy of military action.102 He claimed the US 
and UK’s attempts to draft a second resolution in February 2003 reflected British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair’s preference for a mandate to appease resistance from his own government and domestic audience 
for “military and political protection.”103 Consequently, although some states drafted a resolution calling 
on Iraq to demonstrate “full, unconditional, immediate and active cooperation,” 104  and imposing a final 
timeframe, the Coalition states maintained it was not a legal necessity, but had been little more than a 
political nicety. Consequently, the Coalition members maintained their actions were still legal, even 
without the second resolution. Deputy Assistant US Attorney General John Yoo explained the legal 
argument behind the revivalist approach:  “the United States could use force not only to enforce 
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Resolution 687’s cease-fire, but also to restore ‘international peace and security’.”105 Therefore, when 
Resolution 1441 found Iraq “in material breach” it “triggered Resolution 678’s authorization to use force 
in Iraq. Suspending the cease-fire and resuming hostilities with Iraq.”106 The representative for the US 
presented this argument to the Council on the 27th of March.107 The UK and Australian positions also 
accepted this approach.108  
 
                 Figure 5.4: Contestation Radar for the Use of Fore in Iraq 
Despite their efforts to legitimise the use of force without a second resolution, the wider international 
community rejected this position. Even in the lead up to the conflict when states contested the legitimacy 
of a possible or hypothetical use of force scenario, the broader international community, contested not 
only the legitimacy and legality of unilateral force, but also the legitimacy of Security Council mandated 
intervention. Figure 5.4109 demonstrates that during phase one, there was not only a widely held view that 
unilateral force would be illegal and illegitimate, but even Council mandated action, although legal, 
would be illegitimate. Therefore, not only did the international community reject the revivalist legal 
justification for the use of force by arguing a second resolution was necessary, but it rhetorically excluded 
the option of using any force at all.  
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However, the US offered a second legal frame to justify its actions. In a letter to the Secretary General the 
US stated its intention to use force “to defend the United States and the international community from the 
threat posed by Iraq.”110 The Australian111 and British112 letters did not adopt self-defence language 
offering the revivalist approach as their principle legal justification. The US’s use of this language, 
however led to further contestation over the normative acceptance of a principle of pre-emptive or 
anticipatory self-defence.  
Using the frame that Iraq’s illicit WMD programme posed a particularly dangerous and pervasive threat, 
the US argued it was legally justifiable to use force to defend itself and the international community from 
a future WMD attack. There is significant legal debate on the legal validity of pre-emptive force, based on 
contestations over the meaning of the “imminent threat” criteria developed in the landmark Caroline 
Case.113 The Caroline test emerged from nineteenth century diplomatic documents involving a British 
attack on a US schooner, the Caroline. Neither the Caroline nor the US was officially taking part in the 
hostilities, which were between the British forces and Canadian combatants, however the British justified 
the attack on grounds that the vessel had been used to transport supplies and rebels. The US argued the 
ship was not being used or readied for use at the time, making the attack illegal. In rejecting the British 
claim, then-US Secretary of State, Daniel Webster accepted “that exceptions growing out of the great law 
of self-defence do exist” however rejected the pre-emptory self-defence justification provided by the 
British arguing that “those exceptions should be confined to cases in which ‘the necessity of that self-
defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.’”114 
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The contestation over pre-emptive self-defence has therefore been based in interpreting this definition of 
imminent attack.115  
The US’s pre-emptory self-defence claim took this test and reformulated it to apply to the nuclear age. 
First formulated by President Kennedy, this view holds that “nuclear weapons are so destructive and 
ballistic missiles are so swift, that any substantially increased possibility of their use or any sudden 
change in their deployment may well be regarded as a definite threat to peace.”116 The National Security 
Strategy (NSS) outlined this approach stating “we must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the 
capabilities and objectives of today’s adversaries.”117 Former Deputy Assistant U.S. Attorney General  
John Yoo applied this “reformulated test” and argued “the threat of a WMD attack by Iraq, either directly 
or through Iraq’s support for terrorism, was sufficiently ‘imminent’ to render the use of force necessary to 
protect the United States, its citizens, and its allies.”118  
However this approach has not gained much traction outside the US and has been widely rejected by the 
international community and legal scholars.119 The UK and Australia relied predominantly on the 
revivalist approach. Although the question of pre-emptive force remains a vague and poorly defined area 
of customary international law, it was explicitly rejected by only a handful of non-permanent members.120 
For example, the representative from Lebanon rejected outright any claim to individual or collective self-
defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter, arguing force could be used against another state “only if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations -a condition that is not met in this case.”121 
Similarly, Iran pointed to “12 years of comprehensive sanctions” to reject any claim Iraq could “be 
considered an imminent threat against the national security of the belligerent Powers.”122 Therefore, rather 
than reject pre-emptive self-defence outright, most held the view that Iraq’s disarmament, while posing a 
threat to international peace and security, could be verified by inspections, not force. With this view, the 
audience position excluded both the revivalist and pre-emptive defence normative frames.  
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The contestation over the use of force therefore shows that the use of force was excluded by the 
international community which not only viewed unilateral force as illegal and illegitimate, but any force, 
including in self-defence or Council mandated intervention, was not a viable means to verifying Iraq’s 
disarmament. Although Council members did not dispute the intelligence brief offered in February 2003, 
they did not develop a normative expectation that force could or should be used to guarantee Iraq’s 
compliance. This can be contrasted with other cases, such as Libya, Kosovo and the latter stages of 
Rwanda, where a normative expectation that force could be used emerged from the accepted narrative. In 
this way, they could exclude the frames underpinning both the revivalist and pre-emptive self-defence 
approaches.  
Humanitarian Reframe 
Although the Council remained largely opposed to the use of force, individual states accepted that 
following the invasion, there was a need to bring the issue back into alignment with international law and 
to restore the credibility of the Council. It could be argued states’ reluctance to pronounce definitive 
interpretations of poorly defined international norms such as pre-emptive defence reflects a desire by 
states to keep international law vague and weak so they can continue to adopt whichever interpretations 
suit their interests in the future. However it remains this contestation also points to the widespread use of 
legal and legitimacy languages and the role of an audience, whose acceptance or rejection of key frames 
influenced key decision making processes and rejected the justification provided by the interveners for 
their use of force. Although these audience members could not prevent the invasion, Council members 
recast the contestation using a humanitarian reframe. This reframing of the contestation balanced the 
pragmatic need to legalise the occupying powers’ authority and the legitimacy of a transitional 
government without legitimising or legalising the invasion itself.  
Secretary General, Kofi Annan first cast a humanitarian reframe on the 26th of March, barely a week after 
the invasion began.  Annan’s position was deliberately ambivalent questioning “why the Iraqi 
Government did not take full advantage of the last chance they were given by the Council” and also 
“whether it was legitimate for some Member States to proceed to such a fateful action.”123 Recognising 
the need for the Council to “rediscover its unity of purpose” he called for an end to the conflict “as soon 
as possible” but also stressed that “while it continues, it is essential that everything be done to protect the 
civilian population… the wounded and the prisoners of war… and to bring relief to the victims,” 
emphasising that “this obligation is binding on all the belligerents.”124 Consequently, he emphasised a two 
tiered approach based on “respect for Iraq’s sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence” and 
                                                          
123 United Nations Security Council, 27th March 2003 S/Pv.4726, Annan 3. 
124 United Nations Security Council, 27th March 2003 S/Pv.4726, Annan 3. 
141 | P a g e  
 
“respect for the right of the Iraqi people to determine their own political future and control their own 
natural resources.”125 This frame would be adopted by future resolutions in order to deal with the reality 
in Iraq, without legitimising or legalising the invasion itself.  
The Council utilised a humanitarian reframe on the 28th of May, when it adopted Resolution 1483 (2003). 
Several members emphasised Resolution 1483 was a compromise which accepted the reality of the 
situation. For example the Pakistani representative recognised “that the Secretary-General will need to 
coordinate his activities in Iraq with those who happen to be in actual control of any part of that 
country,”126  and stressed this Resolution was passed “without prejudice to our view on the legality or 
otherwise of the situation.”127 Therefore, the recognition of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as 
the legal authority in Iraq reflected the international community’s acceptance of the reality in Iraq but not 
the legitimation or legalisation of the occupation and invasion. The resolution was deliberately written in 
terms that offered neither legality nor legitimation of the Coalition’s use of force.  It reframed the 
situation in order to establish a particular legal frame which in turn imposed very specific obligations on 
the Coalition as the occupying power. It framed the situation in terms that were recognisable in law and 
established normative expectations for future contestation.  
Additionally, Resolution 1500 (2003) adopted on the 14th of August established UNAMI and recognised 
the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC)128 while Resolution 1511(2003) adopted on the 16th of October 
reaffirmed the continuation of the occupation and called on members to contribute to the multinational 
UN force.129 In accepting these resolutions, key audience members who had opposed the use of force 
accepted the reality of the invasion and the need to work with the occupying powers in order to address 
the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, and move towards reconstruction and rebuilding. For example, 
Germany expressed deep concern for “the plight of the Iraqi people and the imminent threat of a 
humanitarian disaster,” and accepted that “this is not the time for accusations or apportioning blame” as 
the Council needed to “face the reality of war.”130 Consequently, the German speaker recommended the 
Council should focus “on the future and on the immediate challenges for the international community” 
and “bringing this war to an end as soon as possible.”131 In doing so the Council members established 
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certain responsibilities of the now legally categorised Authority, calling on “all parties to the conflict to 
assume their responsibilities under international humanitarian law, especially the Geneva conventions.”132 
Drafted and sponsored by Coalition members, these resolutions legalised the occupation and recognised 
the decisions of the CPA and IGC as legitimate and legal authorities. Some Council members explicitly 
stated that the development of a unified Council response that recognised the occupying powers’ authority 
in Iraq was a reflection of the reality the Council had to work within, not the acceptance of the Coalition’s 
use of force. Essentially, they accepted they were trapped by the Coalition’s actions, but needed to 
respond to the continuing crisis. Many explicitly avoided speaking to the questions of force or 
apportioning blame. For example Argentina stated that “legal and political debate on the legality of the 
armed conflict will once again divide and paralyse the Council and divert it from what we understand 
should be the priority of the moment: the humanitarian situation of the Iraqi people.”133  
Consequently, although these resolutions provided for the legalisation of the occupation they did not 
legalise or legitimise the intervention itself. Rather, they provided a role for the Council and framed the 
situation as an occupation with all the legal implications of that designation under the Geneva 
Conventions. While the Council was trapped by the situation, unable to take more strident action against 
either the Coalition states or Iraq, they sought to deal with the reality of a potentially illegal and 
illegitimate invasion. This humanitarian reframe therefore provided the Security Council an avenue to 
bring the Iraqi situation back within the purview of the United Nations without explicitly or implicitly 
legitimising the invasion itself; they could, however continue to oppose the invasion itself and were not 
prevented from speaking against it.   
5.5 The Iraqi Legitimation Process 
The Iraq case presents some significant departures in the legitimation process, however ultimately 
demonstrates that in this case, which challenges the very foundations of international law, the languages 
of legality and legitimacy were not only prevalent, but central. Furthermore, these contestations were not 
determined solely by the positions of the powerful states who initiated the invasion. By focusing on the 
contestation immediately before, during and after the conflict, this chapter has been able to engage the 
legitimation process underpinning the initial use of force. Although the legitimacy of the Iraq war was and 
remains a contentious issue, the intervening states failed to successfully legitimise the use of force and 
their claims of legality have been widely rejected. Although the international community accepted several 
key frames in the actor and narrative contestations, it widely rejected the Coalition’s unilateral use of 
force and the legitimacy of mandating any use of force at all. Therefore despite accepting that Iraq had 
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failed to cooperate and posed a threat to international peace and security, the audience was of the view 
that force was not a legitimate response.  
The ten year anniversary of the invasion in 2013 saw the 2003 invasion revisited with the benefit of 
hindsight. This literature focused on the legitimacy and legality of the invasion and the occupation and 
consequences of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Consequently, although the intervening states accepted 
Hussein did not have WMDs, leaders of the three troop contributing states, the US, UK and Australia, 
emphasised the removal of Hussein was a legitimate justification for and consequence of the invasion, and 
they would do the same again even knowing there were no WMDs.134 They have not conceded the 
contestation and continue to maintain the end justified their actions. 
The legitimation process that unfurled in the Iraq case points to a legitimation process including instances 
of rhetorical entrapment and rhetorical exclusion. The US attempted to trap the Security Council into 
accepting that Iraq remained in material breach of its obligations and had therefore failed to take 
advantage of the final opportunity offered by Resolution 1441. The Council members did not dispute the 
authenticity of evidence that would later be proven faulty, but rather recast the narrative in a way that 
would exclude the interveners’ approach. Expressing concern over the allegations, they accepted that 
Iraq’s disarmament constituted a threat to international peace and security, and should be overseen by the 
Security Council but they did not find Iraq in material breach and maintained the allegations could be 
investigated by the existing inspection agencies. This meant that even if the international community 
accepted the interveners’ revivalist approach to obtaining authority for the use of force, the option was 
still excluded because the political process was deemed viable by most Council members. Therefore, by 
recasting the narrative debate, the audience members excluded force as a viable response. 
Realists would argue this reframe proves nothing of the strength of international law, pointing out that the 
powerless audience members were unable to prevent the invasion or punish the rule breakers. They would 
also argue the audience was allowed to adopt a humanitarian reframe because the rule breakers had 
already fulfilled their interests by using force. However this ignores the broader context of the 
legitimation process. Although the interveners’ case was based on intelligence that would be proven false, 
the narrative and normative contestation focused not on proving Iraq’s possession of WMDs, but on its 
cooperation and compliance with its disarmament obligations. The audience accepted Iraq had failed to 
                                                          
134 Tony Blair in BBC News, “Tony Blair: Life in Iraq 10 years on not as I hoped.” BBC Word News 26 February 2013, 
accessed 14 July 2013 from   http://news.bbc.co.uk/ 2/hi/uk_news /politics/8485694.stm; George W. Bush. Decision 
Points, 223-272; George W. Bush in BBC News. “Bush has no Regrets Over War,” BBC World News accessed 14 July 
2013 from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7448108.stm, 00:16; Richard Cheney in NBC News, “Cheney: WMD or Not, Iraq 
Invasion was Correct.” Meet the Press 10 September 2006, accessed July 11 2014 from 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14767199/ns/meet_the_press/t/cheney-wmd-or-not-iraq-invasion-was-
correct/#.VW2hn0YnY0x; John Howard. “Iraq 2003: A retrospective.” Speech to the Lowy Institute Tuesday 9 April 
2013, accessed 14 July 2014 from http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/ howard_2013_lowy_speech_on_iraq_final.pdf. 
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fully implement its obligations but also recognised that recent improvements indicated the viability of the 
inspection process. This proves the presence of a legitimation process in which discourse was shaped by 
legitimacy and legality language frames, established not by central contesters, but by audience members. 
Although this case is often used by critics of international law and institutions to argue that the powerful 
do what they want despite the strictures of powerless, unenforceable rules and laws, the preceding 
analysis demonstrates that a process of legitimation took place even in this case. That process of 
legitimation was entrenched in contesting the legitimacy of the central actors, the legitimacy and legality 
of their decisions and key events and the legitimacy and legality of certain interpretations of international 
norms, rules and laws.  
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Chapter 6 
Libya: Legal and Legitimate 
 
 
6.1 The Libyan Gap 
Protesters demanding reform and justice took to the streets across the major cities of Libya, mainly 
in the eastern provinces, in mid-February 2011, following similar uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. 
Protesters and demonstrators called all Libyans to action as violence between the government and 
anti-government groups escalated from protest and unrest to civil war. The international community 
quickly accepted the frame that the Libyan authorities, led by Muammar Muhammad Abu Minyar 
al-Qaddafi, had failed to discharge their responsibilities to protect the Libyan people and responded 
with disproportionate force. This constituted a grave violation of international human rights and 
humanitarian law and warranted an international response. This chapter will examine how the 
contestation process led the Security Council to authorise the enforcement of a No-Fly Zone (NFZ) 
in order to protect civilians.  
The decision to use force in this case was exceptional for two closely linked reasons. First, it is 
widely recognised as the first time the Council has authorised the use of force for the purposes of 
protecting civilians without the consent of the target state1 and is therefore also widely viewed as a 
test case for the application and implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP).2 As none of 
the previous cases were RtoP cases, I will not attempt to establish the normative acceptance of the 
principle. However, as legitimacy is being understood as a process of discursive and contested 
legitimation, the use of civilian protection and RtoP language to frame the narrative of the 
humanitarian crisis and its normative interpretation will be examined. The second notable feature is 
not only that the Security Council approved two highly interventionist strategies - referring the case 
                                                          
1 Alex J. Bellamy. “Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm.” Ethics & International 
Affairs 25, no. 03 (2011), 263-264; Paul D. Williams. “Road to Humanitarian War in Libya, the Briefing.” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 3 (2011), 249-250. 
2Bellamy. Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: The Exception and the Norm, 263-69; Aidan Hehir. “The 
Permanence of Inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect.” International Security 38, 
no. 1 (2013), 137-59. 
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to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for investigation by adopting Resolution 1970 (2011) and 
authorising the imposition of a NFZ in Resolution 1973 (2011) - but that it did so very rapidly. As 
demonstrated by the timeline in Figure 6.1, the Libyan situation evolved from civil protests to 
violence to civil war to international intervention in just over a month. The Libyan case was not on 
the Security Council’s agenda before February 2011, but within two weeks of the first protests, the 
violence in Libya was recognised and condemned by the African Union (AU),3  the Organisation of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC),4 the League of Arab States (LAS),5 the Human Rights Council 
(HRC),6 and the General Assembly.7 The Security Council would pass its first resolution, referring 
Libya to the ICC, before the end of February and with the authorisation of the use of force in mid-
March. 
 
Figure 6.1: Libya Timeline 
Although these unique features would suggest there was little contestation over this case, or that 
areas of disagreement were rapidly resolved, there was no single position on the most appropriate 
response to the violence in Libya or the legitimacy of the NFZ once initiated. Despite the Council’s 
unanimity on Resolution 1970, Resolution 1973 was adopted with five abstentions, suggesting there 
were detractors. However, although Russia and China did not support the NFZ, they abstained from 
voting on the Resolution. As permanent members, they had the capacity to exercise their veto and 
                                                          
3 Peace and Security Council. Communiqué of the 261st Meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African 
Union, 25 February 2011, Addis Ababa: African Union. 
4 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. “OIC General Secretariat Condemns Strongly the Excessive Use of Force 
against Civilians in the Libyan Jamahiriya,” OIC Press Release, 22 February 2011, accessed 18 October 2013 from  
http://www.oic-oci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=4947&ref=2081&lan=en&x_key=OIC%20General%20 
Secretariat%20Condemns%20Strongly%20the%20Excessive%20Use%20of%20Force%20against%20Civilians%20in
%20the%20Libyan%20Jamahiriya. 
5 United Nations Security Council. “Annex to the letter dated 14 March 2011 from the Permanent 
Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations United Nations” in Letter dated 14 March 2011 from the 
Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council S/2011/137 15 March 2011. United Nations: New York, 2011. 
6 United Nations Human Rights Council. Situation of Human Rights in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Resolution 
Adopted by The Human Rights Council at its 15th Special Session on 25 February 2011 as A/HRC/RES/S-15/1. United 
Nations: New York. 
7 United Nations General Assembly, Resolution on the Suspension of the Rights of Membership of the Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya in the Human Rights Council adopted by the General Assembly on 1 March 2011 as A/RES/65/265. United 
Nations: New York.  
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prevent the Resolution’s adoption, but they did not, choosing instead to abstain, thereby allowing 
the Resolution to pass while expressing their concerns. Therefore, while some states were reticent 
toward the NFZ, they were compelled to accept the general consensus of the Council and regional 
organisations. The question for this case then becomes: how were the Council’s decisions in 
relation to Libya contested and legitimised? 
As with previous cases the actor, narrative and normative frames were contested in languages of 
legitimacy and legality and the acceptance of certain frames within these clusters influenced the 
decisions of all actors, regardless of interests or preferred outcomes. The following chapter will 
therefore examine the legitimation of these actors and the narrative and normative frames they 
contested in order to make sense of the situation, and decision to use force.  
6.2 Actor Contestations  
The central actor contestation was between Qaddafi’s government and opposition forces in 
particular the National Transition Council (NTC).8 The NTC was the self-declared political wing 
representing numerous oppositional groups in Libya who had gained control of various Libyan 
cities and regions. The reception of this contestation by the audience was crucial to the Council’s 
rapid and largely unanimous responses in February and March. The NATO-led multinational 
intervening forces joined this central contestation following the adoption of Resolution 1973 and 
the initiation of airstrikes as states began contesting the legitimacy and legality of the 
implementation of the resolution. Regional organisations, in particular the AU and LAS played key 
roles, although the LAS’s call for a NFZ ultimately trumped the AU’s more bipartisan and 
aspirational response. The HRC, the General Assembly and the ICC also played important roles as 
legitimate and lawful decision-making bodies throughout the initial crisis and during the 
intervention. Their role as key audience reframers will also be examined.  
 Central Contestation 
The central actor contestation took place mostly between Qaddafi’s government and forces, and a 
broad category of opposition groups which included protesters, rebel leaders and the NTC. Figures 
6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 point to significant legitimation for the NTC and opposition groups and sweeping 
delegitimation of Qaddafi and his regime. All three radars also point to a much smaller contestation 
over the legitimacy and legality of NATO and the intervening forces. As leaders of the intervention, 
NATO became a central contester in phase two, however as demonstrated by Figures 6.2 and 6.3, 
this was a much smaller contestation. The legitimation contestation for NATO was over the 
                                                          
8 The NTC is sometimes abbreviated to NLC or TNC. I will use NTC here, except where sources use alternatives. 
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legitimacy of the implementation of Resolution 1973, specifically its targeting methods and the 
fulfilment of the protection of civilians mandate. The contestation over the interveners’ role was 
therefore over the narrative of events and the normative interpretation and implementation of the 
mandate itself and will therefore be examined in the narrative and normative sections of this 
chapter. The following section will focus on the contestation between the regime and opposition 
forces.  
 
Figure 6.2: Libya Actor Legitimacy Radar Phase 1: 15th February- 16th March 2011 
 
Figure 6.3: Libya Actor Legitimacy Radar Phase 2: 17th March- 31st October 2011 
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Figure 6.4: Libya Actor Legitimacy Radar Phase 3: 1st November 2011- 8th July 2012 
The contestation radars for the actor legitimation process in this case indicate clear delegitimation 
of the regime, including the loss of legal recognition, and legitimation and legal recognition of the 
opposition and NTC. These patterns are indicative of a number of key characteristics of the actor 
contestation. Firstly, the regime’s frames were excluded from international fora following the 
widespread defection of Libya’s diplomats, most notably the majority of the Libyan diplomatic 
delegation to New York in the final week of February. However, these diplomats did not resign 
their positions and continued on as representatives at the United Nations speaking against the 
regime and Qaddafi while claiming to represent the Libyan people. This almost completely silenced 
the regime’s frame in international fora as only a few Libyan allies accepted the position of the 
regime. Another key feature of this contestation is the role of the own government’s inflammatory 
language choices in delegitimising the regime. Inflammatory language used by members of the 
regime threatened Libyan civilians and broke international norms of legitimate authority, 
contributing further to the delegitimation of the regime. These features combined with an extremely 
effective campaign of legitimation by the NTC, which not only formulated itself quickly as a united 
and legitimate political front representing the people’s demands, but accepted the constraints and 
obligations of international norms.   
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In the initial days, the government-controlled media ignored the opposition protests, only showing 
viewers footage of pro-Qaddafi supporters.9 As violence escalated and international scrutiny 
intensified, Qaddafi remained defiant. Refusing to step down he called protesters “traitors” and 
“cowards” who were “serving the devil.”10 After almost a week of protests and violence, Qaddafi 
spoke via Serbian media, maintaining violence was being instigated by foreigners with Al-Qaeda 
ties.11 In a televised telephone call he claimed rebels and residents in Zawiya were siding with Al-
Qaeda, and protesters were “armed youngsters… incited by people who are wanted by America and 
the Western world” and “stoned with drugs.”12  In a subsequent address he also referred to the 
protesters as “rats and cockroaches”, causing both anger and mockery within Libya and heightening 
the concern of the international community who was reminded of the impact such inflammatory 
language had in Rwanda.13   
This language can be contrasted with the frames presented to the international audience. In an 
attempt to “tell the truth” to the international community Qaddafi accepted an interview in late 
February with western reporters from the BBC, Sunday Times and ABC.14 During this interview he 
denied protests against his government were occurring, telling the journalists there was “no 
demonstration at all in the streets.”15 When one of journalists replied he had seen demonstrations for 
and against the regime in Zawiya the day before, Qaddafi denied they were protesting against him 
or his regime, stating “they are not against us. No-one is against us.”16 He claimed the violence was 
the result of a few drug-crazed youth under the influence of Al-Qaeda who had broken into police 
stations and military bases to seize weapons and were now “terrorising the people.”17 Qaddafi 
therefore attempted to frame the regime as the legitimate government with strong domestic support, 
responding to an Al-Qaeda terror threat.  
This reflects two narrative frames from a single actor. Internationally, Qaddafi’s position 
downplayed the scale of the violence, denying opposition to the regime existed. However on Libyan 
media, tightly controlled by the government, Qaddafi escalated his rhetoric. Vowing to “die as a 
                                                          
9 BBC News. “Libyan State Media Silent on Protests.” BBC World News, 17 February 2011, accessed 11 July 2012 
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-middle-east-12496420.  
10 BBC News. “Libya protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to Quit.” BBC World News, 22 February 2011, accessed 18 
July 2012 from http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12544624.  
11 Al Jazeera. “Defiant Gaddafi Confined to Tripoli.” Al Jazeera English, 27 February 2011, accessed 18 July 2012 
from http://www.aljazeera. com/news/africa/2011/02/201122792426740496.html. 
12 BBC News. Libya: Gaddafi Blames Osama Bin Laden for Protests. 
13 BBC News. Libya Protests: Defiant Gaddafi Refuses to quit; Bellamy, The Exception and the Norm, 265. 
14 BBC News. “Full interview with Col Gaddafi.” BBC News, 1 March 2011, accessed 18 July 2012 from 
http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12607478. 
15 BBC News. Full interview with Col Gaddafi, 8:52 
16 BBC News. Full interview with Col Gaddafi, 9:12.  
17 BBC News. Full interview with Col Gaddafi, 9:30. 
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martyr at the end” he called on his supporters to take to the streets to fight the rebels.18 The 
narratives themselves will be examined momentarily, however the highly inflammatory language 
which Qaddafi utilised on domestic media to call on his supporters to escalate the violence was out 
of step with his attempts to downplay violence to international western media. Just days before 
Qaddafi spoke to international journalists, claiming there were no demonstrations against the 
regime, Saif Qaddafi appeared on state television, urging protesters to return to their homes or “face 
rivers of blood.”19 This disconnect between the regime’s domestic and international narratives were 
not only rejected as factual explanations of the Libyan story, but served to further delegitimise 
Qaddafi and his regime.  
Conversely the primary claim of protesters was that Qaddafi had lost all domestic legitimacy as the 
ruler of Libya and should stand down. Despite evidence of abuses and killings by rebel groups and 
the subsequent challenges to the new government in Tripoli, the opposition was largely successful 
in both, delegitimising the regime and framing itself as a legitimate and united interlocutor for the 
Libyan people. Although this was not the first time opposition groups had protested or clashed with 
Libyan government forces, this movement, propelled by successes in Egypt and Tunisia, spread 
across the country.20 Within days, opposition groups were calling for a national “day of rage”, 
encouraging Libyan people to take to the streets against the government.21 The NTC emerged when 
forces in control of key cities formed a united front, bringing together the National Transitional 
Council of Libya on the 27th of February 2011. It called itself the “political face of the revolution” 
and claimed to be the “only legitimate body representing the people of Libya and the Libyan 
state,”22 thereby claiming both, domestic legitimacy as the de facto representative of the Libyan 
people, and international legitimacy as the representative of the state. Figures 6.2 and 6.323 
demonstrate that these frames were accepted with the legitimacy of the opposition recognised in 
phase one, and legal recognition following in phase two.  
                                                          
18 Al Jazeera. “Defiant Gaddafi Vows to Fight On.” Al Jazeera English, 23 February 2011, accessed 18 July 2012 from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122216458913596.html. 
19 Richard Spencer, “Libya: Protests Gather Pace as Gaddafi’s Son Vows to Fight to the End.” The Daily Telegraph, 21 
February 2011, accessed 18th July 2012 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/ 
8337546/Libya-protests-gather-pace-as-Gaddafis-son-vows-to-fight-to-the-end.html.  
20 Katerina Dalacoura, “The 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications.” 
International Affairs 88, no. 1 (2012), 65. 
21 Al Jazeera. “‘Day of Rage’ Kicks Off in Libya.” Al Jazeera English, 17 February 2011, accessed 15 July 2012 from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/ news/africa/2011/02/201121755057219793.html. 
22 Libyan Interim Transnational Council. Founding Statement of the Interim Transnational National Council (TNC), 
Lauterpracht Centre For international Law, 5 March 2011, accessed 28th September, 2013 from 
www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/arabspring/libya/Libya_12_Founding_Statement_TNC.pdf. 
23 See page 148. 
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Defections of high-ranking political leaders and military officials cast further doubt on the 
legitimacy of Qaddafi’s claims and the stability of his government.  Pilots fled to Malta in their 
aircraft, “rather than carry out orders to bomb civilians,”24 while Libyan diplomats denounced their 
government and resigned their positions in protest.25 One Libyan diplomat reasoned “it would be 
hypocritical to assist the Libyan government while we see them attacking people in the streets.”26  
The Libyan delegation to the United Nations denounced the regime but did not resign their 
positions, claiming instead to represent the Libyan people at the UN. Although the delegation was 
split on the 22nd of February, Libya’s Deputy Ambassador to the UN, Ibrahim al-Dabashi requested 
a closed meeting with the Security Council “to discuss the grave situation in Libya.”27 He also 
condemned the Qaddafi government and declared “the Libyan mission is a mission for the 
people…It is not for the regime” and called for international assistance, including a no-fly zone in 
Libya and referral to the ICC for investigation of “crimes against humanity and crimes of war.”28 It 
will be demonstrated in this chapter that although al-Dabashi was the first to recommend both, the 
ICC referral and a NFZ, it was not initial regional organisations mirrored these calls that the broader 
international community began accepting them as legitimate responses.  
At the time, the Head of the Libyan Mission, Ambassador Shalgham, while acknowledging his 
colleagues’ support for the NTC, excluded himself stating he was still trying to “persuade them [the 
government] to stop these acts.” 29 The result was the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of 
Resolution 1970, imposing sanctions on Libya and referring the situation to the ICC. However, he 
defected days later, and in a speech to the Security Council, pled for the United Nations to “save 
Libya” and called for “a swift, decisive and courageous resolution.”30 British Foreign Minister 
William Hague recognised the value of these defections to the legitimation process, observing that 
“the resignation of so many ambassadors and diplomats, reports of ministers changing sides within 
                                                          
24 Ian Black, and John Hooper. “Libya defectors: Pilots Told to Bomb Protesters Flee to Malta” The Guardian, 22 
February 2011, accessed 18th July, 2012 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/21/libya-pilots-flee-to-
malta. 
25 Al Jazeera. “Libyan Diplomats Defect En Masse.” Al Jazeera English, 22 February 2011, accessed 12 July 2014 from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122275739377867.html. 
26 Black and Hooper, Libya defectors: Pilots told to bomb protesters flee to Malta. 
27 United Nations Security Council. Letter Dated 21 February 2011 from the Chargé de Affaires a.i. of the Permanent 
Mission of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, 
S/2011/102. United Nations: New York, 1.  
28 Colin Moynihan, “Libya’s UN Diplomats Break with Qaddafi.” The New York Times, 21 February 2011, accessed 
18th July, 2013 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22nations.html?_r=0. 
29 Ian Black and James Meikle. “Libya Crisis: UN Security Council to Meet Over Gaddafi Crackdown.” The Guardian, 
22 February 2011, accessed 12 July, 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/feb/22/ libya-crisis-un-
security-council.  
30 United Nations Security Council. United Nations Security Council. Security Council 66th year: 6480th Meeting, 
Friday 25th February 2011 S/Pv.6490. United Nations: New York, Libya 5. 
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Libya itself, shows the system is in a very serious crisis.”31 These defections served to delegitimise 
the regime twofold; first, by making delegitimising statements and secondly by the act of defection. 
The act of defection then bolstered their own legitimacy, as the international audience widely 
accepted the delegation’s position as inside voices speaking against their own government. 
Consequently, these delegates continued speaking against the regime as the representatives of Libya 
in all subsequent decisions, including the adoption of Resolutions 1970 and 1973, as well as the 
General Assembly meeting which suspended Libya from the HRC.  
In their statements during meetings adopting Resolutions 1970 and 1973, Security Council 
members and other states participating in the meeting rejected the frames offered by the regime and 
began delegitimising Qaddafi. Resolution 1970 was adopted unanimously, while Resolution 1973 
was adopted with five abstentions, however both resolutions called on the Libyan government to 
respect the “legitimate demands of the people.”32 Portugal, Lebanon, Colombia and Bosnia-
Herzegovina also recognised the legitimate demands of the people in their statements, suggesting 
wide support for the legitimacy of the people’s demands and the illegitimacy of the regime.33 
However even amongst the abstaining states, the delegitimation of the regime and legitimation of 
the demands of the people were widely accepted. The Chinese position was the most ambiguous, 
offering no clear position on the central actor contestation. The Chinese representative noted the 
“special circumstances” of the situation in its statements on the adoption of both resolutions and 
called for an end to violence, bloodshed and civilian killings, but did not attribute these to any 
particular actors.34 However the other four abstaining states expressed acceptance of this frame 
through their statements in Security Council deliberations. Russia accepted this frame early, with 
the adoption of Resolution 1970 specifically condemning “the use of military force against peaceful 
demonstrators.”35 India and Brazil recognised the legitimacy of the people’s demands, utilising it in 
their own statements, while Germany stated the regime has lost its legitimacy.36 Therefore the 
legitimacy of the opposition, as the representative of the people’s legitimate demands for leadership 
change, was widely accepted.  
                                                          
31 Al Jazeera, “Mass evacuations under way in Libya” Al Jazeera English, 23rd February 2011, accessed 12 July from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/02/20112234434813424.html. 
32 United Nations Security Council. Resolution 1970 (2011) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6491st Meeting on 26 
February 2011 as S/Res/1970. United Nations: New York, 2011, 2. 
33 Lebanon 4, Colombia 5, Bosnia-Herzegovina 6, United Nations Security Council. Brazil 6, Portugal 9. 
34 United Nations Security Council, 26 February 2011, S/Pv.6491, China 4. 
35 United Nations Security Council, 26 February 2011, S/Pv.6491, Russia 4. 
36  United Nations Security Council. Security Council, 66th Year: 6498th 17th March 2011 S/Pv.6498, United Nations: 
New York, India & Brazil 6, Germany 4. 
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The most notable shift in this case came as members of the international community openly 
declared Qaddafi was illegitimate and transferred legitimacy and eventually legal recognition to the 
NTC. President Obama first expressed this view outside the Council, telling Angela Merkel during 
a telephone call in late February that Qaddafi had lost the legitimacy to lead Libya.37Approximately 
a week later, Obama publicly declared “Muammar Qaddafi has lost the legitimacy to lead and he 
must leave… And the aspirations of the Libyan people for freedom, democracy and dignity must be 
met.”38 Consequently Lebanon, the UK, Colombia and Portugal accepted this frame in their 
statements to the Council, as did Germany despite its abstention.39 The international community not 
only widely accepted the frame that Qaddafi was illegitimate, but also contributed to his actual 
delegitimation, calling for his removal.  
A unique feature of this case was that the delegitimation of the regime was coupled with the 
legitimation and legal recognition of an opposing actor. French President, Nicholas Sarkozy was 
first to recognise the NTC as a legitimate representative of the Libyan people.40  Canada and 
Germany subsequently recognised the NTC’s legitimacy as an interlocutor in June, and the US and 
UK followed in July.41  Recognition as a legitimate interlocutor does not constitute legal 
recognition as a state or government, but does endow an actor with significant agency. “Such 
recognition is reminiscent of the recognition of the Palestinian Liberation Organization and other 
national liberation movements in the 1970s as the ‘sole legitimate representative’ of their respective 
peoples.”42 In this case the NTC gained a position not only as a legitimate central actor, but as a 
legitimate representative of the Libyan people. Although media reports at this time appeared to 
confuse this de facto recognition with de jure recognition,43 more than a dozen states recognised the 
NTC as a legitimate interlocutor, providing it agency as a negotiator, representative and framer.  
The United Nations General Assembly accepted the credentials of the NTC as the legal and 
legitimate representative for Libya in September 2011, accounting for the sweep of legal 
                                                          
37 Edward Wyatt, “Security Council Calls for War Crimes Inquiry in Libya.” New York Times, 26 February 2011, 
accessed 15 July 2011 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/world/africa/27nations.html.  
38 Barack Obama, “Remarks by President Obama and President Calderón of Mexico at Joint Press Conference.” Office 
of the Press Secretary of The White House, 3 March 2011, accessed 21 July 2012 from http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/03/03/remarks-president-obama-and-president-calder-n-mexico-joint-press-confer.  
39 United Nations Security Council, 17 March 2011 S/Pv.6498, Lebanon 3, UK & Germany 4, Colombia 7, Portugal 8. 
40 BBC News. “Libya: France Recognises Rebels as Government.” BBC World News, 10 March 2011, accessed 12 July 
from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12699183. 
41 BBC News. “Canada recognises Libya Rebels as ‘Legitimate’.” BBC World News, 14 June 2011, accessed 12th of 
July 2012 from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-13771946. 
42 Stefan Talmon, “Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council.” ASIL Insights. Vol. 15 no.6 (2011), 
accessed 18th July 2012 from http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight110616.pdf, 2. 
43 Talmon, Recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council. 
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recognition in phase two (Figure 6.3).44 Those who opposed recognising the NTC, such as Cuba 
and Venezuela, argued NATO’s interference in the matter had rendered the removal of Qaddafi’s 
regime illegal and illegitimate and the NTC, the illegitimate puppet of western intervening 
powers.45 Others such as Kenya felt the new government could not be recognised before the conflict 
in Libya reached a political solution.46 Altogether seventeen states opposed and fifteen abstained 
from the vote, however the overwhelming recognition from 114 member states reflected widespread 
acceptance of the NTC as the new and legitimate government of Libya and also constituted legal 
recognition.  
Following recognition of the NTC as the new government of the Libyan state and the subsequent 
election of a democratic government, Libya continued to emphasise and promote its external and 
internal legitimacy by renewing its commitment to the protection and promotion of international 
human rights. On the same day the General Assembly accepted its credentials, the NTC’s 
delegation recognised the “great and multifaceted” challenges facing the government, stressing it 
would “look forward to building democratic institutions that respect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms,” and stating its intention to “abide by Libya’s previous commitments… promote current 
partnerships based on mutual respect and common interests” and “cooperate with all for 
international peace and security.”47Although the current Libyan government faces significant 
challenges to its domestic legitimacy as conflict continues,48 in 2011 the international legitimation 
of the NTC was significant and rapid, especially when contrasted with the clear delegitimation of 
the Qaddafi regime. 
The central actor contestation in this case showed a very strong swing against the Qaddafi regime 
and this gap was filled by the rapid legitimation of the NTC. This legitimation gave agency to key 
central contesters, in particular the Libyan delegation to the UN which defected from the regime in 
late February. Furthermore, the NTC was legitimised as its actions and statements indicated its 
willingness to accept international norms and laws. The legitimacy of the Qaddafi regime was 
widely rejected, compounded by the language choices of the regime’s statements and justification to 
its domestic audience, perceived by the international audience as inflammatory and inciting the 
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escalation of violence. However although the NTC was rapidly legitimatised and the first to suggest 
both, the ICC referral and the NFZ resolution, it was audience reframers who would recast the 
contestation in terms that were accepted by the Security Council and the wider international 
community. 
Audience Contestation  
Regional actors, the AU, LAS, OIC and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), as well as international 
institutional organisations such as the ICC, General Assembly and Human Rights Council (HRC) 
played key roles as audience reframers in this situation. These reframers were able to influence 
decisions and actions by virtue of their legitimised proximity to the case. As a result, they played a 
crucial role in the legitimation process, firstly by being legitimised as actors, but also by having 
sufficient agency to reframe the contestation themselves. However, some actors offered different 
frames of and responses to the situation in Libya. This was especially the case in relation to regional 
actors, where the AU’s position was less widely accepted than that provided by others such as the 
LAS. Therefore this section will not only examine which audience actors gained positions as key 
reframers, but how some actors were more successful in gaining this position than others.  
The influential role played by regional organisations in Libya has been thoroughly explored.49 The 
states who abstained from Resolution 1973 recognised the integral role of regional organisations in 
their decisions. However these organisations also developed two approaches to framing the actor, 
narrative and normative contestations in Libya. The first, developed by the AU, was bipartisan in its 
actor frames and aspirational in its approach. It opposed the ICC referral of Resolution 1970 and the 
authorisation of a NFZ in Resolution 1973. The second, reflected by the statements of the GCC, 
OIC and LAS, supported both these resolutions. The statements and resolutions of these 
organisations, in particular the LAS, were accepted as the legitimate frame of appropriate responses 
to the crisis. Consequently, although regional organisations have been recognised as gatekeepers in 
this case, it is also apparent that while the LAS achieved significant legitimation, the AU’s position 
was largely rhetorically excluded.    
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The main differences between the two approaches were in how they framed Qaddafi’s legitimacy 
and recommended responses. . The OIC,50 AU51 GCC52 and LAS53 each condemned the killing of 
civilians in Libya and called for international action, however the AU was more nonpartisan in its 
approach. In its communique dated the 10th of March, 2011, the AU’s Peace and Security Council 
(PSC) condemned “the transformation of pacific demonstrations into an armed rebellion” and “the 
indiscriminate use of force and lethal weapons, whoever it comes from.”54 This frame was 
significantly different from the widely accepted frame identified in the central contestation, which 
recognised the legitimate demands of the people while condemning the regime’s illegitimacy. 
Although it accepted that peaceful demonstrations had turned violent, it did not attribute this 
escalation to any individual or belligerent. Despite this position, the three AU members who sat on 
the Council in 2011, South Africa, Gabon and Nigeria, supported Resolution 1973. The AU 
position was therefore problematic, because it framed the actor contestation ambiguously when 
most others clearly legitimised the NTC and delegitimised the regime, and because the actions of its 
members muddied the waters by supporting Resolution 1973.  
The LAS was much clearer in its actor frame. It delegitimised the regime, even excluding the 
Libyan delegation to the League.55 Attributing the “crimes and violations” in Libya to the 
authorities, it declared its intention to “cooperate and liaise” with the NTC and called on the 
Security Council to “assume its responsibilities” by “taking the necessary measures to impose a no-
fly zone; the establishment of safe areas… and measures to ensure the protection of the Libyan 
people and all foreign citizens.”56 Unlike the AU position, the LAS statement clearly attributed 
responsibility for the violence to the authorities, and expressed an intention to recognise and utilise 
the NTC as the interlocutors for the Libyan people. It also called for the imposition of a NFZ. 
The LAS’s call for a NFZ was vital to the passage of Resolution 1973, and demonstrated the 
acceptance of the League’s approach over the AU’s less-interventionist recommendation. Of the 
fourteen members who spoke during the meeting adopting the resolution, thirteen referred directly 
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to the positions of the LAS, AU or both. Eleven of these referred specifically to the LAS’s 12th of 
March call for a NFZ to protect civilians.57 Furthermore, before the 12th of March, the US was 
reluctant to support military action, including a NFZ. Although Ambassador al-Dabashi called for a 
NFZ in February, it was not until these regional organisations adopted the option that the 
international community considered it a viable one. Following the LAS’s recommendation, the pro-
intervention faction in Washington was able to persuade President Obama to accept their position 
and support the NFZ.58 This points to the degree of influence the LAS enjoyed in relation to the 
passage of the Resolution and establishment of a NFZ, and emphasises the rhetorical exclusion of 
the AU position.   
The influence of regional organisations was also notable amongst the abstaining states. China 
attached “great importance to the relevant position by the 22-member Arab League on the 
establishment of a no-fly zone” and also “to the position of African countries and the African 
Union” deciding to abstain in view of these recommendations and “the special circumstances 
surrounding the situation in Libya.”59 Russia also expressed support for the AU’s non-
interventionist approach, which called for an immediate ceasefire and resolution mandating the 
Special Envoy of the Secretary General and the HRC to seek a peaceful settlement. However, 
“guided by” principles of humanitarianism and civilian protection. Russia abstained from the 
Resolution rather than vetoing it. Brazil and Germany also recognised the legitimacy of the LAS’s 
call for a NFZ,60 but India’s justifications were slightly different. It appeared to emphasise not only 
the role of the AU, but also opposed the use of force before the completion of the Secretariat’s 
report and the AU High Level Panel’s negotiations.61 Therefore, even those who did not fully 
support the NFZ accepted the legitimacy of the LAS as a reframer of the situation, recognising not 
only the legitimacy of its call for an international response, but perceiving the call itself as 
legitimation of the NFZ option. This constituted rhetorical entrapment. Although these states 
remained opposed to the NFZ, and with the exception of Germany, became very critical of the 
interveners’ interpretation and implementation of the Resolution, they were unwilling to oppose or 
prevent the adoption of the Resolution. Russia and China had the power to veto the Resolution, but 
having accepted the actor and narrative frames, could not justify prevention it passage.  
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Bellamy has suggested regional organisations were “gatekeepers” in this situation, “influencing 
which issues were debated in the Council, how they are framed and the range of possible 
responses.”62 This evidence would appear to support this conclusion, as these actors not only 
framed the narrative contestation, regarding Libya’s actions, but also recast these arguments in such 
a way that they recommended two highly interventionist responses -ICC referral and a NFZ. As a 
consequence, although the first actors to call for a NFZ and ICC referral it seems were the Libyan 
diplomats who defected from the UN delegation in February,63 the Security Council discourse 
demonstrates it was the regional organisation’s call for such responses which legitimised the 
authorisation and subsequently the legalisation of these responses.  
A second group of audience reframers consisting of institutional actors, including the HRC, ICC 
and General Assembly also played a significant role as audience reframers. However unlike the 
regional organisations whose recommendations to impose a NFZ can be directly linked to the 
authorisation of Resolutions 1970 and 1973, these actors’ influence was less direct. They still, 
however played a significant role, not only framing the narrative and central actor contestations, but 
also providing non-forceful alternatives to exhaust before the resort to force. Libya’s suspension 
from the HRC and referral to the ICC were viewed as diplomatic or political alternatives to force. 
When the Qaddafi regime failed to address the warnings contained in those decisions, not only were 
these actors positioned to reframe the actor and narrative contestations, but they demonstrated the 
exhaustion of diplomatic options. Alternatively, when the new government cooperated with these 
actors, they were legitimised, as demonstrated by the recognition of the NTC as the legitimate and 
international representative of the state. Furthermore, the narrative and normative contestations will 
demonstrate the investigations and findings of the HRC’s International Commission of Inquiry 
(ICI) were vital to framing the contestation.  
These examples of audience contestation demonstrate the important role played by audience 
reframers in the Libyan case. Regional organisations legitimised their own roles in the contestation 
as legitimate actors who could make claims in support of international action. The LAS position 
formed an important basis for subsequent Security Council actions, demonstrating the potential role 
for regional organisations as “gatekeepers”64 influencing which issues to contest, how to frame 
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them and how to respond. It is also apparent that although the LAS’s support for the passing of 
Resolution 1973 contributed significantly to the Resolution’s adoption, its opposition to the 
interveners’ methods, voiced almost immediately after the initiation of airstrikes, remained 
important and continued to frame a vital aspect of the post-conflict contestation, however did not 
influence the interveners’ actions. This will be examined in more detail in the normative section.  
Overall, these actor contestations contributed to a broader frame of Libya’s failures to address 
violence, human rights abuses, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The LAS, General 
Assembly, HRC, and Security Council accepted and recast a frame which delegitimised the Qaddafi 
regime and held him, his government and his forces responsible for the violence in Libya. However 
they also rapidly and widely recognised the legitimacy of the NTC, first as legitimate interlocutors 
for the Libyan people, then as the legally recognised government. The more bipartisan and 
aspirational approach of the AU, however was excluded. The following analysis of the narrative and 
normative contestations will demonstrate these patterns of framing, entrapment and exclusion in 
this case.  
6.3 Narrative Contestations 
The next cluster of contestations involved the legitimation of the narrative of events. This involved 
actors making frames of fact and law to support their claims through the legitimation of certain 
versions of events in Libya. The key areas of narrative contestations are over the scale and nature of 
violence and the threat this posed to international peace and security, and the authenticity of 
political processes and exhaustion of peaceful options. In this case, the contestations over the scale 
and nature of violence focused on the nature of the protests and the proportionality of Qaddafi’s 
response. The second area involved contestations over the validity of political processes, including 
institutional decision-making and the exhaustion of attempts at diplomacy and negotiation. This 
case was quite unique in relation to this contestation as fact-finding and investigative processes 
were incomplete and negotiations never took place between the central contesters. Despite this, the 
use of force was deemed an option of last resort, because the Security Council perceived an 
imminent threat to civilians in Libya. Although this cluster often overlaps with actor legitimation, as 
illegitimate actions lead to further delegitimation of the actor, contestations over narratives are 
important in themselves because these findings of facts frame further finding of law which in turn 
create normative expectations regarding response options. As will be demonstrated here, not only 
do actors contest what happened, they contest what those events mean in terms of international 
norms and laws.   
 Threat to International Peace and Security 
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Qaddafi argued the international community had no legitimate role in the situation as the violence 
in Libya was an internal matter. As noted in the actor contestation, Qaddafi argued the situation 
involved a small number of young people under the influence of drugs and Al-Qaeda, while 
opposition groups argued peaceful protests had turned violent when Qaddafi’s forces responded 
with disproportionate force. The Libyan regime developed a narrative based on self-defence and 
counter-terrorism. Qaddafi argued military and police forces “were trying to defend themselves” 
and “orders were then given not to open fire and positions should be evacuated.”65 In an attempt to 
be conciliatory, Saif Qaddafi acknowledged mistakes had been made by police and military and 
offered reforms, but disputed casualty figures, maintaining the death toll was much lower than 
reported claiming a “big, big gap between reality and the media reports.”66 Therefore, as leaders and 
spokespeople for the regime Muammar and Saif Qaddafi told a narrative that downplayed the scale 
of violence, and blamed the escalation of force on a small group of armed youth manipulated by Al-
Qaeda. Using this same frame, Qaddafi insisted the international community, including NATO and 
the Security Council, had no role in the situation, describing Resolution 1970 as “null and 
void…because the Security Council is not mandated. It has no jurisdiction to look into such a 
case.”67  
With the issue placed before the HRC, General Assembly and Security Council, however, it quickly 
became clear this view was not widely held. The rejection of this position was effectively 
demonstrated by the three institutions’ decisions. The first was the decision of the HRC to establish 
a commission to investigate allegations of abuses and breaches of international human rights and 
humanitarian law, and recommend Libya’s suspension from the HRC.68 Closely linked to this, the 
second was the decision of the General Assembly to carry the HRC’s suspension 
recommendation.69 The third forum was the Security Council’s decisions in Resolution 1970, 
referring the situation to the ICC and imposing sanctions, and Resolution 1973, authorising the 
NFZ. Combined these international actions reflected the rejection of Qaddafi’s narrative. 
Consequently, when the threat to civilians was perceived to be at its greatest, the Security Council 
recognised the evolution of a narrative which indicated the situation constituted a threat to 
international peace and security.    
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The HRC accepted a frame of widespread human rights abuses and breaches of international 
humanitarian law when it established the ICI to investigate allegations of human rights abuses and 
recommended the General Assembly suspend Libya from the HRC. In making this decision, the 
HRC condemned “the recent gross and systematic human rights violations committed in Libya,” 
and called on “the Government of Libya to meet its responsibility to protect its populations, to 
immediately put an end to all human rights violations, to stop any attacks against civilians, and to 
fully respect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.”70 Consequently, whilst establishing a 
body to investigate allegations against all parties to the conflict, it also held the regime responsible 
and liable for violations of human rights, recommending Libya’s suspension from the UN’s 
principal human rights body.  
The General Assembly accepted this frame when it carried out this recommendation. This decision, 
adopted by consensus on the 1st of March 2011, was unprecedented.71 Although the Assembly was 
endowed with the power to suspend a member from the HRC, this was the first time the Assembly 
wielded that power. In recognising the extreme and unprecedented nature of the decision, numerous 
delegations stressed such measures were “required by an extraordinary situation.”72 Very few 
opposed the decision. Nicaragua, Bolivia, Cuba and Venezuela did not acknowledge a narrative of 
human rights violations, each recognising only the “loss of life” in Libya.73 The Venezuelan 
representative argued the Assembly could not suspend Libya from the Human Rights Council 
because “sovereign peoples are the only protagonists of history, and no foreign force is authorized 
to intervene in the internal affairs of the Libyan nation.” 74 These four were the exception. Of the 
thirty-four statements made by states during the General Assembly meeting adopting the resolution 
suspending Libya from the HRC, twenty-nine accepted the decision. Of these, twenty-eight 
accepted frames of human rights abuses and violence. While only three called these abuses 
“flagrant” violations,75 eighteen described them as “systematic” and placed responsibility for those 
acts on the Libyan government.76  Seven explicitly recognised there had been violence against 
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“peaceful” protesters and demonstrators.77 A narrative of widespread, systematic human rights 
abuses was therefore accepted by this audience and, as noted by the actor contestation, 
responsibility for these violations was placed predominantly on the Libyan regime.     
The Security Council also accepted such frames, first when it adopted Resolutions 1970 and 1973. 
Resolution 1970 was adopted after the HRC’s call for Libya’s suspension, but before the General 
Assembly adopted this recommendation and also reflected widespread acceptance of a narrative of 
peaceful demonstrations turned violent by widespread human rights abuses. This frame is reflected 
by the Resolution itself which was adopted unanimously. The Resolution adopted a narrative of 
“gross and systematic violations of human rights, including the repression of peaceful 
demonstrations” and rejected “unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence made against 
the civilian population from the highest level of the Libyan government.”78  
Consequently, when Resolution 1973 was debated, the Security Council had adopted a frame of 
widespread, systematic abuses, attacks on peaceful demonstrators, violence against civilians and 
incitement by the government itself. This Resolution was not adopted unanimously, as Germany, 
China, Russia, India and Brazil abstained. Even though these states abstained, most accepted the 
frame that the level of violence in Libya was unacceptable under international law. Instead of 
expressing reticence not over the narrative, they concerned a NFZ would not protect civilians, but 
put them at greater risk. Consequently, Russia expressed the view that the government’s military 
response was disproportionate, condemning “the use of military force against peaceful 
demonstrators and all other manifestations of violence” as “absolutely unacceptable.”79  Germany 
also accepted a narrative of human rights abuses and Brazil emphasised its abstention did not 
condone the Libyan authorities’ actions.80  
The exceptions to these positions were India and China. India did not apportion any blame directly 
on the government but did express it was “very concerned about the welfare of the civilian 
population and of foreigners in Libya” and deplored “the use of force” as “totally unacceptable.”81 
China did not explicitly accept that human rights violations were occurring or condemn the 
government for disproportionality. It expressed concern at the use of force against civilians, but did 
not attribute this action to either government or opposition groups.82  
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A frame of widespread, large-scale abuses and violence against civilians was therefore widely 
accepted by the audience and, with the exception of India and China, the regime was held 
responsible for these violations and for its failure to protect its own civilians.  Therefore, although 
there were states who abstained from or opposed the HRC’s recommendation and abstained from 
Resolution 1973, this narrative was widely accepted.  
In the aftermath of the intervention it has become apparent media reports on the use of force by 
protesters and by the regime were convoluted, if not misrepresented.  At the time, reported death 
tolls ranged from a few thousand to tens of thousands, with the Libyan opposition approximating 
30,000 “martyrs” killed and 50,000 wounded between February and September 2011.83 It is now 
estimated that this number was closer to 4,700 killed, with 2,000 still missing, and Qaddafi-loyalist 
forces suffering approximately the same losses.84 Kuperman points to these lower figures, arguing 
there was no evidence of indiscriminate use of force or a “bloodbath” in Benghazi and that 
Qaddafi’s threats were directed at rebels, not civilians.85 Although these figures were certainly 
overestimated, if not deliberately misrepresented to attract international attention, the international 
community accepted a human rights narrative which held the regime responsible.  
Therefore, although these more recent debates may delegitimise the claims made by opposition 
groups, in March 2011 this narrative was believed. The broad consensus demonstrated by the 
Security Council, HRC, General Assembly and regional organisations showed wide acceptance of 
the frame that violence in Libya was disproportionate and threatened civilians. This failure to 
protect civilians constituted a threat to international peace and security and warranted an 
international response.  
The framing of this narrative was vital to the overall conclusion that the situation constituted a 
threat to international peace and security. This finding of fact in turn legitimised the decision to 
intervene in Libya. This frame was widely accepted and resulted in the rejection of the regime’s 
narrative. Although the opposition and media inflated the casualty figures in the early stages of the 
conflict, the Security Council, General Assembly, HRC and regional organisations accepted the 
narrative that Qaddafi’s forces were responsible for using disproportionate force against peaceful 
protestors, then escalated violence through incitement to violence and systematic human rights and 
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humanitarian law violations. Consequently, the Council ultimately recognised the situation as a 
threat to international peace and security in Resolution 1973 which created an expectation that the 
international community could and should respond.  
Last Resort 
The second narrative contestation involved the legitimacy of diplomatic and political attempts to 
reach a peaceful solution. The previous section established that the international community 
accepted a narrative frame which portrayed widespread, escalating violence, in breach of 
humanitarian and human rights laws which threatened international peace and security. In previous 
cases the contestation over the legitimacy and exhaustion of non-forceful processes included 
contestation over negotiations, diplomacy, political agreements and fact finding or investigatory 
processes. However a unique feature of this case was that non-forceful political processes had 
barely begun and remained incomplete when the use of force was authorised. The AU had 
established a High Level ad hoc Committee to take its Roadmap to the parties, however it had not 
gained access. Furthermore the HRC’s ICI and ICC had not concluded their investigations and the 
Libyan parties could not agree on the conditions for negotiations. The use of force was mandated by 
Security Council Resolution when a frame of imminent mass atrocity effectively exhausted these 
processes.   
There were two approaches to this narrative contestation. The first lay in the expectations of some 
parties, especially AU members, who argued the true “spirit” of Resolution 1973 lay in its support 
for a diplomatic resolution through the AU’s ad hoc Committee and the Secretary General’s Special 
Envoy. As this involved the interpretation and application of Resolution 1973 this will be dealt with 
in more detail in the normative contestation. The second approach, was that the regime’s actions 
and statements indicated an imminent mass atrocity which required immediate international action. 
The scale and imminence of this threat to civilian life created a perceived need for urgent action 
which the more reticent members of the Council could not legitimately oppose.   
This is not to say political approaches were not explored. The Libyan regime was warned of the 
consequences of its actions in Resolution 1970 and more broadly, by the actions of the HRC and 
General Assembly. Those who supported Resolution 1973 pointed to Qaddafi’s failure to comply 
with any of the demands of Resolution 1970. Portugal argued “the authorities in Tripoli took no 
note of that resolution [1970] and have failed totally to abide by it.”86 Although it did not support 
the no-fly zone and abstained from voting on Resolution 1973, Russia recognised the valid 
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“expectation that the relevant requirements contained in the unanimously adopted resolution 1970 
must be rapidly and fully fulfilled by the Libyan authorities” noting, “this has not happened yet.”87 
The regime’s failure to comply with Resolution 1970 was evidence of Qaddafi’s failure to 
genuinely participate in a political process to find a peaceful solution.  
However it remains that the ICI and ICC had barely begun their investigations of allegations against 
Libya, and negotiations had not taken place. The deciding factor for the use of force was the 
perceived imminent and large scale threat against the civilians of Benghazi. Qaddafi had threatened 
to “show no mercy or compassion” to those who stayed and vowed to “find you [rebels] in your 
closets.”88 As noted in the actor contestation, this language was perceived as highly inflammatory. 
The perception that a war crime was threatened against the city of Benghazi became the driving 
force behind the rapid authorisation of the NFZ. Williams has argued that in a context where “time 
was running out… [T]he UN’s member states had previously acknowledged their responsibility to 
protect civilians in danger and now was the time to deliver on that promise.”89 The Council was 
therefore compelled by its accepted narrative which created an expectation that it should take action 
to avert a mass atrocity.  
Very few on the Council countered this position, most having already accepted a narrative of 
widespread human rights abuses, constituting a special situation and threat to international peace 
and security. India pointed to incomplete processes to justify, in part, its abstention from voting on 
Resolution 1973, arguing the Council had not heard the report of the Secretary General’s Special 
Envoy which “would have given us an objective analysis of the situation on the ground.”90 India 
reiterated “we must stress the importance of political efforts” and pointed to AU plans to send a 
high-level panel tasked with forging a diplomatic solution to the crisis as examples of further 
political processes.91 However this position was not widely held by the Council, as demonstrated by 
the previous narrative contestation’s outcome.  
Therefore although some have questioned the accuracy of this frame in the aftermath of the 
intervention92  this view was widely accepted on the 17th of March, 2011. Furthermore, when read 
in the context of this broader legitimation process, it is clear the international community had 
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already delegitimised the regime while accepting the legitimate demands of the people.  There was 
broad support not only for the view that the narrative of events was made up of escalating violence 
which breached international human rights and humanitarian laws but that there was an imminent 
threat to civilian life and the international community needed to respond to prevent a mass atrocity. 
Therefore, the rapid authorisation of force before key processes such as negotiations and fact-
finding missions had been fully attempted points to a successful frame of an imminent threat to 
civilian life which excluded slower, non-forceful options. 
However there were those who argued the NFZ ought to give way to the negotiation process, after 
its authorisation. Consequently the adequacy and necessity for continued diplomatic processes were 
contested, after the use of force was authorised. For some actors, the continued legitimate use of 
force became dependent on the prioritisation of the negotiation process. The AU’s ad hoc High 
Level Committee intended to travel to Libya to meet with both parties with a view to establishing 
negotiations at the time the NFZ came into force. However, the Council refused to allow the 
Committee to fly to Tripoli as airstrikes were beginning.93 The peace mission consequently did not 
gain entry until the 10th of April, after Qaddafi agreed in principle to the Roadmap. 94 Conversely, 
the NTC rejected it outright, arguing “the African Union initiative does not include the departure of 
Qaddafi, his sons and his inner circle from the Libyan political scene, therefore it is outdated.”95  
The narrative contestation therefore reflects commonly held views that perceived the situation in 
Libya as extraordinary. The acceptance of a narrative of widespread, systematic and flagrant abuses, 
including the deliberate targeting of peaceful protesters led to the finding of legal facts, including 
allegations of breaches of human rights and humanitarian law, and that the situation constituted a 
threat to international peace and security. Although diplomatic processes were limited and 
incomplete, it was widely accepted on the 17th of March, 2011 that there was an imminent threat to 
civilian life, made clear by Qaddafi’s threats.  Despite the warning inherent in the decision to expel 
Libya from the HRC and the adoption of Resolution 1970, the regime had failed to find a political 
solution or comply with the Security Council’s demands. Taken in this context, political approaches 
had been tried and ignored, and the rhetoric of the regime was perceived as an unveiled threat 
against civilians with legitimate demands. Although negotiations had not taken place before the 
authorisation of force, and investigatory and fact-finding processes were incomplete, the Security 
Council had accepted a frame which created an expectation for immediate action. As a result, 
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reluctant states, especially those who abstained from the Resolution, were unable to prevent its 
adoption, even though they did not entirely support the use of a NFZ.  
Consequently those actors and contestations that did fully fit within the parameters of these frames 
found themselves rhetorically excluded. The AU’s more peaceful approach was rhetorically 
excluded because it was impartial on the question of responsibility for the use of force and had 
continued to promote a political response. Such as response was excluded, seeming weak after the 
international community accepted a narrative that Qaddafi intended to commit a mass atrocity 
against civilians. Alternatively, other states who accepted this frame were entrapped from 
preventing the authorisation of force. The abstaining states -most notably Russia and Germany- 
accepted a narrative frame of violence against civilians and a threat of mass atrocity. Even China’s 
more ambiguous position, which still noted the situation was “special” reflected the acceptance of 
an expectation that the international community should respond. Whilst these states were reticent, 
preventing the action fell outside the parameters of these expectations. These states were therefore 
rhetorically entrapped.   
6.4 Normative Contestations  
The final cluster of contestations legitimatised the interpretation and application of the rules, norms 
and laws of the use of force for the protection of civilians in this case. Although the use of force 
was mandated by Resolution 1973, there were conflicting positions on the potential effectiveness of 
the NFZ as an instrument for civilian protection. Figure 6.5 illustrates the legitimation of the use of 
force question over the three phases of the conflict. It shows that although the legitimacy of the 
intervention was contested at least to some degree throughout all three phases, the legality of the 
NFZ was not contested at all until the third phase. This suggests that although the Security Council 
was able to reach a consensus that the situation in Libya warranted an international response, the 
interpretation and subsequent implementation of that response were more widely contested.  
The following section will therefore trace these normative contestations by examining the 
interpretation and implementation of Resolution 1973, paying particular attention to the protection 
of civilians mandate and the authorisation of the NFZ. The first contestation was over the 
interpretation of the use of force mandate in Resolution 1973, in particular definitions of no-fly 
zones and intervention, as well as the effectiveness of no-fly zones in protecting civilians. These 
interpretations of the relevant norms then established the basis for a second contestation over the 
subsequent implementation of the Resolution, including the legitimacy and legality of the 
interveners’ actions under humanitarian law, and the implementation of the protection of civilians 
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mandate in accordance with the principles of the protection of civilians agenda, RtoP and 
humanitarian law.  
As the only RtoP case in this dissertation, I will not attempt to establish a chain of events that points 
to the success or failures of this emerging principle. The success of Libya as an RtoP case has been 
thoroughly examined by others.96 Both resolutions recognised the Libyan government’s 
responsibility to protect97 but only three Security Council members used a clear RtoP framework to 
justify their support for Resolutions 1970 or 1973,98 while a further eleven General Assembly 
members used such language to justify the suspension of Libya from the HRC.99 Although the 
utterances of a few members across two organs do not establish anything close to a customary rule 
of international law, the inclusion of RtoP language in both resolutions does show states are willing 
to use the language of this principle to make sense of crises of violence.  More prominent however, 
was language drawn from the closely related area of the protection of civilians agenda. The 
principles of this agenda therefore form the basis of this normative contestation analysis. 
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Figure 6.5: Libya Use of Intervening Force (NFZ) 
There were three approaches to interpreting the legitimacy and legality of the use of force contained 
in Resolution 1973. The first, presented by most members who abstained from Resolution 1973 
questioned the utility and inherent risk of using a no-fly zone as an instrument of civilian protection. 
The second was adopted by the LAS and reflected an interpretation of interventionism and 
definition of no-fly zones seemingly unique to this organisation. The third was presented by the AU 
members of the Security Council and reflected a gap between the interpretation and subsequent 
expectations of the African states, and those of the interveners.  
All five members who abstained from voting on Resolution 1973 questioned the capacity the NFZ 
to effectively protect civilians. The German representative saw “great risks”, including the 
“likelihood of large scale loss of life” and a “danger of being drawn into a protracted military 
conflict that would affect the wider region” if the operation was ineffective.100 Similarly, the 
Brazilian representative was apprehensive, stating the Resolution might not be unable to fulfil the 
Council’s “common objective- the immediate end to violence and the protection of civilians.”101 
Russia expressed concern over how it “would be enforced, what the rules of engagement would be 
and what limits on the use of force there would be”102 and India echoed these concerns regarding 
the enforcement of the mandate,103 but China was less clear, noting only the “special 
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circumstances” and the role of the LAS.104 Although Germany praised the low civilian casualty rate, 
content to use it to frame the successful implementation of the NFZ for the protection of civilians, 
China and Russia would become critical of the NFZ’s implementation, pointing to civilian 
casualties as evidence of the interveners’ failure to protect.   
The LAS offered another interpretation of Resolution 1973. Although the LAS called for the NFZ 
and supported Resolution 1973, Amr Moussa, the head of the League retracted this support within 
days of the operation’s commencement. He argued “what is happening in Libya differs from the 
aim of imposing a no-fly zone, and what we want is the protection of civilians and not the 
bombardment of more civilians.”105 This position was underpinned by the LAS’s expectations for 
the mission and definition of no-fly zones. Although it called for a NFZ, the LAS position did not 
view its recommendation as interventionist. The LAS statement calling for a NFZ recalled the 
League’s “commitment to preserve Libyan territorial integrity” and “to ensure the safety and 
security of Libyan citizens” but rejected “all forms of foreign intervention in Libya… emphasizing 
that failure to take the measures necessary to end this crisis will lead to foreign intervention in 
Libyan internal affairs.”106 The LAS therefore did not view the imposition of a NFZ as 
interventionist because it excluded any form of foreign occupation force. However, despite this 
limit, Resolution 1973 authorised the imposition of a NFZ and mandated enforcing states “to take 
all necessary measures…to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in 
the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.”107 Compared to previous UN authorised NFZs, this mandate was 
incredibly robust,108 making it difficult to reconcile with this interpretation of a NFZ.  
The AU members of the Security Council offered yet another approach to interpreting the 
Resolution and the authorisation of a NFZ. After voting in favour of Resolution 1973 despite AU 
opposition to the intervention, these members criticised its implementation, claiming the mission 
prolonged the conflict. The South African representative, Ms. Nkoana-Mashabane argued that 
despite the “military action, there has not been a solution to the Libyan crisis. In fact, the situation 
has deteriorated, with more loss of civilian life and massive destruction of infrastructure.”109 She  
claimed NATO’s military role was illegitimate on the grounds that Resolution 1973’s second  
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operative paragraph emphasised seeking a political solution and was the true “spirit” of the 
resolution.110 This section of the Resolution stressed “the need to intensify efforts to find a solution 
to the crisis which responds to the legitimate demands of the Libyan people,” and noted the roles of 
the Secretary General’s Special Envoy to Libya and the AU’s ad hoc High Level Committee in 
“facilitating dialogue to lead to the political reforms necessary to find a peaceful and sustainable 
solution.”111 This points to a difference in expectations between the African Security Council 
members, who supported Resolution 1973, and those states who implemented it. The African states 
believed the proper interpretation of the Resolution required the pursuit of political options through 
the Secretary General and AU first, and did not intend to condone the use of force. 
These positions were entrenched in the ambiguities over what no-fly zones are and how they are 
enforced. Enforcing a no-fly zone requires outside states closing another state’s airspace. This 
closure is enforced by militarised air-power and requires the crippling of the target state’s air 
defence systems by airstrikes.112 All of these characteristics suggest a NFZ requires interference in a 
sovereign state. Although no-fly zones occupy a grey-area in international law, their enforcement 
requires the use of military force, making them a highly interventionist option.113 The precise nature 
of this force, however remains a highly contested, and was even contested between NATO 
members. Some argued no-fly zones may only use force against air-based threats. Turkey argued   
Resolution 1973 permitted NATO to engage Qaddafi’s air forces, only “while they were aloft.”114 
However others argued they argued any military air system aloft or on the ground was legitimate, 
making launching pads, airbases and other ground-based air force infrastructure acceptable targets. 
US enforcement of NFZs in Libya, the Balkans and Iraq suggest it has a more expansive view that 
includes any military target that threatens civilians. The US, France and the UK endorsed what 
Hillary Clinton called a “no-drive zone”, and included tanks and troops on the ground. Definition 
was then expanded further to include grey-area targets of civilian-military infrastructure such as 
rear command posts, power grids and transport infrastructure such as roads and bridges. This 
disagreement was resolved through NATO command structures and Turkey agreed not to oppose 
such operations while the other interveners would not expect its participation.115 Thus, the 
definition and implementation of no-fly zones remains unclear and ill-defined, but problems of 
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interpretation were not allowed to prevent these actors from implementing the Resolution, resulting 
in a compromise to ensure the NFZ still went ahead.    
The language in operative paragraphs four and eight of Resolution 1973 provided that members 
could use “all necessary measures” to ensure the protection of civilians and enforce compliance 
with the NFZ short of ground invasion. When notifying the Secretary General of their intentions to 
take military action in Libya, NATO states and their partners pointed specifically to these 
mandating provisions. For example, in a letter to the United Nations Secretary General, NATO’s 
Secretary General claimed that the Alliance’s efforts were “to take all necessary measures to protect 
civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack by the Libyan forces” in accordance 
with paragraph four of Resolution 1973.116 Therefore, despite the African states’ differing 
interpretation and subsequent expectations of Resolution 1973, contestations over the legality and 
legitimacy of the resolution’s implementation centred less on the question over the role of operative 
paragraph two, and more on whether or not the campaign retained the primary goal of “protecting 
civilians and civilian areas under threat of attack.”117 It was therefore entrenched in the grey areas 
of international humanitarian law and civilian protection. 
This led to contestation over implementation of the resolution, closely related to the interpretation 
of the terms, NFZ and protection of civilians. Although only two states referred explicitly to the 
RtoP during the debate adopting Resolution 1973, ten states utilised protection of civilians 
language, including four of the five abstaining members. India called on the Libyan authorities to 
“protect the civilian population” while Brazil stressed its abstention did not show disregard for “the 
need to protect civilians.”118 Similarly Russia also stressed its abstention did not change its 
“position regarding the clear unacceptability of the use of force against the civilian population” and 
stressed its commitment as “consistent and firm advocates of the protection of the civilian 
population.”119 The language of the protection of civilians agenda became the normative yardstick 
for measuring the legitimacy of the NFZ. This led to two main questions: did the intervening states 
in fact provide protection to civilians as mandated by Resolution 1973, and was the mission 
primarily underpinned by a protection of civilians goal?  
The simple reality that the interveners had caused civilian casualties in Libya provided the regime 
with evidence the NFZ had failed to protect civilians. Libyan state media showed footage of the 
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wounded and dead, claiming they were the victims of NATO bombs.120 Qaddafi claimed his own 
family had been targeted.121 This position therefore equated the interveners’ harms with the failure 
to protect civilians and conflated the interveners’ intentions and actions as well as legitimacy and 
legality.  
NATO admitted certain mistakes had led to civilian deaths, however argued the mission’s targeting 
procedures aimed to avoid civilian casualties. In response to confirmed civilian deaths on the 21st of 
June 2011, NATO Commanders accepted that “due to a technical failure, one of our weapons did 
not strike the intended military target.”122 Accepting responsibility for the error, the spokesman 
went on to maintain this accident was the exception to an otherwise precise and effective operation 
claiming “after over 4,000 strike sorties you can see we have taken utmost care to avoid civilian 
casualties and will continue to do so.”123 Therefore, whilst accepting responsibility for civilian 
casualties, NATO maintained the small number of casualties did not detract from the mission’s 
overall successes or its legitimacy in implementing the protection of civilians mandate.  
The findings of the ICI report found the operation was “highly precise… with a demonstrable 
determination to avoid civilian casualties.”124 Although Germany had abstained from voting on 
Resolution 1973 due to concerns the NFZ risked civilian lives, it accepted this finding, reiterating 
that “NATO had conducted a highly precise campaign with a demonstrable determination to avoid 
civilian casualties.”125 The German position therefore framed the interveners’ actions as legitimate 
and legal because the campaign was “precise” and did not deliberately target civilians. This 
essentially conflates the two questions above, finding that because the airstrikes did not intend to 
cause harm to civilians, the protection mandate was satisfied.  
However critics of the interveners’ method distinguished between the interveners’ intentions and 
the reality of their actions. Russia argued NATO’s airstrikes exceeded the provisions of the 
mandate, seeking objectives other than civilian protection. Pointing to the prolongation of the 
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conflict and confirmed civilian casualties, Russia argued NATO had failed to implement the 
protection mandate. In a statement from the Duma, the Russian government explained it abstained 
on Resolution 1973 in order to maintain “the cohesion of the international community” in its 
rejection of the repression of the Libyan people. However it also stated “the implementation of the 
resolution has revealed the desire of a number of States to use it as a pretext for achieving other 
aims.”126 It therefore argued that not only had NATO failed to in fact provide protection to civilians, 
this failure was the result of mission creep and overreach because NATO had adopted a goal of 
regime change, thereby overstepping the protection of civilians mandate.  
The interveners denied the operation had been delegitimised by mission creep or overreach. 
President Obama argued that although “there is no question that Libya - and the world - would be 
better off with Qaddafi out of power…broadening our military mission to include regime change 
would be a mistake.”127 British Prime Minster, David Cameron expressed a similar position, noting 
the Resolution was “limited in its scope” and “explicitly does not provide legal authority for action 
to bring about Gaddafi’s removal from power by military means.”128 The interveners therefore 
distinguished and separated their view that Qaddafi ought to be replaced from their responsibilities 
to protect civilians through the NFZ. The question of whether or not the operation was focused 
primarily on protection of civilians was therefore one of the main areas of contestation in phases 
two and three of the conflict.  
The interveners maintained airstrikes had always aimed to cripple Qaddafi’s capacity to used force.  
There is uncertainty in humanitarian law regarding the legitimacy and legality of targeting of 
military positions or infrastructure which do not pose a direct threat but are crucial to the capacity 
of a fighting force. As previously noted, there was dissent amongst even NATO members as 
whether or not it could target any threat to civilians on the ground, including troops, tanks, convoys 
or even command centres, or whether a no-fly zone should be restricted only to air-based military 
systems, or even only to aircraft actually flying at the time of engagement.129 Despite disagreement 
over the acceptability of a no-drive zone and the ground targeting strategy generally, NATO 
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commanders maintained the operation had “focused on stopping direct and indirect attacks… [and] 
the mandate, to protect the population, to ensure a No-Fly Zone and to conduct the embargo.”130  
The authorising mandate in Resolution 1973 contained an added limitation to the use of force. The 
mandate required the “protection of civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack.”131 
Ulfstein and Christiansen suggest the initial strikes, which targeted Libyan military hardware on the 
outskirts of cities such as Benghazi were within the mandate however NATO’s air support role in 
the fall of Tripoli overstretched Resolution 1973 and compromised the impartiality of the 
intervening forces.132 However, they are less sure about indirect threats such as command centres 
pointing to yet another grey area in the enforcement of no-fly zones.133 This contestation points to 
the difficulties of interpreting and implementing humanitarian law, such as the distinction between 
legitimate military and civilian targets with military applications, for example media networks, 
power grids or roads and bridges.134 It also points to other poorly defined and often contested issues 
in relation to intervention, such as the importance of the interveners’ goals and interests.  
Despite civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the NTC and new 
government were highly supportive of the overall implementation of the NFZ. Pointing to “the 
allegations about crimes committed against civilians by NATO forces in Libya” the newly 
recognised NTC accepted “that the strategies employed by the NATO leaders were designed merely 
to protect civilians from the violence aimed at them by the tyrant Al-Qadhafi’s forces.”135 
Accepting “that some mistakes were made, as a result of which some civilians were killed” it 
attributed these losses to collateral damage, stating they “were the kind of errors that happen in all 
wars.”136  
Overall, this normative contestation demonstrates that the frames cast for and against the legitimacy 
of the interveners’ methods were based in contested interpretations of the protection of civilians 
mandate contained in Resolution 1973 and humanitarian law. Whilst the narrative contestation 
recognised the relevance of protection of civilians, humanitarian and human rights law, the 
normative interpretation and implementation of these principles and norms was more widely 
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contested, particularly after the intervention began. Therefore the legitimation of the normative 
contestation in the Libyan case was and remains a contested issue. This is somewhat confusing 
given this is also the most legitimate case examined in this dissertation and demonstrates further the 
dangers of conflating or oversimplifying our understandings of legitimacy and legality in 
international politics.  
For the intervening states and those who supported them, a yardstick for establishing if the mission 
had satisfied the protection of civilians mandate could be determined by assessing the targeting 
methods of the mission itself, to ascertain civilians were not intentionally targeted. For detractors 
however, the question was a much more difficult one, entrenched in proving the intentions of the 
mission and the limits of the protection of civilians framework. Despite the interveners’ claims that 
the protection of civilians remained their primary cause, the strikes against indirect threats to 
civilians suggest NATO was at times targeting the regime itself, rather than the threat it posed. 
However both arguments sit in the grey areas of humanitarian law and therefore were and remain 
contested.  
 6.5 The Libya Legitimation Process 
Although, with its legally mandated NFZ, the Libyan case sits within the ‘legal and legitimate’ 
quadrant of the legitimacy matrix,137 the situation was still subject to the same process of 
contestation in languages of legitimacy and legality as each of the previous cases. This points once 
again to the problems inherent in treating legitimacy and legality as static categories. The in-depth 
analysis of the contestations in this situation demonstrates the presence of a common process of 
legitimation and the nuances of the individual contestations in this case.  
First was the sweeping delegitimation of the Qaddafi regime and the legitimation of the opposition, 
in particular the “legitimate demands of the people” culminating in the de jure recognition of the 
NTC. Although the NTC enjoyed significant legitimation in this case and seemingly called for both 
an ICC referral and NFZ first, it was not until these calls were recast by regional organisations that 
they gained any traction. Consequently, we can once again see that although the actor legitimation 
contestation may endow or remove an actors’ capacity to frame further contestation, it is non-
central actors who ultimately recast and sell these frames. Central actors therefore do not set the 
parameters of discourse, but rather are compelled to observe and participate in a process of 
legitimation where key frames of the actor, narrative and normative contestation will be set by 
                                                          
137 See Figure 1.1 page 10. 
178 | P a g e  
 
others. It does, however demonstrate, that those who can adapt well to such frames will enjoy 
higher levels of legitimation and agency. 
The second key feature of this contestation was the rhetorical entrapment of the Security Council 
members, in particular the five who abstained from voting on Resolution 1973. With the actor and 
narrative frames widely accepted, the expectations which emerged from these findings of fact and 
legal fact entrapped these states. Consequently, although they did not support the forceful 
imposition of a NFZ, they accepted the need for international consensus and action. Furthermore, 
although these actors were prevented from opposing or preventing authorisation of the use of force, 
their reservations on Resolution 1973 set the foundation for the normative contestations over the 
interpretation and implementation of the mandate.  
This process also highlighted the rhetorical exclusion of frames and actors that were incongruent to 
the accepted actor, narrative or normative frames. This was the case with the AU and its Roadmap 
peace plan. There have been numerous attempts to explain the failings of the AU in this case,138 and 
questions regarding the legitimacy of the AU’s plan remain. De Waal has argued “the AU was not 
able to convince the Libyans, Africans or the world that it was a credible interlocutor for peace in 
Libya.”139 In a context where the AU lacked the economic or political clout to implement a peace 
process, and was also viewed as a tool of the Qaddafi regime, it remains uncertain what, if any 
success the ‘Roadmap’ could have had. I would argue this was a result of the AU’s rhetorical 
exclusion from this contestation. The actor and narrative frames most widely accepted excluded the 
AU’s more bipartisan approach and aspirational tone. Consequently, although the Security Council 
placed great emphasis on the role of regional organisations as gatekeepers, actors who fail to cast 
their own conclusion within the parameters of the accepted frames risk rhetorical exclusion from the 
contestation.   
Actors may also be rhetorically entrapped. In accepting narrative and actor frames that placed 
responsibility for the violence on the regime and identified a threat of an imminent mass atrocity, 
the abstaining states were trapped by an expectation that the international community, especially the 
Council, ought not to be prevented from responding to the situation. The acceptance of even a 
                                                          
138 Apuuli. The AU the Libya Crisis and African Solutions to African Problems; De Waal, African Roles in the Libyan 
Conflict of 2011; Stephen Kingah. “Determinants of a Regional Organisation’s Role in Peace and Security: The African 
Union and the European Union Compared.” The South African Journal of International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2012): 201-
22; Eki Yemisi Omorogbe. “The African Union, Responsibility to Protect and the Libyan Crisis.” Netherlands 
International Law Review 59, no. 02 (2012):], 141-63; Neethling, Reflections on Norm Dynamics. 
139 De Waal, African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011, 379. 
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simple frame that the situation was special, left the abstaining Security Members unable to 
legitimately vote against or veto Resolution 1973. 
The final feature or characteristic of this contestation demonstrates that even where there are 
moments of consensus which result in the legal authorisation of an interventionist response, 
contestation can be expected. It should not be assumed that when states develop various or even 
conflicting approaches to reasoning for hard cases that their claims are by definition dishonest. 
Casuistic arguments in hard cases of international relations should not be dismissed out of hand, but 
set within the context of the legitimation process to gain a more holistic view of the entire 
contestation, including moments where individual frames are accepted, rejected or recast by others. 
These contestations emerge from a complex array of frames which interpret the actors, narrative 
and normative understandings of any given case. Expecting a singular or hardened understanding of 
what constitutes the proper interpretation of what is legal or legitimate is unreasonable in the 
context of a complex and hard case such as Libya.  Although these arguments seem contradictory 
and unclear, there is an underlying process whereby arguments are heard, weighed, recast and 
accepted leading to expectations that compel behaviour and result in decisions.  
Although more recent events and continued instability and violence in Libya have certainly led to 
further reflection on the effectiveness of the international response to the 2011 situation, the tracing 
of this legitimation process demonstrates the impact these contestations of legality and legitimacy 
had on the actions taken at that time. The complexities and contradictions of this case may suggest 
that states employ the rhetoric of legitimacy and legality to justify their behaviour as they see fit, 
and individual actions in this case, such as the conflation of casualty rates and the interveners’ 
targeting methods most likely were informed, at least in part, by the actors’ interests. However the 
process of legitimation tempers this use of law and legitimacy as a mere façade. Consequently, 
central parties to a contestation could not claim anything, as their justifications will be contested, 
accepted, rejected or recast by an international audience. 
This demonstrates the presence of a legitimation process in which the languages of legitimacy and 
legality are engaged by all actors. However this is not a process of mere rhetoric and the role of 
casuistry cannot be devalued. Hard cases where different sets and interpretations of norms, rules 
and laws collide provide space for states to engage in this process of legitimation; and this process 
shapes who acts, in what ways and by what rules. The following chapter will draw this analysis 
together across these four cases. 
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Chapter 7 
Combined Analysis 
 
 
7.1 Identifying the Legitimation Process 
The four hard cases developed in this dissertation offered different responses to the use of force in 
international relations that contribute to sceptics who argue international law is powerless, 
unenforceable and not real law. Although the cases draw on common themes underpinning the use 
of force, humanitarian and international human rights law, the political realities of each case 
resulted in inconsistencies within and between the cases that make it difficult to argue that 
international law has any impact on state behaviour or the implementation of justice and order in 
international relations. Such inconsistencies led the Independent International Commission on 
Kosovo to conclude that NATO’s actions were illegal, prohibited by the principles of non-
interference and sovereignty in the United Nations Charter, but legitimate as Security Council 
paralysis meant something needed to be done. The problem with these approaches is if we accept 
that Kosovo was illegal, but legitimate, does this make Rwanda a legal but illegitimate omission?  
The challenges of recognising normative principles for or against the use of force for humanitarian 
purposes has been explored by many in the constructivist and English school literature.1 This 
dissertation, has not sought to prove or disprove the legitimacy or legality of any of these cases, or 
attempted to establish the development of new or emerging norms but rather, it has explored the 
legitimation process underpinning the contestation of them. It has adopted a non-pejorative 
definition of casuistry, understanding it as a method of reasoning that applies practical reasoning to 
                                                          
1 Alex J .Bellamy, “Humanitarian Responsibilities and Interventionist Claims in International Society.” Review of 
International Studies 29, no. 3 (2003): 321-40; Martha Finnemore, “Fights About Rules: The Role of Efficacy and 
Power in Changing Multilateralism,” Review of International Studies 31, no. Supplement S1 (2005); Martha 
Finnemore, “Constructing Norms in Humanitarian Intervention,” in The Culture of National Security: Norms and 
Identity in World Politics. ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Luke Glanville, 
“Norms, Interests and Humanitarian Intervention.” Global Change, Peace and Security 18, no. 3 (2006): 153-71; 
Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
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a new or ambiguous case, such as these hard cases, to situate them in the accepted ethical 
paradigms, resulting in shifts that modify the act, the paradigm or both. Casuistry is therefore an act 
than can be performed well or badly, and the task of the legitimation process is to distinguish 
legitimate claims from illegitimate ones. Therefore as the legitimacy of an act, actor or norm lies in 
the language of these contestations and how they are received by audiences, it is not sufficient to 
only explore what things claim or have been deemed legitimate or illegitimate. Legitimacy is a 
characteristic endowed through the process of legitimation, thus this research has focused on the 
process of legitimation rather than the characteristic of legitimacy.  
The legitimation process has been traced through three areas of contestation. The following analysis 
will utilise the same framework adopted for each individual case, comparing the actor, narrative 
and normative contestations across all four cases. As defined in chapter two, actor contestations are 
made up of two levels of contestation. First, the central contestation is argued between those actors 
directly involved in the use of force. This particular actor contestation is adversarial in nature and 
expressed in absolute terms, where each central actor completely legitimises their own position 
while delegitimising the other. They therefore do not aim to convince each other to adjust their 
positions, but direct these claims to an audience. Tracing this process demonstrates that central 
contesters’ frames are frequently reframed by these audiences. States cannot claim whatever they 
please and these contestations are more than mere rhetoric or façades because audience members 
not only receive such claims, but they may accept , or reject and recast these frames as they build 
their own conceptualisation of the situation and apply normative principles to it.  
 This leads to the second actor contestation, the audience reframe. Audience reframers are deemed 
to have sufficient proximity or interest in the situation, enabling them to recast the parameters of the 
contestation. They are not necessarily adversarial, but successfully legitimised actors gain 
significant agency in reframing the contestations posed by the central actors. They may contribute 
not only to the further legitimation or delegitimation of those actors, but are often viewed as key 
actors for framing the narrative and normative contestations that follow. However in both levels of 
actor contestation in these cases, certain actors were able to attract significant levels of legitimation, 
whilst others failed to do so and may be delegitimised. Legitimised actors have increased agency 
and are better able to cast frames of the debate, therefore a key aspect of this analysis is to establish 
which actors were successful and why. .  
This leads to the second group of contestations, the narrative contestation. Narrative contestations 
pertain to the story told to make sense of the plot and actors in a particular situation. They establish 
facts which may amount to legal facts, labelling a situation “genocide”, “civil war” or a 
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“humanitarian crisis”. Legal facts create expectations that certain responses are warranted and may 
therefore “trap” actors into accepting particular responses preventing the framing of alternative 
responses. The two broad narrative contestations traced throughout all four cases were that the 
situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, and peaceful alternatives to the use 
of force were exhausted. Whilst neither of these individual narratives creates an expectation that a 
forceful response was required, combined they created an expectation that the international 
community, in particular the Security Council, must respond.  
Finally, the third cluster of contestations relate to the normative interpretation and implementation 
of force. Within this cluster states contest the norms and laws related to the use of force and 
humanitarian law. They contest the legitimate and legal authority for the threat of force, the use of 
force and the implementation of that force. The contestations in this case demonstrate that where 
force was used, the question of legality was quite clearly resolved, however questions of legitimacy 
were more widely contested. It also points to another microprocess I have identified in some cases, 
the humanitarian reframe. The following combined analysis will therefore trace these 
microprocesses of legitimation across all three areas of contestation, comparing the four cases.         
By accepting legitimacy and legality as related but separate areas of contestation, this dissertation 
has developed from the position that these contestations are in themselves significant processes. 
Borrowing from literature that distinguishes the characteristic of legitimacy from the process of 
contesting or claiming legitimation,2 I accepted Rodney Barker’s position that legitimation is a 
common practice of all governments. Using these claims to ask if a government is legitimate is 
therefore insufficient as the proper question is how do actors make these claims and with what 
success.3 Therefore, rather than focusing on establishing what is or is not legal or legitimate, this 
research concentrated on how these claims to legality and legitimacy were made and received by 
identifying a process of legitimation, and the key features that lead to the acceptance of certain 
claims, actors, actions and norms within it. It identifies two microprocesses that indicate a complex 
normative process.  
First, it draws on theories of argument and rhetoric by identifying situations of rhetorical 
entrapment.4 Rhetorical entrapment occurs where actors are trapped into supporting certain 
responses or decisions they may not otherwise accept because they have already adopted a 
particular frame. In accepting a frame, actors also accept the parameters of that understanding, 
                                                          
2 Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon press, 1975), 1. 
3 Rodney Baker, Legitimating Identities: The Self-Preservations of Rulers and Subjects (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 21. 
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leading to the establishment of certain normative expectations regarding the actions or responses 
that should follow.   This leads to the second process, which I have called rhetorical exclusion. 
Rhetorical exclusion occurs when the audience members accept a particular frame which in turn 
creates an expectation for legitimate and illegitimate options. Claims and responses that do not fit 
within the parameters of these expectations cannot be maintained, leading to the rhetorical 
exclusion of certain actors, their claims and their recommendations. These microprocesses are key 
to understanding why some arguments and actors are accepted but others are not, both within and 
between the cases. 
7.2 Actor Contestations 
In each case, the actor contestation demonstrated the roles played by the central actors and audience 
reframers. Where central contestations were adversarial and cast in terms which reflected absolute 
legitimacy and legality while delegitimising the other, it was the audience reframers who muddied 
these waters by recasting the contestation in more nuanced terms. Consequently there were two 
notable features which emerged from these actor contestations which will be highlighted in the 
following comparative analysis. First, central contesters may be legitimised or delegitimised, in 
some cases very clearly, however they do not legitimise themselves. Their claims are received by an 
audience. This audience could be international or domestic, and may include international fora, 
individual states, the broader international community or domestic constituencies and leads to the 
second feature of the actor contestation -audience reframers. Audience reframers recast the terms of 
the contestation, often in terms which compelled certain actions. Even where a central contester cast 
a particular frame or called for a response, audience reframers recast these frames in a manner 
acceptable to the broader audience of states. The actor contestation will therefore identify the 
legitimation and delegitimation of central contesters and audience reframers, tracing these processes 
of legitimation to determine how some actors attained a high level of legitimacy, even international 
legal recognition, while others failed often resulting in their exclusion or entrapment.   
 Central Contestation  
The strongest examples of central actor legitimation and delegitimation occurred in the Kosovo and 
Libya cases. The delegitimation of the governments of Milošević and Qaddafi, and legitimation of 
the Kosovar Albanian and Libyan National Transition Council (NTC) were quite stark.5 In Iraq 
there was significant delegitimation of Hussein and the Iraqi state, however with no Iraqi opposition 
participating in the central contestation the legitimate actor space remained unfilled.6 By contrast, 
                                                          
5 See Figures 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 pages 85-86 and 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 pages 148-149.  
6 See Figures 5.2 and 5.3 pages 122-123. 
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there was very little international contestation over the legitimacy of the actors in Rwanda, where 
the agency of the central contesters was determined by military victory on the ground and the 
subsequent legal recognition of the RPF’s transitional government. Although legitimation created 
significant space for agency in casting the rest of the contestation, the central actors expressed their 
own frames in absolute terms which were not accepted in full in any of these cases. The first 
identifiable pattern of the actor contestation was therefore that central actors’ frames were not 
accepted in full. The second was that although none of these frames was accepted in its entirety, 
some actors were widely legitimised while others were widely delegitimised and excluded. 
Central actors’ claims to legitimacy and legality were expressed in unqualified terms in which each 
actor framed itself as both, legitimate and legal. Although the Rwandan central actors did not take 
part in the international contestation at the same time as international agency for these actors was 
determined by victory, both the interim government, which took over following Habyarimana’s 
death on the 6th of April, and the transitional government which took over following the RPF’s 
victory in July 1994 blamed the other for the violence and for breaking the provisions of the Arusha 
Accords. However the Security Council held both parties responsible for the collapse of the Arusha 
Accords, reflected by the acceptance of a civil war frame and the emphasis placed on the “holy 
trinity” of peacekeeping, consent, impartiality and the minimal use of force,7 placing responsibility 
on both actors to re-establish the conditions of the peace process. 
Similarly, the legitimising claims of the central actors in the Kosovar and Iraqi contestations were 
also recast by audiences. For example, where Belgrade argued it was responding legitimately to a 
terrorist and secessionist threat in Kosovo, the Kosovar Albanians argued Belgrade had undertaken 
a campaign of oppression and terror against Kosovar Albanian civilians. However whilst many 
Security Council members recognised the legitimacy of the Kosovar people’s demands, especially 
those made non-violently, its Resolutions condemned both the disproportionate use of force by 
government forces, and the use of terror tactics by the KLA, and imposed sanctions on both actors. 
The international community also recast the actor legitimation claims of the central contesters in the 
Iraq case. The Security Council members emphasised they had no illusions regarding the brutality 
of the Iraqi regime, but also rejected the legitimacy of the interveners. Figure 5.2 and 5.38 
demonstrate the clear delegitimation of both actors.  
                                                          
7 Alex J. Bellamy, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 196-197. 
8 See pages 122-123. 
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Finally, although the NTC was widely legitimised while Qaddafi was sharply delegitimised, the 
claims of the NTC representatives were also reframed. The first reported call for a no-fly zone 
(NFZ) was made by the Libyan UN delegation which broke away from the regime and joined the 
NTC in the last week of February, 2011.9 However the calls for assistance were not heeded at this 
point, as the international community remained reluctant to use force. Furthermore, when the call 
was made for the imposition of a NFZ, it was attributed to regional organisations, in particular the 
League of Arab States (LAS). This will be further examined in the audience reframe analysis 
below, however it demonstrates that even where central actors were widely legitimised their 
contestations were reframed by audience members. This demonstrated that while central actors may 
make legitimation claims in absolute terms, these claims were rarely accepted in full.  
However although each of these central actors’ claims were not accepted outright, some actors 
undoubtedly enjoyed greater legitimation than others. Those actors who were legitimised enjoyed 
significant agency in framing other aspects of the contestation, however the delegitimised actors’ 
frames were more widely rejected. This was particularly clear in the cases of Libya and Kosovo, 
where the governments in both cases were significantly delegitimised, while the opposition groups 
were legitimised.  
In the Libyan case, this pattern was quite clear with strong legitimation of the Libyan people and 
protestors and rapid delegitimation of the regime.10 This sharp distinction between the two actors 
was established in the pre-conflict phase. I argued this was based on the widespread acceptance of 
the legitimate demands of the people combined with the perception that the regime’s response, was 
disproportionate and triggered escalation. Furthermore, the regime’s own rhetoric was contradictory 
and confused, playing down the scale of the threat to international media,11 while making unveiled 
threats of extermination against its opposition domestically.12 The result was the clear legitimation 
of the opposition and equally clear rejection of the legitimacy of the Qaddafi regime as the ruling 
authority in Libya.13 Therefore, although the international community recast the NTC’s calls for a 
NFZ, the opposition enjoyed significant legitimation which ultimately amounted to international 
                                                          
9 Colin Moynihan. “Libya’s UN Diplomats Break with Qaddafi.” The New York Times, 21 February 2011, accessed 18th 
July, 2013 from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/world/africa/22nations.html?_r=0; Paul D. Williams and Alex J. 
Bellamy. “Principles, Politics, and Prudence: Libya, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Use of Military Force.” 
Global Governance 18, no. 3 (2012): 273-297, 290-291. 
10 See Figures 6.2, 6.3 and 6.4 pages 148-149. 
11 BBC News. “Full interview with Col Gaddafi.” BBC News, 1 March 2011, accessed 18 July 2012 from 
http://www.bbc. co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12607478. 
12 Al Jazeera. “Defiant Gaddafi vows to fight on.” Al Jazeera English, 23 February 2011, accessed 18 July 2012 from 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/02/201122216458913596.html; Richard Spencer. “Libya: protests gather 
pace as Gaddafi’s son vows to fight to the end.” The Daily Telegraph, 21 February 2011, accessed 18th of July, 2012, 
accessed 18th July 2012 from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/ 8337546/Libya-
protests-gather-pace-as-Gaddafis-son-vows-to-fight-to-the-end.html. 
13 See Figures 6.2 and 6.3 page 148-149. 
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legal recognition. The regime, however, was widely delegitimised and its claims failed to gain 
international recognition. 
The Kosovar Albanians on the other hand were legitimised late in the pre-conflict phase. As noted 
above, their claims to legitimacy were tempered by an audience reframe which recognised the 
disproportionality of Belgrade’s response, but also categorically condemned acts of terrorism. 
Consequently, phase one showed wide variance in relation to the Kosovar Albanians’ legitimacy as 
the international community balanced the claims made for and against both central actors, imposing 
sanctions on both, Belgrade and the Kosovars. This shifted when the Kosovar Albanian negotiation 
team, which included hard-line members of the KLA, acceded to the conditions of the Rambouillet 
Accords, compromising their demands for independence by accepting an autonomy arrangement 
instead. 
This decision reflected the processes of rhetorical entrapment and rhetorical exclusion. By 
accepting the Accords, the Kosovar Albanian leadership legitimised themselves, creating a narrative 
of themselves as good-faith negotiators and forced the rhetorical exclusion of Belgrade. Combined 
with the increasingly accepted narrative frame that Milošević had instigated a deliberate plan of 
ethnic cleansing to force Kosovar Albanians from the province, rejecting the Kosovar Albanians’ 
compromise drove the international community to accept the Kosovar cause, with some arguing that 
Belgrade’s hard-line response “drove” first the Kosovar Albanians, then the international 
community to the KLA.14  
While the Kosovar Albanians’ acceptance of the agreement was most likely a carefully measured 
risk to ensure international support for their cause by compromising on an agreement Belgrade 
would most likely reject, this actor contestation does not reflect a realist interpretation of power 
utilisation and exploitation of powerless laws. Indeed, all of these actor contestations have at some 
point included egoistic states making self-interested decisions to improve their position, often at the 
expense at others. But while realism provides an explanation of some aspects of this process, the 
broader legitimation process demonstrates a more complex contestation where audience members 
reframe these arguments and shift the parameters of the discourse. Tracing the legitimation provides 
a more holistic understanding of each case, rather than individual events or claims within it. 
 
 
                                                          
14 Henry H. Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The inside Story of an Insurgency (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2008), 47. 
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 Audience Reframers 
The second significant feature of the actor contestation is the audience reframer contestation. 
Audience reframer contestations legitimise actors who, although not directly involved in the 
conflict by means of the actual use of force, have an indirect interest in a situation. They may be 
non-state actors, such as institutional organisations or representatives, including UN personnel, 
organs or missions, or regional organisations, such as NATO, the LAS or the AU. They may also be 
state actors with a close link to a situation which falls short of using force, such as Russia’s close 
linkages to the FRY and Serbia in Kosovo, or France, Germany and Canada, as traditional NATO 
allies of the US and UK in Iraq. Unlike the central actor contestation, the legitimation of audience 
reframers is not necessarily an adversarial contestation, and in some cases, is accepted by all central 
actors. However, as with central contestations, some actors attained higher levels of legitimacy and 
agency, while others were rhetorically entrapped by or rhetorically excluded from the contestation.   
The Rwandan case demonstrated how key audience members may fail to fulfil this role as framers, 
despite having legitimate agency to do so. The Office of the United Nations Secretary General, the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNAMIR’s command structure have been criticised 
for failing to provide the international community with sufficient information to properly respond to 
genocide in Rwanda.15 It has been suggested that Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 
particular failed to appropriately frame the Rwandan crisis, “by reporting the ongoing violence as 
‘chaos’, by conveying the impression that it was overwhelmed by events, and by failing to put 
forward concrete recommendations.”16 However the Secretary General had the capacity to recast 
the terms of the contestation. When the Secretary General’s May Report on Rwanda concluded 
“there can be little doubt that it constitutes genocide,”17 it reframed the narrative contestation and 
forced the Security Council members to accept a version of events in that created certain normative 
expectations regarding its response. Before the submission of this report, only two states utilised an 
explicit frame of genocide but after its publication, twenty-five states utilised this frame, most 
notably when Resolution 925 (1994) recognised the Rwandan violence as genocidal. The evolution 
of the genocide frame itself will be further examined in the narrative contestation, however it 
demonstrates how an audience reframer may fail to utilise an opportunity to frame a contestation 
despite their legitimation. 
                                                          
15 Henry H. Perritt, Kosovo Liberation Army: The inside Story of an Insurgency (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2008), 47.225-229. 
16 Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide, 127.  
17 Office of the United Nations Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Rwanda 31st May 
1994 S/1994/640. United Nations: New York, 11. 
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Conversely, the IAEA and UNMOVIC weapons inspectors were widely accepted by all actors 
throughout the Iraq case. The inspectors’ reports set the parameters for debating vital issues such as 
the nature of Iraq’s weapons programme and most importantly, the sufficiency of its cooperation 
with inspections and disarmament. The findings of UNMOVIC’s Twelfth Report stated Iraq was 
cooperating in relation to matters of “process” but less so on matters of “substance”.18 Although 
ambiguous, this report was utilised by all central actors and audience members to frame their 
respective claims, demonstrating the legitimation of the report’s writers as audience reframers, 
despite its ambiguities.   
This can be contrasted with the role of Russia in the Kosovo case which demonstrated how a single 
actor may be both legitimised and delegitimised as an audience reframer. Russia was legitimised as 
an audience reframer early in phase one, however was rhetorically excluded when it tabled a draft 
resolution condemning NATO’s aggression. Although described by some as a spoiler, Russia 
played a key role as a member of the Contact Group and friend to Belgrade.19 In this role, Russia 
was able to impact the decisions of the Contact Group and Security Council, adding blanket 
condemnations of Kosovar terrorist activities and imposing sanctions on both Yugoslav and 
Kosovar forces. Russia played a key role in recasting the central actor contestation, accepting the 
disproportionality of Belgrade’s response while also pushing the view that the KLA posed a serious 
terrorist threat. Conversely, its condemnation of NATO’s actions was not widely received, 
demonstrated by the defeat of its draft resolution, including negative votes from seven Council 
members who were not NATO members at the time.20 This demonstrates that audience reframers, 
like central contesters, cannot make any claim they please. When audiences accept certain actor, 
narrative and normative frames they are compelled by the expectations those frames create that 
certain responses or options lie outside the scope of the accepted position. In this case, Russia’s 
failure to address the audience’s expectations that emerged from the designation of the case as a 
threat to international peace and security resulted in its rhetorical exclusion.  
However the most significant example of audience reframer legitimation occurred in the Libyan 
case. The significance of regional actors in the Libyan crisis has been well-researched and noted as 
an exceptional feature of this case.21 Although regional organisations withdrew support for the NFZ 
                                                          
18 United Nations Security Council. “Twelfth Quarterly Report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations 
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council Resolution 
1284 (1999) S/2003/232.” United Nations: New York, 11. 
19 Fred Abrahams and Elizabeth Andersen. Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo. (Human Rights Watch: New York, 
1998), 112-113. 
20 Argentina, Bahrain, Brazil, Gabon, Gambia, Malaysia, Slovenia. Slovenia was not a member of NATO in 1999. 
21 Bellamy, Alex J.  The Exception and the Norm, 266; De Waal, Alex. “African Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011.” 
International affairs 89, no. 2 (2013): 365-79; Tim Dunne and Jess Gifkins, “Libya and the State of Intervention.” 
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only days after airstrikes began, they were crucial to the framing of the situation in Libya as one 
which required an internationally enforced NFZ. It is unclear which actors first raised the possibility 
of a NFZ, however it seems the first call came when Libyan diplomats and officials announced their 
rejection of Tripoli in late February 2011 and asked for a NFZ to prevent foreigners entering 
Libya.22 However it was not until regional organisations adopted the call as a protection of civilians 
measure that the international community accepted it as a legitimate course of action. The regional 
call for a NFZ was vital in swaying reluctant members of the US administration, including President 
Obama, towards intervention.23 The most notable acknowledgement of the organisations’ influence 
as a reframer was reflected not by the states who supported Resolution 1973, but the five who 
abstained.24 Four of the five abstaining members, China, Russia, Germany and Brazil noted the 
importance of the LAS statement particularly. Altogether, fourteen statements made during the 
meeting adopting Resolution 1973 recognised the legitimacy of regional organisations in this case, 
eleven of which specifically noted the LAS statement calling for a NFZ. Consequently, these 
regional organisations have been labelled “gatekeepers” in this case.25  
Moreover, by accepting the LAS’s and OIC’s calls for a NFZ, the recommendation of the AU was 
rhetorically excluded. The AU was reticent towards the use of force and bipartisan in its 
condemnation of the central Libyan actors, recommending a political response but not force or the 
ICC referral. Although the AU’s Roadmap was widely accepted as a legitimate plan for a political 
solution, most Council members adopted the actor and narrative frames of the LAS and OIC, which 
clearly delegitimised the regime and recognised the legitimate demands of the people.26 The AU on 
the other hand offered a more bipartisan approach which avoided delegitimising the regime in any 
strong terms.27 The AU’s aspirational and bipartisan tone fell outside the accepted frames that had 
clearly delegitimised the regime and were starting to legitimise the NTC. As will be explored in the 
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22 Moynihan. Libya’s UN Diplomats Break with Qaddafi. 
23 Paul D. Williams. “Road to Humanitarian War in Libya, the Briefing.” Global Resp. Protect 3 (2011): 255-256 
24 China, Russia, India, Brazil and Germany abstained.  
25 Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The New Politics of Protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility 
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26 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. “OIC General Secretariat Condemns Strongly the Excessive Use of Force 
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narrative analysis, the audience accepted a narrative that Qaddafi had threatened to commit a mass 
atrocity crime against civilians in Benghazi which created an expectation that force was necessary, 
excluding the AU’s political and diplomatic plan.  
 Understanding Actor Contestations 
There are several recognisable patterns and common microprocesses in these actor contestations. 
First, central actors cannot claim anything they please; or rather, they may try, but these claims may 
not be accepted by the audience. Central actors’ claims to legitimacy are not accepted without 
reframing to some degree. Even the most clearly legitimised or powerful central actors were unable 
to set the parameters of the contestation entirely in their own favour. However actors who were 
widely legitimised were able to cast more frames than delegitimised actors.  
This legitimacy also applies to audience reframers. Such actors were able to recast the frames of the 
central actors. Their perceived legitimacy as actors with close proximity to the situation enabled 
them to recast significant areas of debate. This was demonstrated by the role of key states such as 
Russia in Kosovo, France and Germany in Iraq, regional ‘gatekeepers’ in Libya, inspectors in Iraq, 
and the Secretary General’s framing of genocide in Rwanda. Actor contestations therefore not only 
legitimise and delegitimise actors, but in doing so establish who has agency to frame the remaining 
areas of contestation.  
Although sceptics would argue these actor contestations reflect egotistical states pursuing self-
interest through the pursuit of logics of consequences, not appropriateness, the legitimation process 
points to something deeper. Although individual states may be motivated by self-interest or power 
gains, and may use deceitful or bad casuistry to pursue those interests, the claims of the central 
actors were recast in every case- even in Libya where one central actor was legitimised. Therefore, 
although these states may apply poor versions of casuistic arguments in order to protect their own 
preferences, the international community can mitigate them by recasting the terms of the 
contestation and shifting the terms of the discourse.  
Moreover, actors may also find themselves trapped by or excluded from the contestation if their 
claims do not fit the widely accepted positions of the audience. It will be demonstrated by the 
following sections that these processes of rhetorical entrapment or rhetorical exclusion may be 
intentional, where actors attempt to deliberately set the parameters in order to force an opposing 
contester to either adjust their position or face delegitimation, or unintentional, where an actor 
excludes or entraps themselves by accepting certain facts and the expectations which emerge from 
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them. Instrumentalist approaches to international law fail to accommodate the impact the 
development and imposition of such normative expectations have on the legitimation process.   
7.3 Narrative Contestation 
Narrative contestations develop the story told to make sense of the situation on the ground and the 
main characters involved. It is closely related to the actor contestation as it “highlights the agency 
of particular individuals,”28 and normative contestation as these stories establish legal facts, often 
creating normative expectations. That is, in telling certain stories, certain labels such as ‘civil war’, 
‘genocide’ or ‘humanitarian crisis’ attach to the narrative which in turn create an expectation that 
the international community has a particular role to play. Unlike domestic systems of law, where 
courts are the arbiters of legal fact, the international audience has the ability to determine such legal 
facts. The individual stories across these four cases were quite different. They included 
contestations over a range of labels such as civil war, genocide, mass atrocity, humanitarian crisis, 
terrorism, secessionism, WMD possession and human rights abuse. Despite these different plots, 
these narratives established two frames: the first was that the situation constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, while the second was that the non-forceful options had been 
exhausted.  
A threat to international peace security was recognised during the first phase of the Kosovar, Iraqi 
and Libyan cases, however this label was not applied to the Rwandan case until the genocide was 
well-underway in the second phase of the conflict. The exhaustion of non-forceful options, however 
was accepted early in only the Libyan and Kosovar cases. These narratives will be compared to 
those in Rwanda, where most Security Council members maintained faith in the peace process 
established by the Arusha Accords until late into the contestation, and Iraq where most members 
expressed support for the continuation of the inspection process. Although neither narrative is a 
trigger for the legitimate or legal use of force on its own, combined these legal facts compel an 
expectation that certain normative or legal frameworks apply and certain responses may or may not 
be adopted, resulting in situations of entrapment of exclusion.  
The Rwandan case demonstrated how a narrative may evolve, leading to changed expectations 
regarding the international response. The narrative in this case evolved from one of general violence 
and civil war to a threat to international peace and security constituting the crime of genocide. 
Viewed during phase one as a piecemeal and fragile post-civil war peace, based on the Arusha 
Accords, when violence  erupted after the assassination of President Habyarimana’s, the Security 
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Council framed the situation as one of generalised violence and banditry and called for a return to 
the peace process. Consequently, despite the many problems inherent in the Arusha Accords, the 
initial narrative was informed by the norms of peacekeeping, in particular the “holy trinity” of 
impartiality, consent and minimal use of force.29 The Security Council’s first response following the 
wave of violence in April 1994 was therefore the reduction of its peacekeeping force, UNAMIR.30 
Presented as one of three poor options, many members were reluctant to reduce the mission to a 
token force, however viewed complete withdrawal as unacceptable and an increased mandate and 
force as unrealistic. They were therefore trapped by this initial narrative as it did not support 
alternative expectations.  
This narrative changed during the course of phase two, and the Council members accepted a frame 
indicating more serious levels of violence. Labelling the situation a threat to international peace and 
security, it adopted Resolution 918 (1994), reversing its decision to reduce UNAMIR and 
authorising a more robust Chapter VI mandate with a force of 5500.31 However despite the 
authorisation of this force, the mission struggled to find the requisite funding, equipment and 
personnel to deploy to Kigali. Struggling to implement the new mandate, the Secretary General 
submitted his report on the 31st of May, employing the word “genocide” to describe events in 
Rwanda.32 Where only two states utilised an explicit genocide narrative before this report, twenty-
five statements recognised this frame after its publication. Resolution 925 (1994), adopted just over 
a week after the submission of the report, applied a genocide narrative and further expanded 
UNAMIR’s mandate. However the deployment of the mission remained sluggish and when the 
Secretary General reported it would be delayed by up to three months, the Security Council 
authorised the French-led Operation Turquoise to fill the gap.  
This chain of events demonstrates that narratives do create expectations for international action. 
Whilst some have argued some states avoided the use of the “g-word” in order to prevent imposing 
an obligation to act,33 the evolution of this narrative demonstrates that while this may have been 
true for some states, the acceptance of certain narratives did create expectations and the members 
were compelled to act, albeit slowly and inefficiently and resulting not only in the reversal of the 
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decision to reduce UNAMIR, but the authorisation of Operation Turquoise. Actors who had called 
for an intervention in April 1994 were reticent towards the French-led mission, concerned the 
Chapter VII mandate of the operation would interfere with the less robust Chapter VI mandate of 
UNAMIR, however were unable to oppose the intervention because the narrative frame demanded 
not only Council authorisation of force, but the authorisation of a forceful mission that could be 
deployed.  
The narratives in the other cases were more clearly and quickly accepted. In the Kosovo case, the 
situation was recognised as a threat to international peace and security in September 1998, with the 
adoption of resolution 1199 (1998). Although Russia acknowledged the need for an international 
role, it did not itself adopt the language of a threat to international peace and security. China on the 
other hand openly rejected claims the situation constituted a threat to international peace and 
security, and considered the matter an internal issue.34 This did not, however reflect the general 
consensus of most Council members.  
Most Security Council members did agree that the situation constituted a threat to international 
peace and security. Thirty-nine statements recognised the situation as a threat to international peace 
and security, while fourteen did not. Thus 74% of statements accepted the threat to international 
peace and security label. Combined with a narrative of atrocities such as the Račak killings, and the 
expulsion of Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) chief, Chris Walker, the narrative held that the 
situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, and Belgrade was not cooperating 
with international efforts to achieve a political solution. The acceptance of this frame was made 
clear when the Council rejected a draft resolution proposed by Russia, India and Belarus 
condemning NATO’s actions. The resolution was resoundingly defeated, with twelve negative 
votes, three of which constituted vetoes. This decision included the negative votes of seven Council 
members who were not central contesters or key audience reframers. Slovenia and Malaysia argued 
they voted against the draft because it failed to recognise previous resolutions which had noted a 
humanitarian crisis and designated the situation a threat to international peace and security. 
Similarly Argentina and Bahrain rejected the draft because it failed to address accepted views and 
risked encouraging Belgrade’s ethnic cleansing strategy.35 Therefore, the Russian position was 
rhetorically excluded because its proposal was incongruous to the expectations created by the 
established narrative of humanitarian crisis, ethnic cleansing and a threat to international peace and 
security.  
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35 United Nations Security Council, Friday, 26 March 1999, S/Pv.3989, Argentina 7, Bahrain 9, Malaysia, 8, Slovenia 
3-4.  
194 | P a g e  
 
A similar narrative emerged in the Libyan case, although it evolved very quickly. This narrative 
was widely received by the Security Council and international audience, demonstrated by the 
General Assembly decision to suspend Libya from the HRC.36 This narrative told of widespread 
abuses, civilian targeting and the use of disproportionate force against peaceful demonstrators. The 
designations of threat to international peace and security and last resort were adopted in Resolution 
1973 on the 17th of March, barely a month after the first signs of violence. Qaddafi’s own language 
led to concern amongst the international community that government forces would commit a mass 
atrocity if they defeated the rebel stronghold in Benghazi. The narrative was therefore cast in terms 
that produced expectation based on the norms of the protection of civilians agenda. Consequently, 
although the central Libyan contesters had not met to negotiate a political solution, the concern 
created by Qaddafi’s threat created a perception that there was an imminent risk of a mass atrocity 
crime in Benghazi and a need for immediate protection. Hence this narrative created an expectation 
that the Security Council should act. Most abstaining states, with the exception of India, had already 
accepted this frame and did not oppose the subsequent expectation that the Council should respond 
to protect civilians, but abstained out of concern that the NFZ mandated by the Resolution posed a 
further risk to civilians. Having accepted a narrative that something needed to be done, they were 
rhetorically entrapped. Therefore despite their lack of support, Germany, Russia, China and Brazil 
could not legitimately prevent the adoption of the Resolution as this would break the expectation 
created by the narrative they had already accepted, that the situation constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, and the imminent threat of mass atrocity demanded the immediate 
protection of civilians under threat of attack. 
Moreover, by accepting the call for a NFZ, the Security Council rhetorically excluded the position 
of the AU. Having already found itself outside the accepted actor contestation, the AU’s call for 
parties to come to the table was rhetorically excluded by the perception that an imminent threat to 
civilian life needed to be addressed immediately. The more bipartisan approach adopted by the AU 
avoided explicitly condemning the regime and did not utilise a protection of civilians framework, 
applying a narrative of more generalised violence. This narrative was incongruous to the more 
widely accepted views of the audience leading to the exclusion of the AU position. Thus, despite 
the fact that its plans to bring both parties to the negotiating table or send fact-finding teams to the 
area were incomplete, accepted frames, which delegitimised the regime and feared an imminent 
mass atrocity excluded the AU’s more moderate and non-interventionist position.  
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In contrast the Iraqi narrative contestation established only one of these narrative frames 
demonstrating any one of these frames, by themselves, do not legitimise force. Although the 
Security Council recognised the situation in Iraq constituted a threat to international peace and 
security in Resolution 1441 (2002), key Security Council members, in particular audience reframers 
France and Germany, did not accept that non-forceful options had been exhausted.37 The US and 
UK attempted to prove Iraq had illicit secret weapons programmes in order to compel the Security 
Council to mandate the use of force but the contestation was recast by audience reframers, 
especially UNMOVIC inspectors who refocused the contestation on questions of cooperation, not 
possession.38 Most audience members also recommended the US hand its evidence over to 
UNMOVIC and the IAEA for further investigation. Therefore although they did not dispute the 
narrative developed by Colin Powell’s presentation to the Council in February 2003 even though 
much of the evidence would be disproven, most audience members called on the US to turn its 
evidence over to UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Moreover they developed an expectation that the 
Council’s response should utilise the existing political framework; conversely, they did not develop 
an expectation of force. Most audience members accepted that the situation constituted a threat to 
international peace and security however argued that improvements in Iraq’s cooperation with 
UNMOVIC indicated the threat could be addressed through inspections. Therefore the option of 
using force was rhetorically excluded by the audience before the Coalition of the Willing invaded 
Iraq. Although a normative contestation over the legal and legitimate use of force ensued, most 
audience members rejected the narrative that non-forceful options were exhausted, leading to the 
expectation that force was not a legitimate response in March 2003.  
Consequently, responses which did not fit within the accepted frame at any given time were 
rhetorically excluded. This was demonstrated by the failure of the Russian-led draft condemning 
NATO’s actions against Belgrade, demonstrating the exclusion of a frame incongruous to the 
accepted narrative that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security, and the 
exclusion of use of force in Iraq as improvements in cooperation indicated the viability of 
inspections. It also pointed to the exclusion of the AU’s narrative for the Libyan situation, which 
called for a political solution which did not fit within the scope of expectations created but the more 
widely held view that delegitimised Qaddafi and feared an imminent mass atrocity.  
However where these frames were both accepted, there was increased discourse regarding the 
question of force and expectations that the Council should respond. Thus in the Libyan case we saw 
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the rhetorical entrapment of states who had reservations over the use of force in Libya, but had 
accepted a protection of civilians narrative which created an expectation that the Security Council 
should respond. We also saw the entrapment of Security Council members in the Rwandan case 
where the evolution of a more serious frame of violence and genocide created reciprocal 
expectations, not only to authorise a more robust response, bit to authorise the response that could 
deploy immediately, if imperfectly.  
7.4 Normative Contestation 
Normative contestations in all cases involved questions over authorisation, interpretation and 
implementation of force. In the three cases where the use of force occurred, Kosovo, Iraq, and 
Libya, contestations pertaining to the legitimate and legal use of force were demonstrated by 
Figures 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.39 The legality of force in each individual case was quite clearly established. 
In Libya twenty-three statements (88%) supported the legality of the intervention to four who 
deemed it illegal. Conversely the use of force in Iraq was framed as legal by only eight states (15%) 
to forty-seven rejections. Although not as stark, the Kosovo case also shows fairly strong rejection 
with only fourteen frames of legality to twenty-eight frames of illegality (33% support for legality). 
This suggests that although some may argue law is indeterminate and uncertain, states do have clear 
ideas of what constitutes legal and illegal uses of force in individual cases.  
However these positions are less clear in relation to contestations over the legitimacy of force. With 
the exception of Iraq, where the legitimacy frame was also widely rejected by 125 statements to 
eighteen (only 12% support for legitimacy), the question of legitimacy was more widely contested 
than the questions of law, demonstrated by the broad sweeps along the legitimacy axes in Figures 
671 and 67.3.  This indicates the presence of a higher level of contestation over questions of 
legitimacy than questions of legality. Divisions in relation to the use of force in Kosovo were 
almost evenly divided with 53% of statements across all three phases supporting the legitimacy of 
NATO’s use of force. In the Libyan case, despite its high level of legal acceptance, 63% supported 
the legitimacy of the use of force, pointing to discrepancies in the implementation of Resolution 
1973, rather than its legality. The following analysis will trace these contestations in relation to the 
authorisation, interpretation and implementation of force. 
 
                                                          
39 See page 180-181 
197 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 7.1: Use of Force Across all Three Phases: Kosovo         Figure 7.2: Use of Force across all Three Phases: Iraq 
 
 
             Figure 7.3: Use of Force Across all Three Phases: Libya  
 
In relation to the question of authorisation there is a widely held view that a Security Council 
mandate is required for the legal use of force against states in international relations. Where the use 
of force was authorised in Libya, there were very few claims that the Security Council’s 
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authorisation of the NFZ was illegal and the contestations in this case therefore focused on 
interpretation and implementation.  
The radars for the Iraqi and Kosovar cases demonstrate clear findings that the use of force without a 
Security Council mandate was illegal. Although the intervening states claimed legality and 
legitimacy for their actions, these frames were rejected. This suggests that while the lack of a 
mandate rendered both situations illegal, the divergence in the normative expectations stemming 
from the accepted narratives provide a better means of understanding the varying outcomes. 
Therefore, the difference between the Iraq case and the Kosovo case was the expectation that force, 
if authorised, would have been legal and legitimate.  
This leads to a more disparate contestation over the interpretation and implementation of these 
norms. The specific normative interpretation of each case was based on slightly different normative 
frameworks. As demonstrated previously, the Rwandan case was based in normative frameworks 
surrounding peacekeeping. Consequently, informed by the principles of consent, impartiality and 
minimal use of force, the Security Council initially reduced UNAMIR. As the narrative frame grew 
more serious, it adjusted these expectations, reversing this initial decision by expanding UNAMIR. 
But it was not until the situation was determined to be beyond the capacity of a Chapter VI mandate 
that it changed its interpretation of these normative frameworks and adopted a more interventionist 
stance. By this time, the situation was recognised as a genocide by the Secretary General and 
numerous states and there was an expectation that the Council should respond. Consequently, 
although some states opposed the authorisation of another mission, separate from UNAMIR and 
with a much stronger Chapter VII mandate, they were rhetorically excluded, unable to prevent the 
authorisation and deployment as they had already accepted the need for international action. The 
French proposal offered the only alternative in circumstances where the accepted interpretation of 
events and normative principles created an expectation that the Council should not only make a 
decision, but that the decision needed to be implemented immediately.  
On the other hand, the response to the Libyan situation was much faster and more decisive. This 
situation was interpreted through the norms of the protection of civilians agenda. As noted in 
Chapter six, the language of the protection of civilians was widely utilised by the Security Council 
members, more so than the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP). The adoption of a protection of 
civilians framework created an expectation that the international community would respond to an 
imminent threat of a mass atrocity. However the AU and LAS interpreted this authority differently. 
The AU states quickly withdrew their support for the NFZ, although their votes only days before 
had ensured the adoption of Resolution 1973. They argued the true “spirit” of the Resolution lay not 
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in the call to force, but in the support it provided for political processes, in particular the work of the 
AU’s High Level Panel. Similarly the LAS also withdrew support for the airstrikes, arguing the 
interveners overstepped the terms of the mandate. The LAS position was ultimately unclear as its 
call for the enforcement of a NFZ suggested it did not consider a NFZ “interventionist”.40 Both of 
these positions were therefore widely excluded as they did not fit clearly into the accepted 
protection of civilians frame.  
Therefore the Libyan normative contestation came to focus on two main contestations, embedded in 
this normative framework; first, did the NFZ in fact protect civilians, and secondly, was the 
protection of civilians mandate the primary goal of the interveners? Critics such as Russia argued 
the interveners overstepped the terms of the resolution, prioritising a regime change agenda over the 
protection of civilians. This points to very complex and difficult international humanitarian laws 
involving the legality and legitimacy of targeting indirect threats, such as a fighting force’s 
backlines or command quarters, and civilian infrastructure with military application, such as roads, 
bridges, media outlets and power grids. 41 There is also disagreement over the legitimacy of 
imposing no-drive zones through no-fly zones. Those who take a strict reading of the term argue 
enforcers of such mandates may only target aircraft actually flying in the exclusive zone. More 
moderate interpretations argue ground-based air force infrastructure such as bases, grounded 
aircraft, landing pads or air defence systems may be targeted. The third, much broader interpretation 
argues any military threat to civilians would be a legitimate threat, including tanks, troops and 
command posts. Therefore, although the authorisation of force was widely accepted, even trapping 
those states who were reluctant to authorise the NFZ, the interpretation and implementation of that 
mandate remained contested. 
A similar process occurred in Kosovo. Just as the audience recast much of the actor and narrative 
debate, the audience members recast this normative debate. Therefore, although the use of force 
was widely viewed as illegal, the question of legitimacy was more widely contested. However the 
Security Council also rejected the Russian-led attempt to condemn the intervention. Of course, the 
UK, US and France vetoed the draft condemning NATO’s use of force against Belgrade without 
Security Council authority, however the decision also demonstrated a resounding defeat with twelve 
votes against its adoption. Of these twelve votes, seven were not NATO members at the time. This 
demonstrated the rhetorical exclusion of the Russian position. Although only four members spoke, 
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they indicated that the draft resolution did not meet the expectations created by the narrative 
framing of the situation, which including ethnic cleansing, humanitarian crisis and a threat to 
international peace and security. They also viewed the negotiation process as legitimate, viewing 
the Kosovar response as legitimising and the Serbian response as delegitimising.  
Expectations were similarly developed in the Iraq case, however where in Kosovo these 
expectations meant the audience members would not condemn the use of force, in this case, the 
expectation created meant the situation did not warrant any use of force. The revivalist position 
offered by the intervening states argued the use of force provisions embedded in Resolutions 678 
(1990) and 687 (1991) were revived or reactivated by Iraq’s failure to comply with its disarmament 
obligations.42 This position was widely rejected, demonstrated by Figure 7.2. The general position 
of most audience members was that a second resolution was required to legally mandate the use of 
force in Iraq. Consequently, the use of force was widely viewed as illegal.  
However this contestation also points to the development of an expectation not to use force, which 
can be contrasted with the other cases examined here. Although most states argued the use of force 
was illegal because there was no second resolution, some also argued that if the Security Council 
had authorised force in March 2003, the authorisation, although legal would have been illegitimate. 
This is demonstrated by Figure 5.3.43 This points to an expectation identified in the narrative 
contestation that any use of force would be illegitimate as inspections remained viable. This can be 
contrasted with the expectations developed by the Kosovo narrative which created a viable 
expectation that force would be an acceptable response, however Security Council paralysis would 
prevent it. Consequently, the international community, in particular the Security Council, was 
rendered ineffective by these unilateral and illegal uses of force. In order to restore the Council’s 
authority the situation had to be recast in terms which established a frame based on a limited set of 
accepted positions. I have termed these processes humanitarian reframes.  
The final normative contestation involved the manner in which these cases were brought back 
within the purview of the Council’s authority. Humanitarian reframes provide audience members 
the means to draw a case back within the purview of the Security Council by recasting the terms of 
the contestation using undisputed frames based in humanitarianism. In three of the cases, Rwanda, 
Kosovo and Iraq, the Security Council struggled to maintain a position of authority as a decision-
maker as it was viewed as weak and therefore circumvented or ignored. Consequently, each of these 
cases was drawn back within the Council’s authority through the authorisation of humanitarian 
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assistance under UN auspices to alleviate the remaining humanitarian crises and to implement the 
terms of peace agreements. In the cases of Kosovo and Iraq, the Council did so while avoiding 
legitimising the use of force. Although it can be argued these exercises were merely trying to help 
the Council save-face following major failures, it remains that there is a view that the Council ought 
to save-face. Whilst it may seem that the intervening states forced the international community to 
accept their actions through rhetorical entrapment, this is not the case. By adopting a humanitarian 
reframe in these cases, the Council was able to accept the realities presented while addressing the 
immediate problem and redrawing the situation into the purview of the Council and accepted 
principles of international law. This is another unique and identifiable element of the legitimation 
process where the languages of legitimacy and legality are carefully utilised to adopt a response 
based on a bare minimum of shared expectations.  
7.5 Entrapment, Exclusion and Reframing 
The legitimation process therefore indicates the presence of a normatively driven process of 
contestation, embedded in the languages of legitimacy and legality. The legitimation process 
highlights the role audience members play in accepting, rejecting and recasting the frames offered 
by central actors. The contestations of central actors were not accepted in full, making the role of 
audience members, in particular audience reframers especially important to this process. 
Legitimised actors of any type, state or non-state, central or audience, were better able to reframe 
further areas of contestation.  
Legitimised actors therefore played a key role in casting the narratives told to the international 
community to make sense of the situation and the actors involved. These frames were accepted, 
rejected, reframed and recast to piece together an understanding of the situation on the ground. 
These narrative frames also formed legal facts which in turn created expectations that certain 
responses were or were not warranted. Consequently frames or actors may be rhetorically entrapped 
where certain expectations compel particular responses. This may be a deliberate act of entrapment, 
such as Russia’s recasting of the Kosovar actor contestation or the US’ attempt to compel the 
authorisation of force by providing evidence of Iraq’s illicit WMD programmes or the unintended 
consequence of an accepted frame, such as the entrapment of the abstaining states in relation to the 
authorisation of a NFZ over Libya.  
Realists would reject any normative element to entrapment, arguing these arguments are utilised by 
powerful actors to pursue logics of consequences. This, they would argue, makes entrapment a 
consequences of power games, not language ones. However I have also identified another 
microprocess, whereby frames which lie outside the accepted actor and narrative and were 
202 | P a g e  
 
incongruous to the expectations created by accepted frames are excluded. This points to a more 
complex and normatively driven process. This occurred when Russia, India and Belorussia drafted a 
resolution condemning NATO’s aggression in Kosovo. The condemnation failed to address the 
accepted frames that the situation constituted a humanitarian crisis and threat to international peace 
and security. The AU’s position on Libya, which was incongruous to the widespread delegitimation 
of the Qaddafi regime, was also incongruous to the accepted actor and narrative frame in that case, 
and was therefore excluded.  
This legitimation process can be identified across all four cases. Although the outcomes were 
different and some cases focused on certain areas of contestation more than others, there is a 
common process across all four cases; a process entrenched in the languages of legality and 
legitimacy. This dissertation has explored how these contestations unfolded. It has not established a 
precedent for intervention, nor identified the international community’s criteria for applying new 
principles such as the R2P, but it has traced these contestations through a legitimation process, 
demonstrating not only the presence of such a process in each case, but also highlighting the 
microprocesses that are crucial to the varying outcomes of these four cases.  
By extracting the individual actor, narrative and normative contestations across these four cases, I 
have been able to trace this process and identify common microprocesses. By focusing on the 
process of legitimation rather than trying to establish outcomes of legitimacy, this dissertation has 
identified a linguistic process entirely reliant on the related but separate languages of law and 
legitimacy. Tracing these processes has demonstrated that although these contestations are casuistic 
in nature they ought not be disregarded or dismissed as sophistry. Rather than diminishing the value 
of international law, norms and rules, this casuistic process highlights its role in international 
relations and demonstrates that in order to understand hard cases we cannot focus on establishing 
what is or is not legal or legitimate, but rather ought to focus on how these contestations are made. 
If we are to understand how international law functions in international relations, we need to stop 
trying to establish what it is, or what is or is not legal and develop ways to understand how it is used 
in this diverse, disparate and ultimately casuistic process of contestation. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion 
 
 
Contestations over legality and legitimacy in international politics are vital indicators of 
international law and norms at work, not their unenforceability or uncertainty. Traditional theories 
of law force us to choose between two unsatisfactory and often conflicting interpretations of 
international law which treat legitimacy and legality as static categories. This has led to a 
presumption that the casuistic nature of legal argument in international politics is indicative of 
sophistry, where states choose whichever interpretations justify their preferred outcome or offers a 
path of least resistance. I have rejected this assumption, using a non-pejorative definition of 
casuistry. Thus if casuistry is simply a process of reasoning, it may be good or bad; to better 
understand these legitimation processes, we need to understand how the international community 
makes this distinction.  
As exercises of casuistic reasoning, the conflicting interpretations of law and legitimacy offered by 
the four hard cases examined here have often been dismissed as sophistry or mere rhetoric, 
concealing the true and self-interested preferences of powerful states behind a façade of legalistic 
and moralistic language. However the preceding analysis has demonstrated this view is incomplete 
and ignores the deeper, more complex processes at play. I have argued we need to understand the 
nuances and connections between legitimacy and legality, while accepting the two are interlinked 
but not synonymous. However these hard cases demonstrated that whilst legitimacy and legality 
language use is ubiquitous in international relations the presence of one does not imply the presence 
of the other because legitimacy and legality are related but separate questions for contestation. 
Although central contesters case their arguments in terms that claim absolute legitimacy and 
legality for themselves, while completely delegitimising their opposition, the recasting of these 
contestations by audience members indicates the separation of these labels. State and non-state 
actors contest the legitimacy and legality of the parties to a conflict, their actions and omissions, and 
the interpretation, application and implementation of international norms in any individual situation 
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and is by my definition a process of casuistic argument. With legitimacy and legality understood as 
related but separate contestable concepts, these contestations rather than just their outcomes can be 
understood as significant processes within themselves. 
By focusing on the process of contestation rather than its outcomes, this dissertation was able to 
identify the individual contestations which occurred in each hard case. Although the outcomes of 
these cases were quite different and seemingly contradictory, this analysis has pointed to a common 
process of legitimation by contestation. In order to clarify this process, I identified three areas or 
clusters of contestation: the actor, narrative and normative contestations. Legitimacy may be 
attributed to any or all of these three broad categories. Therefore, although presented as three 
clusters of contestation, these frames fed into and supported each other.  
Actor contestations were further divided into two separate processes. The first involved the 
contestation between the central actors - those parties directly involved in the conflict itself - and 
the audience reframers, who although not directly involved in the conflict had a special interest or 
role in the situation which provided added agency. The first notable feature of the actor contestation 
emerged from the central actors’ processes. The central actors’ claims, although adversarial in 
nature, were not directed at each other. Although these actors compete with each to prove they are 
more legitimate than their opposition, their claims are directed at convincing an audience, not each 
other. Consequently, their claims are made in absolute terms where legitimacy and legality exist 
easily alongside each other. They claim they are both legal and legitimate actors and that their 
arguments should also be understood as such. However as these claims were presented in terms of 
absolute legitimacy and legality, the audience recast these contestations. Accepting some elements 
while rejecting or changing others, these audience members blurred the lines between legitimacy 
and legality leading to the creation of legitimacy gaps.  
This led to the second actor legitimation process, in which members of the audience with special 
proximity to the case were able to recast these contestations. These actors may be states, individual 
leaders or organisations. This particular process is not necessarily adversarial, although the roles of 
the General Secretariat’s Office in Rwanda and the AU in Libya indicate that some actors fail to 
recast contestations in terms which are acceptable to the international community while others, such 
as the LAS and OIC in Libya and UNMOVIC inspectors in Iraq gained strong legitimation and 
therefore significant levels of agency. The presence of this legitimation demonstrated that central 
actors cannot claim any path of least resistance. As the recast frames of audience reframers are 
more likely to be accepted by the audience, they feed into and set parameters for the consequences 
or expectations which emerge from the narrative and normative contestations.   
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The second cluster, the narrative contestation, established the facts of the situation which in turn led 
to findings of legal facts. Despite the differences in the details of each situation’s narrative, these 
stories aimed to build a factual basis to frame a situation as a threat to international peace and 
security and the use of force as a last resort. Therefore, they contested situational facts, such as the 
scale and nature of violence in a state or the presence of illicit weapons. Piecing together these facts 
led to the attribution of labels that the situations amounted to civil war, ethnic cleanings, genocide 
or a mass atrocity. As there is no court or meditating body to find legal facts in international 
relations, this task falls to the actors themselves. When actors recognise a legal fact, they move 
from telling a story of events to applying a label which creates expectations for what may or may 
not follow. Although the individual context of each case differed, leading to four different 
narratives, all four contested two common facts. Firstly, that the situation constituted a threat to 
international peace and security, and secondly that attempts to reach a peaceful solution were 
exhausted. Although neither finding was a trigger for the use of force on its own, the legitimation 
process demonstrates that establishing both these facts created normative expectations as to what 
responses may or may not follow.  
Finally, the normative contestation took the frames established by the actor and narrative 
contestations and applied them to accepted understandings and interpretations of international 
norms. This contestation demonstrated that in many cases, there was wide consensus on the 
interpretation and application of international norms; questions of legitimacy, however, were far 
from resolved. Although this may seem like a failure of the international normative system, I would 
argue it indicates a significant and influential process of contestation.  Therefore, although these 
four cases did not share common outcomes, they did share a common process. These different 
outcomes do not point to the indeterminability, unenforceability, uncertainty or weakness of 
international law because the legitimation process shows the languages of legality and legitimacy 
are not only ubiquitous, but capable of influencing the decision of states and institutions.  
This legitimation process indicated the roles played by microprocesses such as rhetorical 
entrapment or rhetorical exclusion. Rhetorical entrapment occurs when actors, having already 
accepted certain frames and legal facts are compelled to accept the legality or legitimacy of a 
decision or response. Whilst they may not support or endorse the decision, they are unable to 
prevent or oppose a response, as doing so would break the expectations created by the actor, 
narrative or normative frames they have already accepted. Such entrapment may be intentional, 
where actors deliberately attempt to manipulate a contestation to compel their preferred decision, 
but it can also be unintentional, resulting from the accepted expectations of the narrative or actor 
frames. Rhetorical exclusion on the other hand occurs when an actor, narrative or normative claim 
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is incongruous to the expectations created by the accepted frames. Consequently, further frames or 
recommendations are excluded as they do not fall within the parameters of the accepted 
contestation.  
The rules of using force are therefore not inadequate, indeterminate or uncertain, although their 
interpretation and application will vary from case to case. This does make international contestation 
a casuistic process but casuistry should not be equated to sophistry or dishonesty. Certainly 
individual state interests influenced individual contestations, however the presence of a common 
process of legitimation across all four cases demonstrated that states can be compelled to accept 
approaches not aligned with these interests where certain frames are accepted, preventing them 
from reasonably justifying a different course of action. Hence, whilst these microprocesses may be 
wielded to intentionally entrap or exclude actors into accepting particular responses or decisions, 
they may fail or may be the unintended consequence of accepting particular frames and facts.  
Since any situation involving the use of force will engage these varied and seemingly conflicting 
areas of law, this process could be traced in any cases where intervention has been undertaken, or 
deliberately excluded as a response. Therefore comparing cases involving other central actors such 
as Russia’s involvement in Ukraine and Georgia may develop an understanding of the nuances 
involving a different intervening actors. Alternatively tracing legitimation processes underpinning 
crises in Darfur or Syria could offer a better understanding of situations where the international 
community has not used force. There has been some criticism that these crises did not elicit an 
international forceful response for political reasons, many pointing to relationships and interests 
with permanent Security Council members. Applying this framework to a broader array of cases 
such as these would offer further understandings of how the legitimation process operates in 
relation to questions of force with different central actors.   
This process could also be traced in other hard cases where the languages of legality and legitimacy 
are used. I believe this would be particularly important in cases where domestic audiences play a 
larger role in determining legitimation processes. Although domestic audiences were important in 
each of these cases, especially where democratic intervening states were held accountable to their 
own constituencies for the costs of their decisions, the legitimacy process examined here focused on 
the international audience responses, in particular the Security Council. Therefore not only could 
the legitimation process examine the differences between internationally and domestically directed 
contestations, but also possible differences between domestic and international legitimation 
processes. This understanding of the legitimation process could offer a clearer view of how legal 
argument influences and is influenced by this disjuncture between domestic and international law. 
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Contestants on both sides fall into the same trap which caused the legitimacy gaps in these 
intervention cases, where legal argument becomes polarised between positivist and naturalist 
understandings of international law in which neither argument can satisfactorily resolve situation as 
neither offers an effective theoretical account of international law and legitimacy. Therefore 
focusing on the legitimation process underpinning this contestation could be more valuable than 
simply engaging the outcomes. 
The legitimation process could also be valuable in understanding the contestation in the other hard 
cases identified in Figure 1.1.1 The continued non-recognition of entities such as Taiwan, Palestine, 
Somaliland or Northern Cyprus could offer insight into the development and operation of agency 
and legal personality in an international order based on the assumptions and privileges of statehood. 
The undefined role of unrecognised entities leads many to question the legitimacy of the laws of 
statehood, however despite this gap in the laws of recognition, unrecognised entities have come to 
function, effectively, even well in some cases, developing viable governments, militaries, 
economies and national identities. The actor contestation would be the most significant area of 
contestation in these cases, where the unrecognised state has often been cast as a secessionist or 
terrorist group and the legitimation of political representatives for such groups has been a major 
source of contestation. As with the hard cases of the use of force, unrecognised entities fall into 
legitimacy gaps where their legitimacy as a domestic authority is incongruous to their legal 
standing. Conversely authoritarian states may have international recognition, bestowing legal 
personhood under international law, but struggle to retain domestic or in some cases, international 
legitimacy as their actions are incongruous to behaviour expected of legitimate authority.  
All these possibilities for using the legitimation process point to an understanding of law as more 
than the application of accepted and determinate rules and norms to any particular situation. The 
legal order is a complex system of interweaving regimes and situational differences. Therefore, 
hardening the rules of intervention will not provide further clarification as each case will still need 
to be contested against these rules. The preceding analysis has demonstrated that, even where 
certain laws are widely accepted, these individual cases contest the interpretation, application and 
implementation of those laws. This points to a continuing process of contestation. Therefore if we 
are to properly understand how international law and international politics interact, we need to stop 
simply trying to establish what is or is not legal and develop ways of understanding the role of these 
casuistic processes and the uses of legal and legitimacy language.  
                                                          
1 See page 9. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table 1: Kosovo Actor Discourse Distribution 
Phase   FRY NATO 
Kosovar 
Opposition 
1 
Legitimate 1 2 3 
Legal 1 1 1 
Illegitimate 5 3 2 
Illegal 4 3 0 
2 
Legitimate 1 14 15 
Legal 1 5 1 
Illegitimate 30 19 3 
Illegal 18 14 0 
3 
Legitimate 1 2 3 
Legal 1 1 1 
Illegitimate 5 3 2 
Illegal 4 3 0 
 
Table 2: Iraq Actor Discourse Distribution 
Phase   USA/ Coalition Iraq/Hussein  
Regime 
1 Legitimate 30 61 
Legal 4 14 
Illegitimate 21 82 
Illegal 7 42 
2 Legitimacy 1 5 
Legality 1 1 
Illegitimacy 28 22 
Illegality 10 15 
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Table 3: Libya Actor Discourse Distribution 
Phase   
Protesters/ 
Opposition/ 
TNC 
Qaddafi  
Regime 
NATO/   
Interveners 
1 
Legitimate 28 1 0 
Legal 3 0 0 
Illegitimate 0 36 0 
Illegal 0 12 0 
2 
Legitimate 35 3 4 
Legal 25 0 3 
Illegitimate 0 32 2 
Illegal 0 24 2 
3 
Legitimate 81 21 0 
Legal 22 12 0 
Illegitimate 8 10 21 
Illegal 7 7 18 
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Appendix 2 
 
Table 4: Kosovo Use of Force Discourse Distribution 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Total 
Legitimate 3 18 10 31 
Legal 1 8 5 14 
Illegitimate 4 20 3 27 
Illegal 4 20 4 28 
 
 
Table 5: Iraq Use of Force Discourse Distribution 
 Phase 1 
Phase 2 
Column1 
Total 
Column2   
 Unilateral 
Force 
 UN 
Force 
Legitimacy 7 38 11 56 
Legality 3 36 5 44 
Illegitimacy 90 91 35 216 
Illegality 29 8 18 55 
 
 
Table 6: Libya Use of Force Discourse Distribution 
 Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Total 
Legitimate 6 13 10 29 
Legal 5 7 9 21 
Illegitimate 3 11 3 17 
Illegal 0 0 4 4 
 
 
 
 
